Madam Deputy Speaker, hon members, the former Speaker, the hon Dr Frene Ginwala, commissioned consultants a while ago to produce a document detailing the challenges that faced our Parliament in relation to its oversight role.
The Report was produced in 1999, and was subsequently referred to the Joint Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Oversight and Accountability, which I co-chaired with the most wonderful hon Ms Constance Nkuna.
There are members of this House who will remember this committee with the long name. The people who were quite instrumental were hon Mr John Jeffrey, Ms Dene Smuts, Mr Enver Surty, who was Chief Whip of the NCOP at the time, Mr Farouk Cassim and Lawrence Lever, former members of this House and the NCOP. We were capably assisted by Mr Kasper Hahndiek.
During our deliberations on our oversight role, we discovered two truths. The first one was that our Parliament is quite unique in its mandate and in its make-up. The second was that the expertise concerning this Parliament and the different aspects of our Constitution lies firmly here in Parliament amongst members themselves, many of whom have helped to fashion our Constitution.
The ad hoc committee presented a set of eight recommendations. It also went a step further and produced an implementation plan which was adopted by the Joint Rules Committee in 2003.
During the time that we worked with the subject we learned that oversight was definitely linked to the primary function of Parliament as the highest law-making authority. As such, Parliament has a vested interest in the implementation of the laws passed. But through oversight we as parliamentarians gain a unique insight into the capabilities of the bureaucracy.
Oversight, therefore, also allows law-makers to adapt laws to the capacity of the bureaucracy at different stages of its development. While not suggesting for a moment that bureaucracies shouldn't be challenged to transgress their limitations, it is also true that many well-meaning laws have gathered dust on proverbial shelves for the lack of implementing capacity.
While we strive to push the boundaries, we dare not set the bar so high that implementation is beyond the capability of a bureaucracy in transition, whether it is in the police service, social welfare, hospitals or schools - I see, hon Sybil Seaton, you were also part of that committee - yet as lawmakers our task should always be to ensure a constant striving to fuller attainment.
During my time as co-chair of that committee I had an opportunity to visit the House of Commons. This august House, upon which, by the way, many of our previous parliaments were based, has one of the finest reputations in the world. But it hardly, if ever, amends legislation tabled by the executive in the manner we do.
Their oversight over the executive is often very closely connected to the intrigues of persons in positions and personal lives. And there is a very close relationship between British MPs and the British media. However, the party whip still features quite strongly in that constituency basis, a system which has evolved over hundreds of years. It works for that society, but in a society such as ours that is in transition, where implementation and delivery are a challenge, this parliament's strength, I believe, is in the winning of small things. Small things like the delivery for the first time of water to small towns in far- off places; the issuing of an ID to an old lady who has never before been documented so that she can for the first time access her old age pension; the passing of uniform and appropriate sentences in the case of serious crimes, such as murder and rape - these are all small things won through oversight work.
These things happen every day because we as the representatives of the people concern ourselves with these issues. We could reprioritise our values and our discourses and deal with things in a different way, and we could become very popular and become household names ourselves. But I think we don't because when it comes down to it, to a person in this house, I would say with conviction that we hold high ambitions for this country and its people.
To strike a comparison, following the attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, the world's media and politicians focused almost exclusively on terrorism, rendition military spending and war.
In his book, A Short History of Progress, Ronald Wright says:
First, terrorism is a small threat compared with hunger, disease, or climate change. Three thousand died in the United States that day; 25,000 die every day in the world from contaminated water alone. Each year, 20 million children are mentally impaired by malnourishment. Each year, an area of farmland greater than Scotland is lost to erosion and urban sprawl.
This Parliament has firmly understood through its oversight discourse over the past 15 years that much of the world's ills are bred from injustice, inequality and poverty. I have heard these and other messages constantly in various portfolio committees from various members from Health to Foreign Affairs.
This, I submit, is a worthwhile discourse for a worthwhile parliament. It may be stale news to some, but it is not about popularity; it is about our future, the future of our children, the future of our country, and indeed about the very survival of the human race on this planet.
There are many other issues that we will have to grapple with over time, given our vested interest in the efficient functioning of our courts. For instance, how do we hold the judiciary accountable without impinging on their impartiality? How do we hold organs of state, as defined by the Constitutional Court, accountable, given the definition of portfolio committees and their structures?
I believe that these issues that we have been in constant discussions about are worthwhile and as long as we are on a worthwhile course, I submit, we are on course.
The model that is being tabled today for adoption is a culmination of our collective efforts and in truth marks the beginning of a new chapter of this young institution which, on the eve of a new Parliament, it is apt to note, many of us have had a hand in crafting. Those who come after us will hopefully build on the foundations we have laid today to allow this body to take its rightful place amongst the foremost legislatures of the world. [Applause.]
Madam Deputy Speaker, the DA essentially supports the document tabled as we see it as a useful framework going forward.
This document is based on current practice, and our own experience indicates that there are various problems such as constraints with regard to the implementation. One of the critical constraints that exists is an attitudinal one because one can produce any theoretical model one likes, but if the attitudes of the members of this House and the executive are not in tune with the model, then I'm afraid one is wasting one's time.
So it is this relationship between the members and the executive that I initially want to focus on. Section 42(3) of the Constitution clearly gives this House the right to exercise oversight over the executive; and Section 55(2) requires this House to actually bring government to account where there are problems. Yet, what is our experience?
I'm reminded of the electricity crisis that we went through early last year. Our desire on this side of the House was to bring the then Minister of Public Enterprises, hon Alec Erwin, to account or rather be fired, because he did not exercise due diligence in his portfolio.
Now Section 92(2) of the Constitution specifically says that members of the executive are collectively and individually accountable for the exercising of their powers and performance of their functions. Yet the ANC and the Cabinet hid behind the whole concept of collective responsibility, contrary to what is in the Constitution.
So the nub of the issue is this: Unless members and the executive take on board exactly what is in this model, are prepared and have the courage to actually implement the model, then I'm afraid the model is useless. We have to exercise that oversight and demand accountability irrespective of what party bosses say - and have the courage to do so - because the attitude of the members, and not the model, will define the credibility of this institution. This brings me to the attitude of some of the Ministers of this House. All too often they treat the House at best as an irritant, at worst as an institution for which they have extreme disdain, bordering on contempt.
Why do I say this? Take questions, for example. They are a critical part of exercising oversight and demanding accountability. What is our experience? First of all, let me just say that in respect of written questions last year, 1 757 questions were tabled. The ruling party tabled 12 questions - 0,68% of all the questions. The DA tabled 1 512, which is almost 86%. But that is by the by.
More importantly, what is the record in respect of answers? Now, it is the Rule of this House that Ministers have to answer within 10 days. Our experience, first of all, is that very often there are no responses at all. As at the end of 2008, 56 questions had not been responded to. In October last year, there were over 280 questions that had not been answered, some of them stretching back to as early as February 2008 - late replies. In fact, the vast majority of replies ignore that Rule which is in the model.
So it is the attitude of Ministers that is pivotal as far as this is concerned. And very often when the replies come, they are fudged replies. In law we call it "vague and embarrassing", and indeed the replies are very often vague and embarrassing.
So, what is the solution? The solution is, as we see in Gauteng and the Eastern Cape, that if a Minister is unable to reply in time, he has to give an explanation in writing. If he does not give an explanation, must appear on the next oral day, table a response and give an explanation as to why that response was not in time. It's done in other legislatures, and there is no reason why it cannot be done in this legislature.
Now, what about oral questions? Regarding oral questions, we know that Ministers come here, but very often they are not present. The nadir was in October 2007 when, in the social clusters, 11 Ministers were required to appear, only four of whom did. Clearly, that can neither be an exercise of oversight nor the accountability demanded in those circumstances.
Very often Ministers do not appear and the Deputy Ministers are required to actually respond, and very often they have not been properly briefed. So, in respect of follow-up questions, quite clearly it is a waste of time; and very often not even the Deputy Minister is here and the response is given to a Minister in that cluster. Well, I get more response from my puppy dog, which at least wags its tail. So, we need to do what we do as far ... [Time expired.]
Chairperson, hon members, there is no doubt whatsoever that the oversight and accountability model is both necessary and well overdue. The committees, task teams and consultants of Parliament worked extensively for some years to develop this model. They really did their research and to a large extent have developed a good and comprehensive model.
I do, however, believe that there needs to be some tweaking. It is important that it becomes fully functional. Considering that the Joint Rules Committee adopted the model as far back as March 2008 and that 11 months later we now are only debating this issue, it raises some very serious concerns, specifically about the administration of this Parliament.
We can have, as Mr Davidson has said, all the good intentions in the world, but if we do not act on our decisions, as has so often been the case in this Parliament over the years, then we might just as well not make decisions at all; we might as well function as an entity that is not in fact Parliament.
The chairperson of the committee is very correct in saying that this is a unique Parliament - all too often we take decisions we do not follow through on! We have over the years lost many good opportunities to improve our lot as Parliament, and the lot of our electorate.
We put in place the Parliamentary Oversight Authority, POA, which rarely meets. We have a Joint Rules Committee that seldom meets; and when it does, it takes decisions that get nowhere, apropos what I said earlier on about this report that we are debating only today, 11 months later.
Our committees, portfolio committees and ad hoc committees meet, make decisions, resolve to get things happening. And what happens? By the time these resolutions and decisions get to Parliament, circumstances have overtaken them, and we're back to square one.
An example of this is the Private Members' proposal on the remuneration for public office bearers. What happens, of course, is that other processes have overtaken them, and nothing can be done.
As Parliament, we also need to ensure that the laws we make are constitutional, that they can, in fact, be enforced and that the departments concerned have the will and the resources to carry out our decisions. As Parliament, we do not hold the executive accountable as we should and the executive certainly does not always accept that it is the role of Parliament to hold them accountable.
Many of our executive members are arrogant and refuse to report to Parliament as requested. I cite the example of the Minister of Correctional Services, who refused to report to Parliament on a very serious issue relating to problems in that department.
He pushed out a man in charge of that department who was doing an outstanding job of exposing corruption and refused to say anything to Parliament or to our committee about it, notwithstanding our concerns.
The ruling party has become arrogant, making unilateral decisions without consulting opposition parties. For example, the recent axing of President Mbeki was such arrogance. Parliament, in terms of our Rules, our Constitution and our oversight and accountability model, elects the President, and it should have been Parliament that took the decision as to whether or not to axe the President.
We provided the oversight and the accountability model. Now we have to put in place the processes, the resources and the will to carry on with our responsibilities.
Chairperson, the Oversight and Accountability Task Team was established to review the need for a co-ordinated approach to Parliament's oversight function and to develop a relevant model for Parliament.
The proposed model aims to enhance Parliament's oversight capacity and bring current practices in line with Parliament's strategic plan. Two critical factors for ensuring the success of the model are the need to integrate Parliament's public participation function within its overall oversight mechanism and the provision of appropriate capacity, especially human resources, to committees and members.
At some point, Parliament should also consider the development of further legislation relating to oversight, which will include committees that are currently regulated by the Rules, as is the case with the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence.
The ACDP commends all those who have been involved in this process and supports efforts to ensure that Parliament is relevant, efficient and effective. Thank you.
Chairperson, many critics are saying our Parliament's oversight function is not robust, assertive or pointed at the executive, and this renders Parliament weak. We, as the Oversight Task Team members, spent time in our research to understand what oversight is and also to engage with this notion and the criticisms levelled against Parliament.
In Chapter 2 of the Oversight Model itself, we tried to give some kind of a definition, as was agreed in the task team. There is one view that says the conventional Westminster view on oversight, as inherited by many former British colonies, is often rather adversarial, and in some instances oversight is professed to be the purview of the opposition politicians and not the legislature as an institution. I think that is one of the criticisms that are guiding this very agreement on this classical narrow definition of what oversight ought to be.
Instead, we are living in a modernised society. Obviously, the Constitution of South Africa has given some kind of requirement and a mandate to Parliament also, as an institution, to then assert itself insofar as oversight is concerned.
The oversight emphasis and argument should always be placed on the oversight rule of legislatures, especially as it relates to ensuring government's compliance with approved public spending. As alluded to by other speakers, section 55(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that the National Assembly must provide mechanisms. Unfortunately, unlike other chapters of the Constitution, the oversight mechanisms were not provided for, such as in sections 74, 75 or 76, in terms of how Bills need to be processed in Parliament.
So the National Assembly was, therefore, requested to begin bringing up these particular mechanisms. Firstly, those mechanisms are to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to Parliament; secondly, to maintain oversight over the exercise of the national executive authority, including the implementation of the legislation and any organ of state. The question is: Why did it take Parliament so many years to come up with such mechanisms? The response is that Parliament does have mechanisms; it is not as if Parliament did not have any form of mechanisms in existence, instituted by it.
It has over a period refined mechanisms such as questions to the President, the Deputy President and the Ministers, as well as members' statements and the new innovation, which was developed in the last few years around the issue of members' statements, which is a prompt mechanism that allows Ministers without any warning to respond or reply to such members' statements.
So those mechanisms have always been there, and also committees themselves have been created to ensure, therefore, that they make the government more accountable and oversee its implementation of the programme.
Maybe the debate should be about the value and quality of questions, members' statements and motions that are being debated generally in this House, and whether they are beginning to assist this institution to effect accountability, ensuring that indeed there is oversight over the executive authority and that it is implementing the constitutional mandate as the preamble states.
For example, the preamble deals with laying the foundation for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law. The other point it makes is about improving the quality of life of all citizens, freeing the potential of each person and also building a united and a democratic South Africa, which is able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations, etc. These quality values are being presented in Parliament to ensure that indeed they assist us in achieving all of these things. Those are the issues we ought to be looking at.
Parliament, as it maximises and brings into place new mechanisms, should also deal or engage with robustness and assertiveness and become a people's Parliament as its vision and mission describe. It must also be balanced to be a people's voice and ensure that the respective public representatives and parties that are elected to Parliament also begin to play that particular role.
In responding to the question of what oversight is, the model defines it as follows: Oversight entails the informal and the formal; it has a surprise element; the strategic and structural scrutiny exercised by the legislature in respect of the implementation of laws; the application of the budget and the strict observance of the statutes and the Constitution.
In addition, most importantly, it entails overseeing the effective management of government departments, hence we have portfolio and select committees to do that in respect of individual members of the Cabinet in pursuit of improved service delivery for the achievement of a better life for its citizens.
In terms of the constitutional provisions of the Constitution and the Joint Rules, Parliament has powers to conduct oversight over all organs. The organs are all these agencies or public entities that are publicly funded or partly funded, and we have 700 such bodies at national, provincial and local government levels. We then need to begin looking at mechanisms of overseeing these agencies and whether they are indeed implementing and delivering on their mandate.
The model goes further to describe oversight functions, which aspects include political, administrative, financial and ethical accountability, and legal and strategic elements. Some of the functions are to detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of government and public entities; to hold government accountable in respect of how taxpayers' monies are used; to detect waste within the machinery of government and public agencies; and to ensure that policies and programmes announced by government and authorised by Parliament are actually delivered. This function includes monitoring the achievements of goals set by the legislation and government programmes. Lastly, it is intended to improve the transparency of government operations and enhance public trust in the government, which in itself is a condition of effective policy delivery.
The model suggests new mechanisms, amongst other things: The first is the passing of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Bill, which is currently scheduled for passing by both Houses. It will give Parliament impetus and power regarding the procedures of amending Bills, should the need arise.
Secondly, Parliament has also been given a mandate here to amend the Act establishing the Reserve Bank without compromising its independence, although it must account to Parliament, as is the case in other developed nations, like the USA.
Thirdly, it suggests a Government Assurance Committee, the role of which is to monitor and hold the executive accountable on all matters, promises, undertakings and assurances raised on the floor of Parliament during debates or replies or responses to questions.
Fourthly, the model outlines mechanisms to oversee the compliance of government with all treaties, conventions and protocols and to scrutinise the particular reports that go to those agencies.
The fifth mechanism is the establishment of a centre in Parliament, with skilled people to monitor, track and advise committees on oversight work done, outstanding issues to be followed and co-ordination with provinces and other spheres of government to avoid duplication.
The sixth mechanism concerns amendmending the rules to be flexible on the joint reporting of committees.
The seventh concerns the establishment, in the Speaker's Office, of an office that would monitor Chapter 9 institutions. The eighth recommendation outlines creating space for MPs to report on their own constituencies' work so that individual members can stand up in Parliament and present reports so that those reports are considered and processed through parliament, and lastly, to introduce sanctioning in case of noncompliance by the executive.
Should all protocol mechanisms be exhausted, and if they do not comply, we need then to call for their sanction if that need arises.
Therefore, that is the model that we are adopting and we are calling upon the National Assembly to adopt this principle and recommendations so that the forthcoming Parliament can then begin to look at the Rules and effect these changes. I thank you. [Applause.]
Chairperson, the MF strives to uphold the national Constitution that carries the purported values and dignity of the South African people. Parliament has been empowered by this Constitution of the people and it is our prerogative to undertake our duties in the most suitable manner that the Constitution instructs us to do.
One of our many functions is that we are to hold the executive accountable by regular oversight visits. I am pleased at the introduction of this oversight model that clearly heightens Parliament's oversight function and allows us to fulfil our duties within a democratic environment.
The MF further feels that it is crucial that in all these visits, representation by all the parties concerned need to be made, especially in the view of the constituency concerned.
We need to remain accountable and answerable to the people at all times. The MF feels that the model ensures this. The MF supports the oversight and accountability model. Thank you.
Chairperson and hon members, many of my colleagues have spoken extensively and eloquently about the history and the detail of the oversight model that we are discussing here today, so I won't repeat that.
I want to focus very briefly on the special and very important role that parliamentary committees play in the oversight model. Parliamentary committees are one of the most important mechanisms to facilitate accountability and conduct oversight over the executive.
We have seen over the past years a paradigm shift from committees focusing on legislation to oversight. This new oversight model will bring with it an enormous shift. Previously committees relied on the executive for information; now they will have their own resource personnel, and it is very crucial to develop Parliament's capacity to undertake this performance of its oversight and to fulfil its mandate of holding the executive accountable.
In terms of the new model, parliamentary committees will be expected to develop oversight programmes that are informed by 5-year overarching strategic goals that are in alignment with the vision of Parliament of building an effective People's Parliament. In doing so, parliamentary committees will move from a narrow focus on monitoring the performances of individual departments to a more expansive oversight role of realising the ideal of a better life for all the people.
The new oversight model constitutes a strategic paradigm shift because it is based on the premise that the oversight function of parliamentary committees is knowledge-intensive and that parliamentarians have to deal with a massive amount of information that needs to be processed into useful knowledge in order to carry out their oversight function effectively.
The success or failure of this model is going to depend to a large extent on the support that is given to parliamentary committees. That support entails administrative support, research support, adequate budgets, legal and procedural support, mechanisms to ensure executive co-operation and, last but not least, the capacitation of members.
On 22 April, we, the people of South Africa, will go to the polls to elect our representatives. It is these representatives who will constitute the fourth Parliament that will be responsible for implementing this oversight model. What is it that this oversight model will have to focus on?
The ANC approaches these elections with a manifesto that recognises clearly that we have made tremendous progress towards the creation of a better life for all over the past 15 years. At the same time, the ANC acknowledges that there is much to be done and that there are many challenges that need to be dealt with.
The ANC manifesto represents a set of workable ideals and plans to deal with these challenges. The ANC has identified five key priority areas for the next five years: firstly, the creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods; secondly, education; thirdly, health; fourthly, rural development, food security and land reform; and fifthly, the fight against crime and corruption.
As the ANC, we will tackle these priorities with all the means at our disposal - the resources of government, the vision of the Freedom Charter and the energy and commitment of our people. These priorities set by the ANC, based on extensive consultation and dialogue with our people, will specifically target the needs of the youth, women, workers, the rural poor, the elderly and people with disabilities.
The ANC will build on the economic achievements of the past 15 years. The ANC will use various measures to build and accelerate the sustainable, equitable and inclusive economic growth path to address these five priorities. Our economic and social programmes will work together to ensure that they support each other.
The ANC believes that the developmental state must play a central and strategic role in the economy. The ANC will ensure a more effective government and improve the co-ordination and planning efforts of the developmental state by means of a planning entity to ensure faster change.
A review of the structure of government will be undertaken to ensure effective service delivery. The ANC is committed to ensuring that we develop a service-delivery culture that will put every elected official and public servant to work for the people and ensure accountability to the people. We will continue to develop social partnerships and work with every citizen. The ANC will manage our economy in a manner that ensures that South Africa continues to grow and that all our people benefit from that growth, and that we create decent work for the unemployed, workers, young people, women and the rural poor. The ANC will remain in touch with the people and listen to their needs. We respect the rule of law and we will defend the Constitution and uphold our multiparty democracy.
We have achieved much in the last 15 years, but we are aware of how much more needs to be done. The fourth Parliament will have to ensure that it implements this oversight model so that it can exercise effective oversight to ensure that the ANC manifesto is implemented. Working together, we can do more!
The ANC supports the adoption of the Second Report of the Joint Rules Committee on the Oversight and Accountability Model. Thank you. [Applause.]
Debate concluded.
Chairperson, I move:
That the Report be adopted.
Motion agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.