Chairperson, hon Minister, hon Deputy Minister, hon members, especially members of the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs, the environmental sector family, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the portfolio committee I extend to all of you a warm welcome to this annual debate on the Budget Vote of the Department of Environmental Affairs. I rise on this occasion on behalf of the ANC, and hopefully the portfolio committee, in unconditional support of this Budget Vote allocation to the department.
It would be remiss of me as chairperson not to start this debate by thanking all members of the Portfolio Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs for the integrity, humanity, diligence and intellectual vigour and honesty with which they participate in the activities of the committee, with a special acknowledgement to the leaders of the various parties on the committee for their constructive engagement and support. I owe all a debt of gratitude. Thank you.
Hon Minister, as I said in the same debate last year, the department is mainly a policy-formulating department on matters environmental and, therefore, is comparatively small and well functioning. The department's finances and financial management systems are in good health. For years now, the annual financial statements have been unqualified, with problem areas being insignificant and easily dealt with. Therefore, there is little to be gained by debating and belabouring the obvious.
Without hesitation, I repeat and support this prognosis for this year. The portfolio committee's comments on this year's Budget Vote are contained in its report tabled in last Thursday's Announcements, Tablings and Committee Reports. One or two new issues contained in the report require brief comment in this debate.
Firstly, the issue of waste and sanitation management has always been a worrying concern in our country, one we have arguably not come to grips with in any meaningful manner. The portfolio committee is of the view that the decision to transfer the sanitation function to the Department of Human Settlements has had many unintended consequences, especially as that department, at the time, seemingly had no legal regime or any capacity in place to perform this function. In our view, even now, a few years later, there seems to be much confusion as to what the mandates of the different departments are in relation to sanitation and waste. In fact, in our meeting the other day it was fascinating to see that not even Treasury knew where things lie. Last year's budget of R1,2 billion for rural sanitation remains unspent; the achievement of our Millennium Development Goals in the water sector seems, on available evidence, to have been seriously compromised; and it appears to the portfolio committee that overall our infrastructure and service delivery in this sector has deteriorated substantially. The portfolio committee urges an urgent and very thorough review of government's waste and sanitation policy.
Due to time constraints, I'm going to skip two issues. For the portfolio committee and the environmental sector family, the year 2011 will always be remembered as the year of climate change. This was the year when, firstly, a six-year-long policy-formulating process relating to all aspects of our response to climate change culminated in a Green and then a White Paper on Climate Change being adopted by Cabinet and then processed through Parliament, all in one year.
Secondly, South Africa not only successfully hosted the international climate change negotiations in the form of the COP 17 gathering but, more importantly, in contrast to the expectations of many, managed the COP 17 gathering in such a manner as to achieve a highly successful and historical outcome; one that is creating a new political international environment that potentially contains fewer of the challenges bedevilling negotiations than prior to Durban, thereby opening up new opportunities for future international negotiations on climate change.
I will start with the adoption of the White Paper on climate change. As we are all aware, South Africa has entered into and played a meaningful role in the arena of international negotiations on climate change since August 1997, when we ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UNFCCC, and did so again after we voluntarily acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in July 2002. Furthermore, in December 2009, at the COP 15 gathering, President Zuma for the first time ever publically committed South Africa to the implementation of mitigation actions that would collectively result in a 34% and a 42% deviation, below its "business as usual" emissions growth trajectory, by 2020 and 2025 respectively.
The South African government captured a policy framework in which to meet its international and national responsibilities and commitments relating to climate change in the National Climate Change Response Policy, which was approved by Cabinet late last year, in October, in the form of a White Paper. The White Paper represents the culmination of an iterative and participatory six-year-long policy development process that involved ground- breaking modelling and research activities; two national conferences; numerous workshops and conferences in every province; a myriad bilateral and key stakeholder engagements; a National Economic Development and Labour Council review; and parliamentary hearings on the Green and White Papers.
In November 2011, within days of the policy's being approved by Cabinet, the portfolio committee concluded public hearings on the policy framework in the White Paper and its implementation challenges. I'll touch briefly on the portfolio committee's assessment and analysis of this White Paper.
Firstly, we are of the opinion that there seemingly exists broad consensus in our society on the principles underpinning the Climate Change Policy Framework.
Secondly, we are of the opinion that in the main the White Paper consists more of an overarching policy framework for all the policies of each department on which climate change impacts, rather than detailed policies for each department. It was noted that our department would be the point department for the overall policy framework, but the policies of each department relating to our response to climate change remained the responsibility and mandate of each department, within the overall policy framework.
Thirdly, we think the policy framework is a balanced and rational but also radical, progressive, all-encompassing, innovative, integrated and transformative response to the challenges of climate change, underpinned by progressive and integrated developmental and sustainability goals, especially for a mid-range emerging economy in a developing country like South Africa.
Fourthly, we think that for the first time in our history South Africa has adopted a detailed policy framework on carbon pricing, carbon budgets, and financial instruments targeted at reducing the creation of carbon by our business community. These are like a carbon tax, with specific targets and mechanisms being identified and adopted for achieving a low carbon economy. This response potentially places our country among the leading nations of the world that are responding boldly and decisively to the challenges of climate change. Thus, this policy framework has the potential of leading our highly fossil-fuel-driven economy in to being a low-carbon and climate- resilient economy within a reasonable and achievable period of time. But this is also conditional on our moving into the future with circumspection and caution, as decisions made in haste and without the necessary prudence can potentially cause us irreparable economic damage.
Fifthly, the portfolio committee also identified various challenges in the policy framework that may require further attention. I'll mention a few: Consideration should be given to the drafting of climate-change legislation as soon as is feasible for processing and adoption in Parliament; the policy framework is mainly silent on all aspects of the financing of our response to climate change, especially in respect of the objectives, funding and accessing of the various green funds created or which are intended to be created in future, both internationally and nationally, such as our national Green Fund; the magnitude and vastness of the policy framework requires that consideration be given to a sequencing of activities in order of priority; consideration should be given by the National Treasury to the compilation of an annual climate change budget at the time of the adoption of the annual budget, which would reflect all monies to be spent by the fiscus on our response to climate change; and consideration should be given to the establishment of climate change champions or focus persons in the provincial and local sphere of government to ensure a more integrated and co-ordinated response by the different spheres of government in achieving the goals of the policy framework.
Sixthly, the portfolio committee regards the adoption of the White Paper as only the beginning and not the end of our nation's response to climate change. Therefore, in future Parliament will, through its various committees on, for example, the environment, mining and energy have to look at and have oversight over the implementation of this policy. In this regard, consideration will have to be given to mechanisms, comprising the various portfolio committees, to co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of the White Paper. To this end the portfolio committee has decided to hold at least one week-long meeting in each half of the year to engage the department and all other relevant departments on progress in the implementation of this policy framework. The first oversight meeting is planned for the first week of June 2012. The portfolio committee is in the process of finalising the programme and inviting other committees.
We have also identified a whole host of other task implementations arising from, and within, the policy framework. Some of these are the setting up of the Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change sub-structures; implementing the flagship programmes; identifying and prioritising the key short-term and medium-term adaptation interventions that must be addressed in sector plans, and the identification of adaptation responses that require co-ordination between specific sectors and/or departments; defining desired emission reduction outcomes and/or carbon budgets for each significant sector or subsector of the economy, based on an in-depth assessment of the mitigation potential, best available mitigation options, available evidence, science, and a full assessment of the costs and benefits; reviewing, auditing and revising key sectoral implementation plans to ensure alignment with the climate change policy, and specifically the identified desired mitigation outcomes and/or carbon budgets and adaptation priorities; developing, testing and commissioning the National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory; designing and publishing a draft climate change response monitoring and evaluation system; and, lastly, appointing a multistakeholder climate financing working group.
Furthermore, through the relevant portfolio committees, each policy and piece of legislation that fall within their mandate must be reviewed to determine whether they comply with the legal requirements to support the effective and efficient implementation of the institutional and regulatory arrangements proposed in the White Paper, and to continuously ensure policy and legislative alignment with the Climate Change Policy Framework.
When the SA government went to the COP 17 gathering in Durban in December last year to negotiate a future global climate change regime, the foundational tenets of the South African negotiating mandate were to balance climate and sustainable developmental imperatives through a multilateral, rule-based, legal regime that, firstly, ensured global emission reductions that were ambitious enough to avert dangerous climate change while respecting the over-riding developmental priorities of developing countries and, secondly, prioritised adaptation, given that the world is committed to unavoidable climate-change impacts, and recognising the vulnerability of developing countries, particularly in Africa.
However, we knew from the outset that the Durban negotiations were faced by two competing paradigms for a future global climate change regime, which had emerged and crystallised into fixed negotiating positions, both of which, it was argued, could give effect to the Copenhagen Accord and the resulting Cancun Agreements. On the one hand, there was the top-down model. This is the approach used in the Kyoto Protocol, providing for a comprehensive, inclusive, multilateral, rule-based, legally binding regime with levels of ambition informed by science. On the other hand, there was a bottom-up, pledge and review model, providing for incremental, domestically determined policies, measures and rules, with the levels of ambition being informed by national priorities and circumstances and "internationalised" through the UNFCCC reporting and review procedures. The challenge South Africa faced at the Durban negotiations was to get both groupings to move from their fixed negotiating positions and to agree to a new future global climate-change regime, which included the most important features of both paradigms in such a manner as to get both groups to buy into the new, future negotiating regime. The end result was that the Durban Conference adopted 19 COP and 17 CMP decisions and approved a number of subsidiary body conclusions, known as the Durban Package.
The Durban Package in large part comprised four main elements. The first element is securing legal multilateral rules and commitments through a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol for willing developed countries. Canada, Japan and Russia indicated immediately that they would not take part in this second commitment period, so that today only 15% of global emissions are covered under Kyoto.
Secondly, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Co-operative Action had taken certain decisions under the convention to operationalise institutions agreed to in Cancun. These included a process on options to secure sources of climate finance; the African priority for a comprehensive adaptation implementation framework under a new adaptation committee; the Climate Technology Centre and Network; the REDD+ mechanisms; the Forum on Response Measures; and progress on the modalities and guidelines for the transparency and accountability arrangements for both developed and developing countries.
The third part of the package is the adoption of the founding instrument for the Green Climate Fund and a process for its operationalisation.
The fourth element is the launch of a new negotiation process, under an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform, of a new legal climate regime applicable to all parties by 2015 and to come into effect by 2020.
Critically for 2012 and COP 18, this decision includes, firstly, an agreement to finalise the work and terminate the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Co-operative Action and, secondly, the definition of a work programme for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform. All this has happened and is happening while South Africa continues to hold the COP presidency - that should be underlined.
I am firmly of the view that the final high-level Durban Package unlocked an historically successful outcome, which is potentially an historic turning point that strengthens the multilateral system through an agreement that significantly advances the global climate effort needed now. However, it also sets a new long-term pathway for a multiyear programme for the development of a fair, inclusive, ambitious and legal future multilateral and rules-based global climate change system, applicable to all parties - that is very important - in both the developed and developing world, which will balance climate and sustainable development imperatives.
However, we must keep things in perspective. As we look forward, into the medium to longer term, the risk of unravelling the Durban Package exists. This is firstly because of the absence of balanced progress in the work to finalise outstanding issues in each of the four package elements. The second risk is a regression to more of the same old divisions of the past during 2012, at COP 18, and into the future.
After all, when the world went to Durban, developments in the negotiations for a world climate change regime were characterised by and crystallised into two fixed competing paradigms for a future global climate change regime, namely, as I said, the top-down and the bottom-up models. However, by the time the world had left Durban, the negotiations resulted in the international community's insisting on neither fixed paradigm and instead agreeing to a hybrid, or transitional, model or paradigm for a future global climate change regime.
They did this by recommitting to a new long-term pathway for the development of a fair, inclusive, ambitious and legal future multilateral and rules-based global climate change regime, which would be underpinned by the principles of equity and a common but differentiated approach, and which would be binding on all nations. However, due to the prevailing economic and political conditions, Durban was only able to set the platform for reaching this final agreement by 2015. At the same time it was also able to achieve the retention of the Kyoto Protocol legal regime, even if it was only binding on a voluntary basis on some developed countries.
Finally, all that still remains for me to do on behalf the portfolio committee is to recognise and applaud, and loudly so, the wonderful efforts of our government and our people in having organised and concluded an historically successful COP 17 gathering. It has the potential of once again giving impetus to the meaningful conclusion of a new climate regime, one that will steer the world away from the impending climate and ecological disasters towards which we are hurtling with ever-increasing rapidity and certainty. Particular mention should be made of the special, enormous contributions made to this successful international event by our two Ministers tasked with leading the South African effort, namely Minister Nkoana-Mashabane and our own Minister Molewa. We express our gratitude to them. Congratulations, Ministers! We really applaud what you have done. [Applause.]