Fraudulent Visas and Permits Task Team; GPW data loss: progress reports

Home Affairs

05 March 2024
Chairperson: Mr M Chabane (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

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Lubisi Report

The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) provided insights into budget allocations for the Multi-disciplinary Task Team (MDTT) and its approach to addressing the Lubisi Report recommendations on the issung of frudulent permist and visas. Government Printing Works (GPW) outlined measures taken to prevent data loss recurrence, highlighting collaborations and system improvements.

Committee addressed queries about ongoing investigations in the consequences for DHA officials for fraudulent activities and for the Government Printing Works (GPW) data loss inciden; identification of fraudulent documents, the visa process, and the involvement of foreign countries. While acknowledging progress, the Committee stressed the need for continued efforts in combating corruption and ensuring effective system changes.

Meeting report

Minister's remarks
Minister Aaron Motsoaledi reminded the Committee that they previously presented the Lubisi Report. A key recommendation was that the Department appoint a multi-disciplinary team to investigate the fraudulent issuing of permits and visas more comprehensively. The Multi-Disciplinary Task Team (MDTT) includes forensic investigators, data analysts, case management professionals, and lawyers. Another recommendation focused on legislative changes, identifying several areas requiring amendments. The Minister said there were ongoing efforts on this noting part of the White Paper was dedicated to overhauling the country's immigration system. The MDTT process involves extensive work in retrieving potentially fraudulently obtained government documents, legal proceedings for those arrested and disciplinary hearings within the Department. This was an update as it has been a year since the MDTT inception.

Lubisi Report implementation: MDTT update
Mr Peter Bishop, MDTT forensic Investigator, noted the Multi-Disciplinary Task Team (MDTT), operational since 1 March 2023 with a total of 60 officials, has a focus on fraud, theft, corruption, and maladministration. It was established to review all permits issued since 2004. Its mandate includes investigations, data analytics, including an analysis on the issuance of visas and permits, as well as identify criminal syndicates for fraud, theft, corruption and maladministration; improving the co-ordination of anti-corruption initiatives between DHA and law enforcement agencies as well as the provision of expert opinion; and including attending court cases, departmental disciplinary hearings and dispute proceedings, and testifying as expert witnesses.

MDTT composition:
Investigations, Disciplinary, Data Analytics, Business Processes, Project Administration

25 Focus Areas For Investigation:
• Presentation details investigation tasks for matters from Lubisi Report.
• Presentation details responsibilities assigned to MDTT for thorough investigation.

Size of Data Sets Analysed:
• Voluminous data used by MDTT for foreign national applications and profiling officials.
• Detailed breakdown of data records.
• Presentation details

Legal Opinion And Recommendations:
• Legal opinion on remedial action for fraudulent visas/permits: stripping citizenship / deportation
• Emphasis on due process, notice, annulment, revocation, and deportation.
• 52 files referred to MDTT for officials referred for disciplinaries.
• Level profiles indicate officials across various salary levels.
• New disciplinaries linked to applications and DHA decision-makers.

Progress On Disciplinary Matters:
• Presentation details charge sheets, hearings, dismissals, proposed dates, appeals, and resignations

MDTT Progress:
• Focusing on impactful areas, law enforcement coordination, urgent matters, minimizing expenditure.
• Detailed progress in investigations and collaborations. 28 individuals referred to DPCI; preparing a further 94 individuals to DPCI; identified up to 307 178 instances of potentially implicated individuals in unlawful or irregular activities in processing of visas/permits;
• Highlights of criminal investigations, retirement visas, data analysis, and Chinese foreign nationals.
• Further investigation details, including address analysis, officials involved, and ongoing inquiries.
• Labour Relations Directorate involved in contingent liability development and data consolidation.
• Data consolidation, cleaning, and analysis insights presented to the Labour Relations Directorate.

GPW: Ministerial Review Panel on data loss update
Ms Alinah Fosi, GPW CEO, reported on the progress made in the implementation of the Ministerial Review Panel Report on the loss of data at GPW.

Background
• Incident: 4th February 2021 - EVA hardware crash at GPW, leading to data loss.
• MRP was appointed in 2021 to investigate across functional areas.
• Focus areas: ICT, Human Resources, Finance, Operations, Production, Security.
• MRP report finalised and presented in July 2022.

Challenges Identified
• Organizational instability, lack of handover, capacity gaps, structural issues.
• External dependencies, dilapidated ICT infrastructure, systemic challenges.
• Cost containment measures, and legacy audit matters.
• Implementation level progress affected by cost containment circular.
• Some recommendations are dependent on other departments/entities.
• Forensic investigation report presented in February 2024.

Overall Progress
• Total Recommendations: 167
• Completed: 120 (72%)
• In Progress: 47 (28%)
• Recommendations in progress categorised by completion timeline (0-6; 7-12;12+ months).

Progress Per Functional Area
• Detailed progress reports per functional area.

Financial Services
• Costing and pricing strategy approved.
• Costing policy and SOPs approved.
• Ring-fencing of revenues and costs implemented.

Security Services
• Electronic visitor registration system implemented.
• Security operating model project plan finalised.

Human Resources
• Senior management roles filled.
• Contract management unit restructured.
• Systemic recommendations on information leakage implemented.

Office of the CEO
• AGSA investigation findings incorporated.
• Forensic investigations initiated on CFO-related matters.

Information and Communication Technology
• Specialist services agreements signed.
• Engagement with SITA for ICT partnership.
• Various recommendations on ICT infrastructure and security were addressed.

Manufacturing and Engineering
• Disaster recovery plans for critical sections were developed and tested.

Operations Management
• Evaluation of appropriate standards completed.

Internal Audit
• One recommendation in progress is to be completed after the ISO project implementation.

Facilities Management
• Six recommendations in progress [see presentation].

Discussion
Mr K Pillay (ANC) raised concerns about page 19 of the DHA presentation, noting the mention of 27 charge sheets, of which 12 have been finalised, five are ongoing, and 10 have disciplinary set-down dates. He questioned the employment status of these individuals during ongoing investigations, expressing worry about their involvement in incidents that could compromise the department. He asked about the number of employees still "within the system" facing disciplinary action or charges.

Turning to the GPW, Mr Pillay queried the meaning of 'consequence management' for those responsible for data loss. He asked for the current status of GPW employees undergoing disciplinary proceedings or having faced disciplinary action. He asked about contingency plans to prevent a recurrence.

He suggested the possibility of the Minister offering amnesty to South Africans involved in procuring fraudulent passports.

Ms L van der Merwe (IFP) expressed confidence in the work on the Lubisi Report but raised concerns about the volume of work and the time taken for each process, emphasising the need for set time frames for finalizing investigations. The Multi-Disciplinary Task Team (MDTT) had been in place for a year, but before its establishment, the Committee had already received a report. She stressed the prolonged nature, leading to thousands of people within South African borders with fraudulent visas and documentation. She noted the misuse of asylum seeker or refugee temporary permits for business purposes, painting "a really dark picture" of individuals holding South African documents without entitlement.

On MDTT composition, Ms van der Merwe noted the DHA staff shortage and queried the decision to use internal staff instead of external companies or individuals, especially considering the involvement of department staff in corruption.Noting the slide discussing applications with the same passport number, she suggested blocking or blacklisting such cases without the need for investigation, as those with fraudulent documentation should be prevented from applying for visas in future. With over 300 000 cases of alleged visa fraud, why does DHA not pause these visas, notifying affected individuals to revalidate their visas. While acknowledging potential legal challenges, court processes are more efficient than prolonged investigation. She urged a quicker resolution to the fraudulent documents

Ms Van der Merwe noted 52 individuals involved in issuing fraudulent visas, while slide 16 mentioned 80 staff members implicated in issuing fraudulent visas to Chinese, Pakistani, and Algerian individuals. Only 27 of them have faced charges. She asked if DHA follows up on resigning employees and if charges have been pursued against them

Addressing spousal visas, Ms Van der Merwe acknowledged the difficulty in verifying genuine marriages, suggesting the need for remedial action to expedite the process. She raised a general concern about the visa issuance process, sharing her experience of a lack of responsiveness after a month-long follow-up on a DHA official. Feedback is crucial she and expressed concern about the state of affairs within the department.

Turning to Government Printing Works (GPW), Ms Van der Merwe expressed skepticism about its progress, citing a perceived emphasis on ongoing investigations and disciplinary actions in GPW presentations. She sought information on the results of the Public Service Commission investigation and details on the remaining 20 investigations in progress in the ICT section.

Mr A Roos (DA) had serious concern about the loss of multiple years of audit data at Government Printing Works. The private sector had stringent measures to ensure data backup. He criticized the accounting officer for seemingly escaping accountability and found it disappointing that, despite four instances of crashes, there was still no effective backup system in place. He asked for clarity on status of backups, especially offsite backups. Are they now in place? The impression was the issue persists based on the time elapsed since the last meeting.

Welcoming the investigations on the Lubisi Report, Mr Roos echoed concerns about the prolonged existence of fraudulent activities in the system. Individuals were still within the system, emphasising the risk it poses. Noting the 45 000 fraudulent visas issued in a seven-year period, he was concerned about the potential backlog impact on of the lives of legitimate spouses. He asked about IT capital projects addressing legacy systems that allowed the bypassing of controls and soght reassurance that these gaps have been closed. He proposed that the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) should conduct an investigation from 2004 to the present to demonstrate the closure of gaps and a drastic reduction in fraudulent transactions.

MrRoos raised a concerning case in the media involving a couple asked to pay R60 000 bribe, supposedly from an email originating from the Minister's office. Describing it as a "red flag", he called for a detailed examination by the Department and Committee.

Mr Roos asked about the red-flagging of forum shopping, if it has been implemented and to what extent. He asked about the progress in system integration to detect applicants making multiple applications. There had to be a clear process to identify and address forum shoppers.

Turning to the 303 832 potentially irregular movements processed by officials, Mr Roos sought an explanation of this figure to better understand the nature of these movements. He agreed with Ms van der Merwe's concern about the pursuit of criminal charges against employees who resign or are dismissed, emphasising the importance of blacklisting them to prevent employment in other state organs. He raised a case where the applicant with fake documents was given a chance to correct them and expressed strong disapproval and asked if this practice had been rectified.

Mr Roos stressed the DHA undercapacity in international migration enforcement, citing a shortage of enforcement officers. He stressed the inadequacy of the current number of enforcement officers (around 770 for the entire country) and questioned how DHA plans to locate individuals without adequate personnel. Referring to previous discussions on an e-verification system, what are the plans to ensure employers can easily and reliably verify the legitimacy of visas, expressing concern about the potential use of fake documents.

Ms A Khanyile (DA) sought clarity on the criteria used to identify officials for training as 9it was importanto of understand the selection process. On passport numbers, she expressed dissatisfaction with the information provided and requested details on the number of passports sharing identical numbers and the actions taken upon their identification. She asked about steps in place to address outstanding passports with the same numbers.

On the Committee oversight visit to DHA civic services, Ms Khanyile recalled the use of biometrics for processing applications and asked if the same system is employed for the immigration process. She asked for an update on the progress made since the appointment of additional officials to address immigration backlogs. She emphasised the link between backlogs and potential solicitation of bribes from applicants.

Ms Khanyile shared instances of applicants facing demands for bribes, including the case where a couple was asked to pay R60 000. She stressed the need to address backlogs to mitigate this. She mentioned cases she has been personally following up, expressing concern about the accuracy of information provided by DHA officials.

On the GPW data loss, Ms Khanyile echoed Mr Roos's concerns and the importance of having backups in place to prevent future data loss incidents.

Ms M Modise (ANC) acknowledged the progress made by both GPW and DHA but expressed concern about the insufficient statistics provided, especially considering the significant number of foreign nationals operating illegally in various sectors. More needs to be done to address these challenges.

On the DHA officers identified, she asked about specific measures taken to prevent corrupt practices, emphasising the need for a robust system to trace and stop such individuals. She shared Ms van der Merwe's concerns about freezing applications and the importance of addressing illegal residency and deportation measures.

Ms Modise expressed worry about GPW evergreen contracts, and sought information on the existing contract periods, their end dates, and plans for a fair and transparent process for new players to participate once these contracts expire.

The Chairperson requested that Mr Pillay repeat his question for the Minister.

Mr Pillay raised a concern about a syndicate involving South Africans applying for passports on behalf of foreign nationals. The process involved swapping a South African individual with a foreign national at the photo booth, allowing the foreign national's picture to be applied to the passport with the details of a South African. He highlighted cases where this activity was discovered only after the individuals involved had passed away. The syndicate involving officials use individuals who may not be aware of the illegal activity, including those who may be under the influence of drugs and paid to participate.

Mr Pillay asked if DHA would consider pardoning individuals who come forward voluntarily, especially those who were not aware of the illegal activity and did not willingly participate in the syndicate. It was important to find a corrective solution for this.

The Chairperson wanted to learn about the countries mentioned in the report as part of the syndicates. Has DHA engaged with these countries to addressing the challenges involving officials from these countries and South African officials. He sought an update on the progress of diplomatic relations in this context. He observed that the tasks of the MDTT might take longer than initially anticipated, potentially leading to additional budget requirements. He asked if DHA has allocated funds for these unforeseen expenses or if it plans to cover them separately for the specified period.

The Chairperson asked about collaboration between the MDTT and BMA, emphasising the need to understand the extent of the BMA's involvement in combating syndicates and corrupt activities outlined in the recommendations. He expressed interest in the submissions from the public through public representatives to the Minister's office, particularly focusing on the Immigration Acting DDG. Acknowledging the influx of complaints about backlogs, he emphasized the importance of the Department's commitment to addressing and resolving these concerns. He asked for the DHA planned response to these matters.

GPW response
Ms Alinah Fosi, GPW CEO, replied about GPW efforts to prevent a recurrence of the February 2021 incident. GPW had been engaging rigorously in the process, acknowledging that such an occurrence is uncommon in the public service and has caused significant challenges. The management team has been actively seeking solutions to prevent a repeat of such an event. They have implemented systems, including a multi-pronged approach, to engage critical stakeholders and ensure backups, both on-site and remotely.

Ms Fosi said that professionals were brought in, following recommendations from the Ministerial Review Panel (MRP), to enhance capacity and support GPW for business continuity. GPW had engagements with the State Security Agency (SSA) on network access and written communications to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) for technical expert assistance in investigating the case. This collaboration has borne fruit, helping GPW fix the system, which has already gone live. GPW is finalizing current challenges through the online system.

The State Information Technology Agency (SITA) is a critical stakeholder and GPW is participating in a contract for essential IT services. All stakeholders played a crucial role in addressing the challenges faced. GPW has achieved several milestones, but the focus is currently on resolving outstanding issues and moving away from crisis mode while maintaining its systems.

Ms Fosi emphasized capacity enhancement and Deputy Directors and managerial positions would be accountable and report to the Executive Committee (EXCO). GPW has developed ICT procurement plans and shared them with SITA for assistance in system procurement.

As for consequence management, GPW has already dealt with the officials, and some have resigned during the investigation. The previous Chief Information Officer (CIO) and deputy director resigned, and GPW is in the process of issuing suspension letters. Going forward, GPW will ensure officials are not lax in adhering to their job description, particularly on IT security and data backup, inherent in their role as ICT specialists.

Ms Fosi clarified that GPW does not lose data during power interruptions, as the Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) ensures data retrieval and backup. Also GPW did not experience four separate crashes but rather two incidents resulting in data loss. To prevent a recurrence, GPW has implemented mitigating plans.

Mr Zwelibanzi Gwiba, GPW Chief Information Officer, stated that GPW currently maintains backups in two forms The first is an online backup on disc, and the second is a backup on tape stored at a remote site, specifically at the CSIR. GPW follows a schedule, transporting the tapes to the remote site on a weekly basis. They also conduct regular tests of restores. Restores for their finance system are performed monthly and tested by end-users. On a quaternary basis, a test is conducted with their internal risk management team to ensure independence and compliance in the restoration process. For e-Gazette, there are ongoing efforts to restore the system. They have tested it about three times, restoring the application in a different environment. However, further work by developers is needed. They have proven that the existing backups can be successfully restored and are functional.

On procurement of additional solutions to enhance GPW's Business Continuity Plan (BCP), MrGwiba reported that GPW is in the advanced stages of procurement, collaborating with SITA. They hope SITA will provide additional support and comfort in dealing with backups.

Ms Fosi highlighted that GPW has successfully concluded 72% of the recommendations to date. Only 28% remain to be implemented, indicating significant progress. She assured the Committee that GPW plans to complete the remaining 28% within the next six months. She committed to return to the Committee to provide updates and demonstrate continued progress in implementing the recommendations.

Mr Sydney Ramasodi, GPW Director: Legal Services, outlined that initially GPW wrote a letter to the Public Service Commission (PSC), requesting an investigation in line with the Ministerial Review Panel (MRP) report. The response letter stated that the Public Service Act only allows investigations within a 12-month timeframe. Despite this limitation, GPW was given an opportunity to provide a motivation for consideration, which they duly submitted. They were granted condonation. However, when additional information was requested for the investigation, GPW explained that some data was lost due to the prior data loss incident. The PSC letter of 11 August 2023 stressed the challenges and ultimately concluded that there was an absence of evidence to proceed, leading to the closure of the investigation.

Mr Ramasodi and the finance division audited all the evergreen contracts in GPW. Contracts without a specified duration were labelled as evergreen. Recognizing the lengthy process involved in negotiating each contract individually, an umbrella approach was adopted. Contracts without a duration were identified, and a three-year period was established from the date of signing the addendum, starting effectively from April 2023. This approach allowed the contracts to be in place for three years, after which new negotiations would be required.

Mr Ramasodi explained the GPW management of sole suppliers adhered to Treasury regulations. According to advice from the Chief Procurement Officer, these suppliers were placed on one-year contracts. To extend the duration, a market analysis had to be conducted by the requester of services. Before entering another 12-month contract, a market analysis was necessary, creating an opportunity for new players in the market.

DHA response
The DHA included Mr T Makhode, Director General; Mr T Mavuso, Deputy DG: Infrastructure Support; Mr T Sigama, Deputy DG: Civic Services; Ms Moitse, Deputy DG: Counter Corruption and Security Services; Mr G Hollamby, CFO; Adv P Khumalo, Chief Director: Legal Services; Mr T Makgola, Communication Officer; Adv M Malate, Legal Services.

Mr Gordon Hollamby, DHA CFO, provided information on the MDTT budget for 2023/24, which stands at R41.6 million. DHA received a budget request from the CAJV for 2024/25, currently under consideration. Funding discussions will need to address at least part of the request. Prioritization for the SIU investigation in 2024/25 is also on the agenda.

Department officials responded to the remaining questions:
• The approach taken over the past 12 months was guided by the 25 priority areas of the Lubisi Report. Unpacking specifics within the historical data allowed the identification of transgressions detailed in the presentation. A legal opinion was formulated, providing a legal framework to address fraudulent documentation and transgressions. The use of link analysis identified gaps in the specifics. These were shared with the Office of the DG, guiding the future procurement of systems

The approach also focused on labour relations, with training primarily directed at individuals responsible for "registers of matters." Engagements occurred internally within the DHA environment, particularly with the Border Management Authority (BMA), addressing its specific challenges. A detailed analysis of each case is conducted to improve the approach to labour relations, disciplinary hearings, and criminal investigations. Despite the three-year appointment, efforts are concentrated on finalizing within the timeframe, though challenges, such as record-keeping, exist. The guiding principle is to efficiently break down the large volume of information, grouping it to form strong specific criminal referrals and disciplinary actions for appropriate consequence management.

• Investigations and disciplinary matters are complex and often intertwined with criminal activities, as highlighted in the presentation. There was a need to prioritize thoroughness over speed, as rushed approaches can lead to financial burden if decisions are set aside by the courts. A careful approach is adopted to ensure fairness and adequate preparation before proceeding with charges. This approach clarifies questions about suspensions, as comprehensive investigations allow the Human Resources and Industrial Relations Department to make informed decisions on disciplinary action. Alternative means of discipline have been initiated, promoting a progressive approach to disciplinary hearings for a fair and expedient process, if warranted. Legal opinions provide a framework to address concerns, and discussions with the legal department, the Department and the SIU will facilitate a practical implementation approach.

• In the Movement Control System (MCS), they had identified users not authorized to process transactions on the MCS, leading to 303 832 potentially unlawful or irregular movements. The investigation team will examine these movements and users to determine if they were indeed unauthorized. On individuals using the same passport numbers, this involves different people using the same passport number, not the same person using it multiple times. They have identified 12 299 instances, but further investigation is required for the complete number. Thorough investigation is important, as 'red flag' testing can lead to false positives. This involves collecting additional information, creating new tests, and enhancing existing tests. DHA is then informed about such cases and it decides whether these need further investigation.

Deputy Minister Njabulo Nzuza expressed appreciation for the work MDTT had done, highlighting the commitment to addressing corruption within the Department of Home Affairs. The approach to fighting corruption would come with financial costs for investigations, time costs causing delays, and costs associated with system and process changes. The recommendations outlined clear system changes that need to be implemented. He stressed the complexity of the process, involving criminal procedures that go beyond merely cutting off someone from work. He urged patience from the Committee, emphasising the importance of completing processes properly and thoroughly, noting the involvement of institutions like the SIU to assist.

He affirmed that modernizing DHA systems is a part of the agenda. They are exploring ways to easily verify documentation, collaborating with organizations to streamline the verification of bank statements and submitted information. This aims to reduce turnaround time for document verification, enhance credibility, and ensure timely application processing. The Trusted Employer Scheme is one such innovative approach, designed to support employers without hampering the economy.

The Deputy Minister replied that DHA is considering the implications and recommendations for visas issued fraudulently. They are considering options such as relisting individuals, rendering them unauthorized to stay in the country, and proper steps will follow to address their illegal presence. He commended the MDTT's work and urged Committee support to continue finalizing ongoing matters. He acknowledged the challenging journey ahead, with ups and downs, but emphasised the commitment to ensuring that those responsible for corruption are convicted, and those involved in buying fraudulent visas face consequences.

Minister Aaron Motsoaledi responded about employees still working while investigations are ongoing. The decision to suspend an employee during an investigation depends on various factors such as the nature of the case, the type of work the person is doing, the type of investigation, and how the person may affect that investigation. It is not an automatic or general condition. In serious cases, the Department does suspend employees, as exemplified by the suspension of many employees within the permitting department outlined in the report.

On amnesty for individuals involved in criminal actions, the Minister emphasised the complexity of the issue. He cited a case involving the arrest of a Pakistani kingpin in April 2022. Individuals involved in fraudulent actions cannot claim innocence. He provided an example of a security officer who knowingly participated in a fraudulent passport scheme. The Minister stressed that amnesty cannot be granted to individuals who are perpetrators of crime, whether involving fraud or drugs.

Addressing the concern about the long delay in MDTT processes, the Minister stressed the immense workload, dealing with 11.9 billion datasets. The team is working with data spanning 20 years, from 2004 to the present. While the MDTT started investigating from 2014 due to the manual nature of records before that year, they are now looking into the manual records as well, acknowledging that this process will take a significant amount of time. The Minister underscored the importance of considering the vast amount of historical data involved in these investigations.

In reply about the Department's response to identifying fraudulent documents, the Minister explained that when DHA identifies a fraudulent document, they are required to investigate the matter. However, individuals caught with fraud often try to deflect blame, claiming they were helped by immigration agents who brought them the documents, and they were unaware of the fraudulent activities. Some claim to have paid money to immigration officers, pleading ignorance once caught. DHA, upon identifying immigration officers involved in illegal activities, opens police cases. In some instances, the claims are genuine, while in others, individuals attempt to evade consequences by blaming immigration agents.

The Minister expressed the wish to freeze visas obtained fraudulently, aligning with the public's desire. However, South African law does not permit this, and such practice is not accepted by courts. Despite believing that all fraud cases justify freezing and blocking, the Department has faced legal challenges. He cited a case where they discovered a fraudulent permanent residence document. After suspending and investigating the individuals responsible, DHA referred the matter to the police. However, due to rushed procedures and the lack of adherence to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), the individuals were able to interdict the Department from retrieving the documents. The Minister emphasised the need for careful handling of these matters to avoid jeopardizing the country's interests.

The Minister addressed the concern that criminal cases die after accused individuals resign. He clarified that the criminal case does not die; resigning saves individuals from the disciplinary (DC) process but not the criminal case. The police and Hawks continue their pursuit even after resignations, with several cases being referred to the police by DHA, even for individuals who were fired.

On spousal visas taking longer than expected, the Minister assured the Committee that DHA is actively working to resolve the matter. He expressed concern about notarial contracts where couples falsely declare their cohabitation. DHA conducts surveillance by sending immigration officials to visit addresses randomly over six months. If it is determined that the couple does not live together, the Department goes to court. The Minister emphasised that the legal process takes time; DHA cannot go to court based on mere suspicion.

On the comment about the DG's workload, the Minister asserted that it is the DG's responsibility to ensure that those under him perform their duties. Consequence management is necessary if employees fail to fulfil their responsibilities.

Addressing IT system challenges, the Minister mentioned the Department's efforts to resolve the problems. The head of IT was demoted due to non-performance, leading to the individual's resignation. The Department enlisted the help of CSIR, and progress has been reported after a month.

On media reports about bribery involving his PA, the Minister stated that it was an attempt to target him indirectly. The matter was reported before the Ministry could respond to the media, and the Department provided a response the following day. The individuals implicated had their emails hacked, a matter reported to the police and the counter-corruption team for investigation.

The Minister acknowledged the inadequate number of immigration officials, a concern presented in the business plan to Treasury. Despite pleas for additional resources, the state of the economy makes it challenging for Treasury to accommodate these requests. He mentioned the recent site visit where 72 immigration officials were hired and trained, but the shortage persists. The Department continually appeals to Treasury for assistance in addressing this shortage.

On the validity of permits, the Minister referred to Section 38 of the Immigration Act, which places the responsibility of checking permit validity on employers. While e-verification is feasible at banks, it is not yet available in immigration. However, the Minister emphasised that many employers are aware they are hiring illegal individuals, as evidenced by repeat offences and fines imposed by the courts.

Addressing the need for biometrics in DHA authorization, the Minister explained that the Biometric Movement Control System (BMCS) is in place, requiring individuals to unlock computers with their fingerprint. This system aids in quickly identifying the official who issued a particular document. However, he reminded the Committee that some of the issues investigated by the MDTT occurred before the BMCS was implemented, making manual tracing more time-consuming.

On DHA offices prone to crime and fraud, the Minister acknowledged that certain areas, especially within immigration permits, have a higher tendency for corruption. The Deputy Director-General for Counter Corruption and Security Services reported that over 60% of their cases involve immigration, particularly in permitting, with the remaining 40% spread across other areas.

The Minister highlighted a concerning petition from permit staff demanding that the Counter-Corruption Unit stop investigating their errors, indicating a deliberate intention to engage in illegal activities.

The Minister provided information about the case involving the blocking of identity documents (IDs) reported by News24. He confirmed that DHA was blocking IDs obtained fraudulently, a legitimate government process despite the absence of specific legislation covering it. The court ruled in favour of this process, emphasising that it should follow fair administrative justice under PAJA. The Minister expressed regret that some individuals disappear when approached, using their fraudulently obtained documents for further illegal activities.

He stressed the importance of DHA's efforts in preventing potential economic losses, with South African banks estimating a potential loss of around R17 billion if the blocked IDs were unblocked. The Minister emphasised the time-consuming nature of the investigation process and the need for careful consideration.

On interactions with foreign countries, the Minister clarified that he had not directly engaged with China. However, he had discussions with the ambassador of Pakistan. The reason for not approaching other countries directly was explained by the ambassador's response, indicating that individuals committing fraud in South Africa were not sent by Pakistan and were not wanted by the Pakistani government. The Minister stressed the need to handle these cases as criminal rather than diplomatic matters, as those individuals were not officially dispatched by their home countries.

The Chairperson expressed gratitude for the comprehensive briefing provided by the Minister and his team. He acknowledged the progress made by both institutions and emphasised the importance of the information shared. The Chairperson highlighted the Committee's role in familiarising themselves with the issues discussed, as they may be required to table the report in Parliament. He mentioned the possibility of calling in GPW again to address specific concerns, including those related to the balance sheet.

The meeting adjourned.

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