Strengthening the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Service (JICS): Interaction with JICS, Department of Correctional Services, Independent Police Investigative Directorate & South African Human Rights Commission

Meeting report

The Chairperson said that due to recent events, he had asked the Minister to write a letter to the Committee addressing what was happening with the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and the national Commissioner. The Minister had also agreed to come to the Committee in early October, so that Members would be able to engage with him.

Mr V Magagula (ANC) explained that he had missed a previous meeting of the Committee due to another meeting, and therefore might have missed information. He asked for clarification on recently reported suspensions.

The Chairperson said the CEO had been suspended.  The letter sent to the Committee Members by Judge Tshabalala, dated 2 September 2013, had clarified what was happening.  Regarding the Commissioner, the Minister would write a letter to the Committee addressing that issue.

Strengthening the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Service (JICS): Interaction with the JICS, Department of Correctional Services, Independent Police Investigation Directorate (IPID) and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) on how the legislative provisions establishing and governing JICS may be amended and/or strengthened to ensure a better system for ensuring effective oversight over the treatment of inmates, and conditions of incarceration

Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)
Ms Koekie Mbeki, Acting Executive Director of IPID, said the strategic outcome-oriented goals of IPID were linked to the achievement of Outcomes 3 and 12, as adopted by the Cabinet in January 2010.  Outcome 3 was to ensure all people in South Africa felt safe and secure, while Outcome 12 provided for an efficient, effective and development-oriented public service and an empowered, fair and inclusive citizenship.

The IPID Act (Act 1 of 2011) was a blueprint for the transformation of the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) into the IPID. The transformation had ushered in a new era of civilian oversight on the SAPS and Members of Parliament. The organization had evolved from a complaints-driven, to an investigation-driven, body. The renaming of the ICD to IPID also meant extending the mandate not only to investigate, but also to ensure that the recommendations by the directorate were implemented by SAPS. To this end, the organization had achieved great strides in transforming the ICD into IPID, but this had not been without challenges and risks. However, the strategies and current structure of the institution had ensured its effectiveness and continued performance.

IPID proposed legislative changes for the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) so that it became an independent entity with a separate vote.  It would have an oversight role, with investigative powers, and would fulfil a quasi-judicial function, acting as an executive authority on quasi-judicial decisions.

South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)
The SAHRC’s main proposal was that the JICS should be independent. Independence could be determined through a number of factors.  These included the legislative provisions regarding the financial sustainability of the institution, the appointment process and security of tenure provisions for leadership of the institution, the degree to which the institution determined its own operational procedures, structures and employment, the powers afforded to the it to execute its mandate, the mechanisms, if any, which linked accountability of the institution to other institutions, and additional accountability, oversight and reporting structures.

The Constitutional Court in Van Rooyen and Others v S and others 2002 (5)  SA 246 (CC) had established a general test to be used in order to determine if the court as in an institution was independent. In these terms, independence was determined by whether a reasonable and informed person from an objective viewpoint would have the perception that the institution was independent.

This test could also be applied in determining the independence of JICS.

The presentation provided a comparative analysis between the JICS and SAHRC.   The JICS had been established by Chapter 9 of the Correctional Service Act 111 of 1998 (CSA), and the SAHRC had been established by Chapter 9 of the SA Constitution.

Section 85 to 91 of the CSA made provision for the appointment of the iInspecting judge, staff, powers and functions, duties and expenses of the Inspectorate. The Human Rights Commission Act, on the other hand, provided for the composition, powers and functions of the SAHRC.

Section 85 (1) of the CSA states that the Jucidial Inspecorate for Correctional Services was an independent office under the control of the inspecting judge, whereas Section 181 (2) of the Constitution referenced the SAHRC as an institution that was independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. Section 181 (3) also placed an obligation on other State organs to assist in ensuring the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of the SAHRC. In this regard, there were no similar provisions or obligations placed on the State to ensure the independence of the Inspectorate.

Section 86 of the CSA provided that the President appointed the Inspecting Judge. In practice, the SAHRC process of appointing Commissioners was widely different, and the President only formally appointed the Commissioners. Also, the appointment of the CEO of the JICS was effected by the National Commissioner of Correctional Services, to whom the CEO would be accountable, and any disciplinary action against the CEO was referred to the National Commissioner. In the SAHRC, the appointment of the CEO was an internal process, and the CEO was accountable to the Commissioner.

Under Section 90 (3) of the CSA, the Iinspecting Judge reported each inspection to the Minister and the Committee.  The Inspecting Judge submitted a report to the President and the Minister annually, and then the Minister would table the JICS report in Parliament. The SAHRC submitted quarterly reports to the President and Parliament, and might submit a report to the President or Parliament whenever deemed necessary. The SAHRC also submitted and tabled its annual report to Parliament; there was no ministerial involvement in the process.

JICS received its budget from the DCS. The SAHRC was financially independent from government, though it received its budget from National Treasury. 

The SAHRC recommended the following strengthening measures for JICS:

• The appointment of the Judge should not be a unilateral decision by the President

• The President should appoint the Judge similarly to other Judges (via recommendations from the Judicial Services Commission), or through recommendations from Parliament.   The nomination, selection and appointment process should be more consultative.  

• Remove the DCS as a central feature of the JICS.

• The JICS budget should be separate from the DCS. 

• The appointment of the CEO should not be in consultation with the National Commissioner.  It should be an internal JICS process.   JICS should have its own legal personality, which sets out that the Inspectorate has standing in law and can sue and be sued.  

• JICS should have greater investigative and enforcement powers (the JICS have previously reported on a lack of responsiveness from DCS in relation to complaints or request for information).   JICS should be equipped with powers of subpoena, search and seizure, similar to that of the SAHRC.  It should be stipulated that no organ of state or individual may hinder or obstruct the JICS in performance of its functions.  Conflict of interest provisions should also be articulated.

• JICS should have greater recourse to Parliament to report on instances where the DCS fail to comply with Inspectorate requests.  Parliament should then exercise its oversight on the Department. 

• Protection from legal liability should be afforded to JICS staff when acting in good faith.  Section 17(3) of the HRC Act may provide guidance in this instance and states that no member of the Commission or staff, ‘is liable for anything reflected in any report, finding, point of view or recommendation made or expressed in good faith and submitted to Parliament’.

• Collaboration with other organs of State or institutions.  Findings and reports of the JICS should be disseminated to SAHRC and other Chapter 9 bodies in order to enhance support to the Inspectorate.
There should be an express obligation stating that other organs of State should afford the Inspectorate the necessary protection to ensure its independence and impartiality. 

• JICS should have power to institute legal proceedings in its own name and a clear mandate to refer cases to SAPS or the NPA in cases of criminal conduct by DCS officials. 

• The public perception of the JICS should be improved.  The JICS should have greater awareness-raising about the role of the Inspectorate.  The Inspectorate should be more robust in publicising their findings via media and press releases.   This would create public awareness on the challenges faced in asserting the rights of inmates in correctional centres. 

The JICS email address and website was also hosted by the DCS.   This gave the impression that JICS was not independent of the Department.  JICS should have its own independent online presence.

The role of JICS as an Independent oversight body was crucial for the effective functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole, and the Department of Correctional Services in particular.  As an independent institution, it should be placed in a position to be both reactive (responding to conditions of detention and treatment in correctional centres) and proactive (allowing for a system of unannounced visits to correctional centres). Its mandate and powers should be clearly articulated in legislation, either through amendment to the CSA or through separate legislation.

Discussion
The Chairperson said the question had been, “what must be done to strengthen JICS?”, but what had come to mind most importantly through the presentations was, what was the need for JICS?  As far as he understood it, JICS had been formed to investigate the treatment of inmates, as informed by the Bill of Rights. However, both the SAHRC and IPID in their presentations had said they were there for that function.

When the ANC had come into power in 1994, the government had not understood the integrated government concept.  There had been a silo approach, where everybody had wanted to do their own thing. This matter needed to be addressed, because the Department of Health could also set up its own “JICS” for the treatment of patients, or the Department of Education set up its own “JICS” for the treatment of children in classrooms. The fundamental question was whether there was a need for all these institutions, or should it be given to the SAHRC as their primary mandate which they should be carrying out throughout the country, for a child, inmate or a patient. The SAHRC had the constitutional protection, while the others were all subservient to the constitution, as they had come about through legislation. Why should the skills required to investigate and make recommendations be duplicated? Why not make JICS and all these other institutions a division of the SAHRC, as they were all doing the same work?

Mr J Selfe (DA) said the question raised by the Chairperson went to the heart of the issue. The matter was a debate that had been going on for some time. Towards the end of the last Parliament, there had been a review concerning the integration, status, and reporting lines of all the Chapter 9 institutions -- the relationship between them and their relationship with other bodies. Whatever was said about JICS, it must be understood that it was not a Chapter 9 institution, nor did it want to be a Chapter 9 institution. The valid point was whether Chapter 9 institutions, such as the SAHRC, had the capacity to monitor human rights of 160 000 inmates in 240 correctional centres 24 hours a day, seven days a week and 365 days a year.  None would have the capacity or the skills set, as they would not know what happened in prisons in sufficient detail.   If they did, there would need to be resources put behind such an institution to enable it to perform that function. Although he was also not in support of the silo approach, there needed to be a balance between the particular skills, experience and infrastructure that JICS had built over many years, which would be a pity to undo now because of organisational convenience or symmetry. There were areas of overlay, but there were also areas of specialisation.  This experience and specialisation needed to be guarded.  

It was Mr Selfe’s opinion that in its current position, JICS could not do what it was supposed to be doing in an ideal world, for all the reasons articulated. JICS should be financially independent, have its own Act, and be a separate institution away from the Department, with its own website and own staff appointments, and come to Parliament regarding their budget. But to do its job, there needed to be a cooperative relationship with the Department, otherwise there were 101 ways in which the Department could frustrate the JICS’s core mandate. Related to the appointment of the Inspecting Judge, there was an amendment Bill to the Correctional Service Act in 2008.   One of the provisions in the original Bill was to convert the judges that had more than 10 years’ experience -- one of the reasons for that was that judges were busy people and courts had huge backlogs, so one could not just take judges off the judicial service and put them in the Judicial Inspectorate because that was the nice thing to do. The experience had therefore been to rely on the good will of retired judges to head the institution. A judge gave the institution the status and the reach that would not necessarily be the case if it was headed by an advocate or an attorney. In the appointment procedure, one had to bear in mind that the pool to choose from was quite small.

Ms Clare Ballard, Researcher, Community Law Centre, regarding the appointment of judges, said the legislation did specify that the pool to source inspecting judges from was retired judges; they were not taken from active service. Also, the Chairperson had mentioned Constitutional protection -- it was very important to emphasise that oversight bodies did have Constitutional protection. One of the earliest rulings of the Constitutional Court about the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), was that the requirement for an institution’s independence was financial and administrative independence. Until JICS had its own budget vote, like IPID and the Public Protector, structurally it would remain in an unconstitutional state of affairs. On the matter of capacity, until it was decided on what JICS was to do, debates on capacity were redundant. There was confusion in the Correctional Service Act.  The opening provision of Section 85 defined the objectives of the office as being to facilitate the inspection of prisons. Inspection of prisons was very different from the processing of complaints. Also, the powers of investigators were not clear.   Legislative confusion had led to the current situation where there was a dual function in one office, and neither of those functions were performed in the way they ought to be.   It was not clear what was required from JICS, and until that was clear, it would not be known what powers to vest them with. Until that was decided, the legislation could not be panel beaten into the instrument that was needed.

Ms W Ngwenya (ANC) asked what caused delays for awaiting trial inmates in detainee centres.  Were there deadlines to investigations? There were inmates that had been in those centres for three to five years, waiting for an investigation to be finalised for their sentencing. In terms of wardens looking after inmates in the centres, there was a challenge on both sides -- on the inmate side and the warden side. There was no proper reporting, where a warden had been suspended or chased away, and when the Committee went on an oversight visit they never received the full story.  Where an inmate had been reported for assault by a warden, they were merely transferred to another centre and their case would not be followed up on. The question was then, how were cases found inside the centres solved? 

Regarding the presentation by SAHRC, there seemed to be a focus on the inspecting judge’s rights. The Chairperson’s question about the need for JICS was worrying. The purpose of the meeting was to assist JICS.  During oversight, the Committee had observed that JICS employees did not have their own offices. It looked like the structure had been formed before it was prepared for it.  The institution did not have permanent staff -- the staff had contracts of three months, and as a result the Committee found that they could not get the answers they wanted because if the employee had a three-month contract and spoke negatively of the inspecting judge, after three months they would not be recommended for the renewal of their contract.

Ms Ngwenya said the recommendations needed to be thoroughly debated. The Inspecting Judge could not be allowed to report to the media before coming to report to the Committee for scrutiny. SAHRC needed to view the Department of Correctional Services as a department that protected the lives of South Africans. The rights of a law abiding citizen and those of an inmate could not be the same. There was no differentiation between the two, and that was why people were saying prisons were five star hotels. Law-abiding citizens paid taxes for inmates to have television. It was agreed that the inspecting judge’s office ought to be independent and not within a correctional services centre. During oversight, the Committee had managed to remove JICS from within Correctional Services immediately and had asked the Department of Public Works to grant them space within 24 hours. Another challenge was that the offices were located in city centres, and not where the people were. People in prison were from townships, but the offices were far from them.   Furthermore, it was difficult to locate the offices -- outside would be written “Public Works,” and JICS would probably be on the third floor of that building.  What had to be done was for JICS to be strengthened in order to function very well, because their reports were a truthful reflection of what was happening.  When the Committee went on oversight, they found exactly the same things that were in the report. 

Perhaps the challenge was about resources.   It first had to be clear whether the budget of JICS came from the office of the Commissioner or that of the Minister, as that was the main challenge. JICS could not claim independence when it depended on the pocket of the Department.

Mr S Abram (ANC) said what was apparent from the presentations was that it needed to be determined whether an office such as JICS was necessary, and the immediate answer to that would be that it was. In 1994, there were prisons that “dealt” with people. At the time it was necessary to have some form of oversight in order to see there were no human rights violations. Oversight was necessary, but the question should then be what would be the correct and appropriate mechanisms -- was there a need for a plethora of bodies to do the work, or just one institution. These were things to be looked at. Once the Committee had some idea as to which mechanisms were to be looked at, there should be public consultation in the form of a workshop to decide on such mechanisms. If the JICS was a motor vehicle, in its current condition, any traffic officer would render it un-roadworthy. You could not be independent if your budget was reliant on someone else -- that was like the Bantustans, who were “independent”, only to be dependent on Pretoria. In the short term, as an issue that had come up on many occasions, whether JICS was to be placed under SAHRC or whatever institution, its transitional independence needed to be ensured.

The Chairperson said everyone knew the challenges of correctional services, but from the meeting there had to be some proposal on the table. It would be impossible to effect the legislative changes in the current term, but what the Committee could do was to prepare a comprehensive report for the incoming Committee. The status quo was not going to change in nine months; Parliament simply did not have time to do that. But the experience of the Committee in the past years could be reported to the incoming Committee, so they could have a clearer path.

The Chairperson reiterated that human rights were human rights whether an inmate, child or patient.

Ms M Phaliso (ANC) said there needed to be a serious mind-set change before changing anything else.  The first things that needed to be considered were the resources of the country in duplicating institutions. Unfortunately, the Committee could not go abroad to study best practices regarding JICS. The matter called for a serious debate, as there were important policy changes needed. Why was the public not aware of JICS?   As a Member of Parliament, she herself did not know about JICS. There was a need for JICS, but there needed to be a clear framework for it to operate in. The public needed to be educated about JICS. It was about correcting the inmates, and there needed to be rehabilitation programmes, because then there would be talk of human rights. But if offenders had not been rehabilitated, how did one protect and enforce their human rights.

Mr V Ndlovu (IFP) said the need for JICS should be examined.  Was it to make sure that in correctional centres there were things that were done correctly?   If so, there was a need for it. Since the need was established, then the question was whether it could be independent or not. There was no independence if someone else gave you the bus fare, or appointed your own staff. There should be a mutual relationship between the Department so that the Department could respond to issues. If JICS was there to investigate, there should be a timeframe provided for the follow up on their findings to take place.

The Chairperson said the powers of the inspecting judge in the current Act were exactly the same as the functions IPID was seeking, and also the powers of SAHRC. It sounded like a cut and paste job. This was a drain on taxpayer’s money.  The government could not be used as an employment agency. IPID was doing what JICS was doing and what the SAHRC was doing -- tomorrow there could be a JICS in education and health. The Committee needed to learn from the silo approach and not continue to entrench the wrong principles.

Mr Delekile Klaas, Regional Commissioner: Western Cape, said the Chairperson had raised a number of fundamental issues. The Department had discussed the JICS matter, and as a department they were not opposed to JICS gaining the independence it required, administrative or otherwise.  However, what needed to be examined was the role of JICS, and what was required from JICS. For instance, if an offender died in the care of the Department, which was a human rights violation, that was a crime which by law was to be reported to the police. If the police were doing their work properly in investigating the death, then IPID was there to step in. If it was an issue of discipline, the Public Service Commission was there to deal with disciplining public servants. There had been an incident in a correctional service centre and the SAHRC had sent a team to investigate.  Two days later the Public Protector had sent their own to team to investigate, and the police. They were all investigating the same incident, but there was coordination. The role JICS could play was to pick up an issue and dispatch it to the relevant unit that would have the specialised skills to deal with it.  The current major problem was the delay in investigations.  Therefore the role and powers to be given to JICS should be to complement existing state institutions. JICS reported to the Minister of Correctional Services and the President because it was a tool in the hands of the hands of the Executive to ensure that what the Department said they were doing administratively, they actually did.  It should also be a tool in the hands of the offenders, to ensure that where crime was reported there were follow-ups. JICS should also be a tool for other Chapter 9 institutions, not by duplicating them but by ensuring that whatever information JICS acquired from the ground was processed properly and dispatched accordingly.

JICS was a tool to the offenders.   Relocating its offices to Gugulethu would not yield anything, as there were no correctional service centres in Gugulethu. The community did not complain to JICS.  If they had complaints about what was happening in the centres, then they could approach the SAHRC or the Public Protector. Accessibility to the community did not mean that you needed to take the offices to the communities, JICS was needed by offenders, and they should be where they were close to centres so it was not difficult for them to reach the centres they would be investigating.

The Chairperson said that Mr Klaas was basically saying that the inspecting judge was a tool of the Minister, and therefore then the debate about independence was meaningless. The proposals raised about giving JICS its own private vote and its own offices were invalid, as JICS would be working for the Minister.

Ms Pregs Govender, Acting Chairperson, SAHRC, hoped that this would result in a rigorous debate that would yield results and hopefully not get lost after the elections with the new Committee. The role of specialised institutions in any area of work versus the mainstreaming of objectives throughout all institutions in the country, needed to be examined. For instance, if one had the DCS, what was their responsibility versus JICS’ responsibility, and how did JICS help to strengthen that responsibility. The idea behind specialised institutions was for them to act as a catalyst to strengthen the mainstreaming of their work in every part of government. That was the challenge, and clearly where the failure was.  If there was no failure in that respect, there would not be thousands of awaiting trial prisoners in prisons who had not yet been convicted.  

Currently the Commissioner operated with four full-time Commissioners and two part-time Commissioners, for a population of 50 million. The SAHRC had dedicated staff and was the smallest of all Chapter 9 institutions. The budget was also the smallest of all Chapter 9 institutions, but that did not mean that SAHRC did not do significant work, despite these limitations.  Therefore the SAHRC could not take on some of the work suggested by Members, purely because it did not have the capacity and resources to do so.

The issue of access to justice, especially to the poor, was a great challenge for South Africans. The perception was that those who could afford wealthy lawyers could get away it, and those who could not afford wealthy lawyers, went to prison.

Mr Justice Vuka Tshabalala, Inspecting Judge, JICS, said on the issue of JICS offices being in townships, that it would be unattainable. In the scheme of things in relations to the DCS, the backbone and function of JICS was in the centres. The townships were already catered for.  There were community stakeholders, and the inspecting judge on occasion went to meetings with them in the communities. Also, one could not do away with JICS because the extent to which it was involved was very broad.   JICS was supposed to be in every centre, according to the Act.  Based on our history, in prisons before 1994 and later, when JICS was formed in 1998, they were called correctional centres.

On the question of reporting and independence, JICS reported to Parliament, the Minister and the President. In these organs, JICS was to provide information on its oversight role in all the facilities. That did not do away with its independence. What took from JICS’s independence was the administrative functioning of JICS, whereby JICS could not procure its own offices or did not have sufficient funds to pay its staff. JICS’s budget in relation to the DSC budget was less that 1%. Taking into account the extent of the work to be done by JICS, how could they get only 1% of the budget?

Mr Matthew Sesoko, Head Investigator Northern Cape: IPID, said the issue of independence was one that IPID had grappled with. They had to examine whether their independence could be guaranteed if they were still within the Ministry of Police. The Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) had been established in terms of the SAPS Act, and that was viewed as compromising the institution’s independence. Parliament in this instance saw a need to have a separate act for IPID, to safeguard its independence. While the institution had its own vote and was administratively independent, they still reported to the Minister, but that did not compromise its independence. However, having its own vote and all other sorts of independence did not ensure the effectiveness of IPID.   It therefore had to be sure, through legislation, that it was clear about the expected functions of IPID. The same principles should apply to JICS.  The Act must be clear on the functions of JICS and strengthen it accordingly.  If JICS’s role was to investigate, legislation ought to be clear exactly what JICS should be investigating or inspecting.  IPID conducted investigations only against the SAPS and no other entity, and according to regulations, the IPID had 90 days to conclude their investigations. IPID did not have a mandate on cases of death and assault in correctional facilities,, but when the police were not investigating those cases as they should, then according to the legislation such matters could be referred to the IPID.

Ms Ngwenya said there had been no proper preparation for JICS.  There needed to be deeper engagement on the matter. Also the issue of office space for JICS had to be taken seriously.  The conditions under which they were working, were discouraging.

Mr Abram said what came to his mind was what Robert F Kennedy had said: “Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves.” What was equally true was that every community got the kind of law enforcement it insisted on. What Mr Abram insisted on was, within the bounds of the current legislation, that the Committee needed to examine what had to be done to see to it that JICS carried out the function it was supposed to.  Immediate attention had to be paid to what the legislation said, to see if the implementation of the legislation fell short.  There should be short term relief, and not only consideration of long-term solutions that could not be effected immediately. People could not be employed on contracts that were renewed every 90 days.  The Committee should focus on immediate short-term relief, and the start could be to provide proper office space for JICS, and to ensure their employees had security of tenure.

Mr Mike Masondo, Director of JICS, said emanating from the submission by JICS, they were praying that they would become a government component.

Ms Nontsikelelo Jolingana, Acting National Commissioner: DCS, said there was a need for a thorough workshop on the matter.   The meeting had definitely been an important starting point in putting issues on the table. To emphasise the point, Correctional Service was moving on the premise of what the current legislation was saying. DCS was not opposed to JICS being independent and the law should be reviewed.  The Department would not object to that.  In the Dewani case, the state of South African facilities had been questioned and the DCS had had to submit that the facilities were humane. But also, the inspecting judge had had to present an independent report on the state of facilities. What this showed was that the magnitude of the role of JICS had not necessarily been mentioned in the interaction. In a workshop, where there would be role clarification and the role of the JICS was unpacked, the need for the institution would not be questioned. The question was whether legislation should change or whether treasury should rather be approached to ring-fence the money for JICS, so they received their budget directly from treasury.

 

Mr L Max (DA) said the presentation indicated what needed to happen to secure the independence of JICS. The workshop would not yield any new proposals other than the ones that had been raised during the interaction and the presentations. The way forward should mandate the parliamentary legal drafters to start with the process, based on research and the inputs from today.

The Chairperson said starting something should be in the manner of planting a seed, to strengthen JICS. When many argued for JICS, they always said it should not be forgotten where the country came from. It was apparent that there was a need for JICS, but it had to be strengthened both in the long and short term.  The rest would be handed over to the incoming Committee, and the experience of the Committee from the past five years should not be lost in the process.

The Chairperson thanked all the entities that were present for their inputs.

Consideration and Adoption of Minutes
Minutes dated 19 June 2013
The Chairperson asked Members to go through the minutes page by page and point out any errors.
 

Mr Selfe proposed adoption of the minutes. Mr Magagula seconded the proposal.

The Committee adopted the minutes without amendments.

Minutes dated 21 June 2013
The Chairperson asked Members to go through the minutes page by page.

Ms Phaliso proposed adoption of the minutes. Mr Selfe seconded the proposal.

The Committee adopted the minutes with amendments to spelling errors on pages 7 and 13.

Meeting was adjourned.