Hon Speaker, members of this august House, ladies and gentlemen and fellow South Africans, our constitutional scheme is premised on constitutional democracy. It is based on the will of the people and the supremacy of the Constitution. In addition, all institutions of governance are subject to the Constitution and most of them are accountable to Parliament. The constitutional framework establishes the executive to make policy, allocate resources and govern the country; the legislature to make the laws; and an independent judiciary to settle disputes by interpretation of the law. In their wisdom, the founders of the Constitution also established a number of constitutional institutions to deepen and support democracy.
The Public Protector is meant to investigate any maladministration in state affairs; the SA Human Rights Commission promotes respect for human rights, and the Independent Electoral Commission manages elections, to name but a few. There are also other state institutions that are executive-based but have adequate independence, such as the Hawks and the National Prosecuting Authority, NPA. Largely, these institutions are meant to support democracy, ensure the will of the people and that the pronouncements of the Constitution are observed.
Today we have before us a motion of no confidence in President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, but what we are actually being called on to consider is a motion of no confidence in government itself. As a matter of fact, it is a motion of no confidence in the people of South Africa who vote for the ANC. It is garbage, and we should strongly challenge and reject it with the contempt it deserves.
The South African state, led by President Zuma is, in its very essence, defined by the strong institutions where the separation of powers is enforced. It is a principle that this government has jealously guarded to protect state institutions from being manipulated to serve narrow political agendas. Where there have been instances of abuse of this principle, we have acted swiftly. Members of the House, it has been under this government that civil society institutions, including nongovernmental organisations, NGOs, have been able to hold the executive to account through activism, mobilisation and, in certain cases, even court action. Last year in 2014, we ranked fourth out of 52 countries in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance - an improvement in our ranking of the year before. [Applause.] This year, we ranked 39th in the World Press Freedom Index - an upward move of three ranks. The Inter- Parliamentary Union's Global Parliamentary report noted that our established practices on public participation, openness and transparency could be regarded as exemplary.
During the current President's tenure in office, a number of institutions have received considerable support, showing the commitment of both the President and the ANC government to the continued promotion of a transparent government committed to the principles of democracy. For instance, the SA Human Rights Commission's budget in 2008-09 was R63 million, while in the last financial year it was almost double that. In fact, it amounted to R119,2 million. The Public Protector's budget has grown from R86,4 million in 2008 to R246 million in 2015. In effect, this means that the budget has almost tripled. This is proof of support for the Public Protector's office to fulfil its mandate.
During President Zuma's tenure, the allocation of a separate budget for the Office of the Chief Justice is part of a move to protect the independence of the judiciary. However, this does not mean that the executive cannot express an opinion in disagreeing with a particular judgment. The courts themselves also get diverted on a particular point of law, hence the majority and minority judgments, as well as the appeal system. The courts are independent and impartial, and the ruling party has always respected the constitutional injunction to assist and protect the independence of the courts.
The opposition has been telling us that the heads of the Hawks, National Prosecuting Authority and other semi-independent bodies must not be appointed by the executive. Yet, in most democracies, such appointments are made by the head of state. In addition, attorneys-general with a similar role to that of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, NDPP, are, in some countries, members of the executive. It therefore makes one wonder why, in South Africa, where the NDPP is not even a member of the executive, this is made an issue.
Listen to this junk: when the respected head of the Special Investigating Unit, SIU, Advocate Soni announced his resignation, he emphasised that it was to care for his very ill wife. Instead, we are fed poison that political meddling was responsible for his resignation. What junk!
As a matter of fact, the vote of no confidence must be directed at hon Maimane. He is leading the most divided DA, between himself and his Chief Whip. [Interjections.] They defied you openly when you entered into an agreement with the Deputy President to bring order to this House. They showed you their middle finger, and you could not move but simply comply, unless you wanted to suffer the same fate of being exiled to study theories of doom like your predecessor, who was described by the madam as ``not being able to achieve anything without her''. You are the weakest DA leader, hon Maimane. [Interjections.] Where is Mr Seremane? Where is Mr Seremane who used to sit here?
Your members refuse to be subjected to processes of vetting. Why? Must we be worried that such vetting processes that are denied may lead to a vetting gate that will uncover an assassin gate, the Askari gate, the Vlakplaas gate, maybe even the drug dealership gate or the eThekwini pants down gate? [Interjections.] What is the problem? Is it the eThekwini pants down gate? My last words ... [Time expired.] [Applause.]