Chairperson, I would like to offer my profound apologies. The committee engaged on an extensive process of looking into the matter of treaty-making. As we know, the role of Parliament in the process is stipulated under section 23 of our Constitution. Part of the difficulty is that over the years, global trends have indeed brought about many challenges, including what we view as the centralisation of multilateral co- operation in institutions such as the United Nations.
Countless decisions that matter to the lives of many South Africans are indeed taken in international institutions. These are normally not subjected to accountability, which indeed impacts on domestic policy, thus limiting policy space. Consequently, Parliaments have resolved to step beyond the traditional executive prerogative in international affairs.
With regard to the matter of treaties, the weakness has always been that generally, governments have not been subjected to a kind of scrutiny and oversight in treaty making. Now, the current situation is that South Africa's role in the negotiation of treaties and the implementation of treaty obligations has aroused considerable interest in many sectors of our society. To us, it was not clear how Parliament relates to the executive in the treaty-making process, much less influences the outcome of treaties. As it is, Parliament comes in at the tail end for the approval needed for the ratification, or otherwise, of treaties.
Therefore, the constitutional mandate to approve treaties should, in our view, logically influence the outcome of these treaties before they are finalised. In this regard, Parliament itself has no framework or common approach for dealing with treaties. It has what we view as an unco- ordinated system in which each committee deals with treaties relevant to its own field in the way it deems fit.
For Parliament, the approval of treaties is therefore merely a compliance exercise without its meaningful input. This is indeed a matter of great concern to us, especially because Parliament's role is generally limited to reservations whose force and effect is not even clear.
Late submissions of international agreements and submissions by departments to Parliament for consideration are indeed a problem. Parliament is generally not afforded enough time to duly scrutinise and consider treaties tabled. There is no definition of what constitutes a reasonable time within which the executive should be compelled to table these agreements.
There is also no analysis as to which laws will be affected by any treaty entered into. There is no costing or budgetary analysis done in relation to the implementation of treaties. The currently used explanatory memorandum, in our view, also lacks national interest analysis. There is inadequate capacity to deal with treaties in Parliament. The institution is equally slow in building a potential capacity in the form of content advisors and so on in dealing with treaties.
As a measure for enhancing capacity to scrutinise treaties, the committee explored whether it would be expedient for Parliament to create a dedicated institutional mechanism such as a joint standing committee or otherwise. We have, however, recommended, after lengthy deliberations, that the committee, having identified all these challenges, proposes to the House that the Portfolio Committee on International Relations should rather be used as a clearing house for all treaties sent to Parliament.
This will enable it to receive and deal with treaties, and indeed confer with other line function portfolio committees rather than creating a dedicated committee to deal with treaties which in our view will consume a lot of resources, including office space, a staff budget and so on. That is the proposal before the House. Thank you so much.
There was no debate.
Hon House Chair, I move:
That the Report be adopted.
Motion agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.