Thank you, hon Speaker. Hon Members of Parliament, criminals continue to prey on our people and society. Organised crime, serious economic and transnational crimes, as well as corruption, undermine our democracy and have a negative impact on our people.
To address this it is essential that we wage an all-out war against criminal elements involved in these types of crimes, criminals who seek to derail the progress we have made as a society. Of critical importance is that Members of Parliament, public representatives across all levels of our governance system, and public servants in general must participate in this offensive in a determined and co-ordinated manner.
Internationally, it is accepted that you cannot separate organised crime and corruption, and that the two forms of crime are considered to be two sides of the same crime coin. It is also internationally accepted that to address these forms of crime a strong multiagency approach and focus are required.
In 2008-09, government and Parliament engaged in a lengthy and consultative process that ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, DPCI, within the SA Police Service.
As government we are continuously seeking to improve the quality of law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system as a whole. It is for this reason that, after finalising the process to establish the DPCI, we agreed that the legislation which created this unit would be subject to a three-year review in terms of section 17K of the South African Police Service Amendment Act of 2009 after being enacted. This review was aimed at using the operational experience gained in these three years to further strengthen our legislation and the effective functioning of the DPCI.
On 17 March 2011 the Constitutional Court, in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, declared Chapter 6A of the South African Police Service Act, which deals with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, DPCI, to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, because it failed to secure an adequate degree of independence of the DPCI. The Constitutional Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of 18 months to afford Parliament an opportunity to remedy this defect. We respected the Constitutional Court and at the same time began in earnest to work on the changes as highlighted during the judgment.
The Bill that is before this House therefore seeks to achieve two objectives. The first is to address our commitment and undertaking that we would review and improve the legislation governing the DPCI, three years after its enactment.
The second is to honour and respond to the Constitutional Court's ruling regarding the DPCI. It is important to reiterate that, contrary to what has been projected by some members of the opposition and certain so-called legal experts, the Constitutional Court in its judgment indicated that the creation of a separate crime-fighting unit within the SA Police Service, the SAPS, was not, in itself, unconstitutional.
The court also, contrary to what some have inappropriately projected in the public domain, stated that the Constitution does not require full independence, but rather adequate levels of structural and operational independence. In defining independence, international standards require political commitment and adequate resources, powers and staffing of the structure or approach. The process of drafting the legislation began in April 2011 and included, amongst others, a serious review and analysis of what the Constitutional Court ruling actually implied; and a review of international standards, approaches and positions regarding such organised crime and corruption- fighting mechanisms.
In addition, during the process of drafting this legislation there was a serious review of different options, and there were extensive consultations with the National Treasury and the Department of Public Service and Administration, DPSA, regarding what models would best work. This was a relatively detailed process and took about 10 months to complete. However, at the end of this process we had satisfied ourselves that amendments to Chapter 6A of the South African Police Service Act and strengthening of the role and position of the DPCI were the correct way to go.
During our international review we were able to recognise that international standards neither offer a blueprint for the setting up of the administration of an anticorruption institution, nor advocate a single best practice model or a universal type of anticorruption agency.
The Bill that is now before this House therefore seeks to align our legislation with the Constitutional Court judgment and, based on the extensive research and analysis process, seeks to improve the legislation governing the functioning of the DPCI and our approach to fighting organised economic and transnational crimes. The Bill provides the DPCI with the adequate structural and operational independence to perform its functions.
However, what is also important is that the anticorruption law enforcement approach is not overburdened by its having to investigate cases of petty corruption. Therefore, it is ideal to limit its jurisdiction to serious cases.
The Bill ensures that there is a strong legal basis for the approach to organised crime and corruption. This should include a clear mandate; institutional placement; appointment and removal processes; internal structures; functions; jurisdictions; powers; responsibilities; budget; personnel-related matters; relationships with other institutions; accountability; and reporting lines.
We believe that the Bill before this House addresses all these issues and will ensure that we as a government are able to enhance and build on our existing successes and approaches in the fight against corruption and organised crime.
In the final analysis, the Bill further recognises that anticorruption bodies or structures do not operate in a vacuum. It emphasises a strong need for co-ordination and co-operation with other government departments and specialised areas.
It also recognises that the SAPS has a constitutional mandate to fight crime and that such mandate must include organised economic and transnational crimes, as well as corruption.
The democratic state, through the Constitution, has tasked the police with being responsible for investigating and preventing crime, including organised crime and corruption. The passing of this important piece of legislation is a step forward as we advance our fight against organised crime and corruption - an effort in which every one of us must put a shoulder to the wheel. Thank you. [Applause.]
Hon Speaker, members of the executive, Members of Parliament, and comrades and friends, corruption and maladministration are inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental values of our Constitution. They undermine the constitutional commitment to human dignity, the achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. Corruption and maladministration are the antithesis of the open, accountable, democratic government required by the Constitution. They are transnational phenomena that cross national borders and affect all societies and economies. They are equally destructive in the public and private sectors, and regional and international co-operation is essential to prevent and control corruption and related crimes.
Today in this House we are tabling a Bill that establishes an adequately independent Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, DPCI, in line with the Constitutional Court judgment, and moreover in line with our conscientious minds.
As the Minister has said, on 17 March 2011 the Constitutional Court declared Chapter 6A of the South African Police Service Act, Act 68 of 1995, which established the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, the DPCI, to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and invalid to the extent that it failed to secure an adequate degree of independence for the DPCI.
As a result of the declaration of the invalidity, as the Minister has said, the Constitutional Court suspended it for a period of 18 months to afford Parliament an opportunity to remedy the defect.
Can I mention here that this judgment was a split judgment? Out of the ten judges who listened to the arguments, four ruled that the chapter was constitutional, one judge abstained and five ruled that the chapter was unconstitutional. We remain bound by and respect the majority judgment.
In ruling on the constitutionality of Chapter 6A, the Constitutional Court asked two questions: firstly, whether the Constitution required the state to establish and maintain an adequately independent body to combat corruption and organised crime; and, secondly, whether or not the DPCI met the requirements of independence.
In answering the first question, the court concluded that the Constitution indeed imposed an obligation on the state to establish and maintain an independent body to combat corruption and organised crime.
In answering the second question, on the independence of the DPCI, the court concluded that the legislation did not meet the requirements of independence on the basis of the following issues: firstly, the DPCI was insufficiently insulated from political influence in its structure and functioning, thereby lacking the necessary structural and operational independence to be an effective corruption-fighting mechanism; secondly, the conditions of service of its members, particularly its head, made it vulnerable to undue political influence, due to a lack of security of tenure of the members of the DPCI; and, thirdly, the Ministerial Committee's accountability and oversight of the DPCI was found to undermine its independence, "as the Ministerial Committee possessed untrammelled power to determine policy guidelines in respect of functioning of the DPCI, as well as the selection of national priority crimes."
In fact, the judgment was too critical of the Ministerial Committee powers. It found that Parliament's oversight function was undermined by the level of involvement of the Ministerial Committee. The judgment further stated that the complaints system involving a retired judge, regarding past incidents, did not afford sufficient protection against future interference.
However, the court was unanimous that Chapter 6A of the South African Police Service Act could not be invalidated on the following bases: that it was irrational; that Parliament had failed to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process that led to its enactment; that section 179 of the Constitution obliged Parliament to locate a specialised corruption- fighting unit within the National Prosecuting Authority; that the creation of a separate corruption-fighting unit within the SAPS was unconstitutional; and that the legislative choice to abolish the Directorate for Special Operations, DSO, and to create the DPCI offended the Constitution. It is important to note that in these matters that I have just mentioned the Constitutional Court found nothing unconstitutional.
The Constitutional Court defined the independent anticorruption body. In this regard, the Court endorsed the definition of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which provides that independence means: firstly, that anticorruption bodies should be shielded from undue political interference; secondly, the political will to fight corruption is the key; thirdly, the level of independence can vary according to specific needs and conditions; fourthly, it is the structural and operational independence that is important; fifthly, there is a clear legal basis and mandate for a special body, department or unit, and this is particularly important for law-enforcement bodies; and, lastly, that transparent procedures for the appointment and removal of the director, together with proper human resources management and internal controls, are important elements to prevent undue interference.
On structural and operational independence, the Constitutional Court ruled that what is required for an anticorruption body is not full independence, but an adequate level of structural and operational independence, secured through institutional and legal mechanisms to prevent undue political interference, and appropriate to the nature of such an organisation.
The Constitutional Court further ruled that the public's perception of independence also plays an important part in evaluating whether an entity is, in fact, independent. In determining the public perception of independence, the Constitutional Court drew up a test, which involves a reasonably informed and reasonable member of the public, who will have confidence in an entity's autonomy-protecting features, which is important in order to determine the degree of independence. One will not just go to a court and claim that members of the public have no confidence in this directorate. One will have, in the structure and operation, to prove to the court such claims.
The Constitutional Court appreciated the following: that our legal system requires some level of executive involvement in any area of executive functioning - I think this is important; that the international agreement issue requires the Republic to establish an anticorruption agency in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system; and that what is required for an anticorruption body is not full independence, but an adequate level of structural and operational autonomy.
What we have just outlined is the core and gist of the Constitutional Court judgment. Allow me to explain to the House the legislative process that unfolded in Parliament, lest we are misled into doubting our own process.
It is normally not necessary to bring to the attention of the House the Bill or legislative processes that have taken place in Parliament. However, it is important to do that in this debate. The South African Police Service Amendment Bill was tabled in Parliament on 23 February 2010 by the Minister of Police.
It was then referred to the portfolio committee on 28 February 2012. On 7 March 2012, the portfolio committee received a briefing on the Bill from the Civilian Secretariat for Police. I must indicate that many civil organisations and legal professionals attended that meeting. The process that was to follow, as per the portfolio committee programme, was outlined by the chairperson in that meeting.
On 9 March 2012 the Bill was advertised in most of our main national newspapers, such as Ilanga, Mail & Guardian, Sunday Times, Business Day, New Age, City Press, Sowetan and Rapport, and written submissions from interested individuals and organisations were invited.
The closing date for written submissions was 27 March 2012. This was well in line with Parliamentary procedures, which call for two weeks plus a weekend for the written submissions. During that time the portfolio committee received just 20 written submissions. We then decided to extend the due date for written submissions to 10 April 2012, in which time only one written submission was received, and this gave a total of 21 written submissions.
Of the 21 written submissions, 12 were substantive and 9 were one-line or very short submissions. Nine organisations were invited to come before the portfolio committee to make oral submissions, as the two other organisations indicated their unavailability. Out of the nine invited organisations, eight came and one did not turn up. We stated, however, that we would accept and consider submissions that came in, up to the time when we adopted the Bill, but nothing more came.
Let me take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for the written and oral submissions that all the organisations and individuals made, particularly those of Prof Pierre de Vos, who also provided alternative and constructive proposals for a directorate either outside or inside the South African Police Service, SAPS. We have included most of the proposals in the Bill that we are debating today. Mention must also be made of Prof Mhango of Wits School of Law for his independent and well-thought- through submissions.
We set aside four days for oral submissions but, as indicated above, we received few substantive submissions, so we ended up listening to them over two days, that is on 24 and 25 April. The portfolio committee started with its deliberations on the Bill on 2 May and easily adopted the Bill on 16 May and we are debating it today, 23 May 2012.
Let me mention that this is the fourth Bill that the portfolio committee has processed during this term. It is the only Bill that took almost 12 weeks to process - from the time it was referred to the portfolio committee on 28 February 2012 until the day of debate. The Independent Police Investigative Directorate Bill, the IPID Bill, and the Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Bill both took only five weeks to process. Speaker, we gave ourselves time to be more thorough with this Bill.
By the way, we were warned even before it was drafted that it would again be challenged in the Constitutional Court. In regard to that we say, the sooner it happens, the better for all of us. [Applause.]
I want to thank members of the Portfolio Committee on Police, particularly those from the ANC, Cope, the IFP and the ACDP, who from the beginning of our legislative process were determined to produce a Bill that would stand the test of time. I am omitting the DA this time, because at one stage I thought they were missing a golden opportunity to make a contribution to the Bill we were processing. A little later they woke up to the realisation that we were committed and seriously doing our work on behalf of the approximately 50 million people of this country.
Let me once more remind members that the Constitutional Court ruled that our legal system requires some level of executive involvement in any area of executive function. The judgment further appreciated that the Constitution requires a member of the Cabinet to be responsible for policy- making. The judgment stated that these constitutional duties can coexist and will do so, provided that the anticorruption unit has sufficient attributes to fulfil the functions required of it under the Bill of Rights.
It further stated that adequate independence did not require insulation from political accountability. It said that in the modern polis that would be impossible, and it would be averse to our uniquely South African constitutional structure. Hon members, I quote the statement by the Constitutional Court:
What is required is not total insulation from political accountability, but only insulation from a degree of management by political actors ...
The heads of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, DPCI, will now be referred to as the national head, the deputy national head and the provincial heads of the DPCI. This makes the point that these people are independent.
The Minister, with the concurrence of the Cabinet, shall appoint the head of the DPCI. This time around we have included the criteria which the Minister will have to consider. This is a deputy director-general, position and it has to go to Cabinet.
The Minister, in consultation with the national head of the directorate and with the concurrence of the Cabinet, shall appoint the national deputy head, as well as the provincial heads of the DPCI. In all these cases the Bill sets out appointment criteria that the Minister must consider. All of them will be appointed for a nonrenewable fixed term of not less than seven years and not more than 10 years. The period will be determined at the time of appointment.
Let me state here that an appointment by the Minister of a person to the directorate does not automatically imply that the appointee will not act independently or impartially. The Constitutional Court has previously commented that:
There is a difference between being nominated by the executive to perform a duty which calls for an independent decision and being (appointed) by the executive to perform that duty in accordance with its wishes.
Remember, "adequate independence" does not mean insulation from political accountability but a degree of insulation from management by political actors that may threaten the independent functioning of the entity.
The current head of the DPCI is accountable to the National Commissioner of Police, which the Constitutional Court found to compromise "adequate independence", particularly because the term of office of the National Commissioner is renewable, which might render him or her vulnerable to political influence. This is according to the Constitutional Court.
We have ensured that the national head of the directorate is accountable to the Minister. Hon Anneliz van Wyk from the ANC will talk about the removal from office of the national head of the DPCI, and we have strengthened the process. Chairperson, hon members and fellow South Africans, as I conclude let me remind all of us that section 199(7)(b) of the Constitution provides that, and I quote:
Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions -
(b) further, in a partisan manner, any interest of a political party.
We are hereby humbly presenting to this august House and the people of South Africa the South African Police Service Amendment Bill, being confident that it will pass the constitutional muster. We believe that it will be a concrete and effective tool to fight commercial and organised crime and, in the main, to fight the corruption that threatens everything we hold dear and precious in our hard-won constitutional democracy.
Amandla ngawethu! [Power to the people!] I thank you. [Applause.]
Speaker, as a member of the Police Portfolio Committee, I have found myself asking over the past weeks whether it is enough to achieve something that may at best be described as "adequate". Is this how the Fourth Democratic Parliament should be written up in our history books, as "adequate"?
When the 130-page Glenister judgment was presented, it was stated that only the Constitutional Court had the jurisdiction to decide whether Parliament had failed to facilitate public involvement in the legislative process. In an attempt to ensure that we did not fall foul of the Constitutional Court on this occasion, the committee conducted public hearings, and then, with 21 submissions, 12 of them substantive, and all but one calling for the unit to be removed from the SA Police Service, the committee proceeded to ignore them!
One must ask why. The answer lies in the fact that the officials, who, some claim, actually run Parliament rather than the hon members, took it upon themselves not only to take a full year to put together what was at first glance a deeply flawed Bill, but also not to give the committee options - a proposal to place it under the National Prosecuting Authority, or another perhaps creating a unit with its own budget, such as IPID. No, it seems the officials decided to give us just one option, which we were then instructed to work with, and which tinkered with the Hawks in an attempt to comply with the Constitutional Court ruling.
Speaker, tinkering with the wheels of a car that has no engine is a futile exercise. It will not put this Fourth Democratic Parliament on the road into the history books as having achieved something extraordinary. And we did have that opportunity, but it was an opportunity missed. That conglomeration of SAPS units which the Ministry decided to name the Hawks, as though it was everyman's answer to the Scorpions, certainly does good work on priority crime. However, here's the rub - when it comes to looking at corruption in high places its role has to date been extremely limited. The reasons for this are legion but, to sum it up, it is a body within the SAPS - its members are part of a ranked structure where juniors take and obey orders from their superiors, and their superiors are politicians!
When the Bills shutting down the Scorpions were compiled, we were offered four options, and they were actually taken to the ANC caucus for a vote by members who had never spent a single second in the deliberations or on the Police portfolio committee. Every attempt at creating a unit that was not the Scorpions, but that still had a modicum of independence, was thrown out and so it was left to the SAPS to try to sell the Hawks as a body that the South African public believed were independent. They failed at that job miserably.
As a country, we did have an independent unit, but because it stung various top politicians, some of them in this House today, they went from hero to zero in the ANC's eyes. As a nation the Scorpions made us proud of their conviction record of 94%, and their mere presence assured us that the good guys were doing a great job. The unit became the bar other nations sought to reach.
Today we stand on the brink of handing the NCOP a Bill that the banks of advocates and law professors told us should have been worded differently. But once the Police Portfolio Committee completed the tick-box exercise of public hearings, the committee moved on as though it had never happened.
Do we have a body which is sufficiently independent to tackle the challenges of systemic and endemic corruption eating away at the very foundation of our democracy? I don't think so! Hugh Glenister, who won this case in the Constitutional Court, doesn't think so. But of course, what we think doesn't really matter! It's not the DA or Hugh Glenister who has to be convinced - it's the Judges of the Constitutional Court who must be satisfied.
We have until 17 September to pass this Bill, which will address Parliament's failure to secure an adequate degree of independence for the Hawks in the existing legislation.
We began processing this Bill in March, and hours were spent poring over legislation by members of civil society, academia and, indeed, the official opposition. Our stating that sufficient independence was unattainable within the SAPS hierarchy fell on deaf ears. I hear the laughter - it is still going on! The Institute for Security Studies, the Institute for Accountability in Southern Africa, and the Helen Suzman Foundation, to name just three, all said, "Take it out of the SAPS!" The Constitutional Court judgment stated:
To create an anti-corruption unit that is not adequately independent would not constitute a reasonable step.
The court approved the criteria applicable for the creation of a best practice anticorruption unit of the kind South Africa has promised its treaty partners around the world. It would be a unit that would: pay specialised attention to corruption; have properly focused training; be independent from political interference, influence and manipulation; have resourcing that is guaranteed; and have security of tenure of staff.
In the committee's attempts to force a square peg into a round hole, I fear there were members who focused on the Polokwane resolution of 2007, on which Luthuli House has to report back at the upcoming conference in Mangaung. The resolution then was that the powers of the Scorpions would be tucked safely back into the SAPS, where political control over the unit could be maintained. And, indeed, what we saw was a single-minded determination to ensure that this Bill spoke to the initial move after the scrapping of the Scorpions, and this Bill today does just that, irrespective of the ruling of the court, and irrespective of what will be of greatest benefit to the citizens of South Africa. Never once was that even referred to by those determined to make the square peg fit.
The DA was obviously not expecting to see, for example, the degree of independence enjoyed by the judiciary or the National Prosecuting Authority. Less could be adequate, if we were not a country where corruption was endemic, and if indeed we were a country where there was zero tolerance for corruption. We are not! Adequate independence must be adequate to the realities of the day, and today we are not! If we were, adequate independence might be set at a relatively lower standard than that which is required to arm the state sufficiently to see off any major challenges posed by corruption. It is a relative concept and the judgment states:
There can be no gainsaying that corruption threatens to fell at the knees virtually everything we hold dear and precious in our hard-won constitutional order.
The SAPS itself was labelled as a dysfunctional part of our dysfunctional criminal justice administration by the hon Adv Johnny de Lange who, of course, paid a huge political price for telling that particular truth.
How else could we describe an entity that boasts a former police chief languishing in prison - of course, not in a cell - serving 15 years for corruption? His successor was suspended pending the findings of a board of inquiry, and his acting substitute is under investigation by the Public Protector. A Crime Intelligence boss, Richard Mdluli, has the civil society advocacy body, Freedom Under Law, seeking to interdict him from carrying out his duties, because the Minister failed to do the right thing.
That weak, weak decision to shift Mdluli rather than suspend him may well speak to the fact that the Minister of Police himself is apparently under investigation for alleged misappropriation of secret slush funds for the purpose of building a wall around his holiday home, irregular use of a motor vehicle belonging to the state, and nepotism. This House knows that the President himself has 783 unresolved counts of corruption against him, charges which could be revived if the decision not to proceed on them is successfully reviewed in the courts at the insistence of the DA.
All of this speaks to the fact that an effective anticorruption unit ought to be located as far away from the SAPS and the executive as possible. Anticorruption units elsewhere report to Parliament, and not to the executive.
What is before us here today is a Bill that establishes an entity within the SAPS that flouts SAPS regulations, and allows a junior to supersede a superior officer, who on the other hand in the Constitution controls the SAPS in its entirety. What has been created is necessary to speak to the judgement, but what has been created is also actually a convoluted constitutional conundrum. Nowhere is there a clause in the Constitution which reads that the national commissioner controls all of the SAPS except for the doings of the Hawks.
The Hawks are not a specialised anticorruption unit; the unit also deals with the prevention, investigation and combating of national priority offences, in particular serious organised and transnational crime, and serious commercial crime. The efforts to make it seem independent of political interference have been legion, but one of the most important calls of the judgment was simply pushed aside. From paragraph 207 of the judgment regarding public perception:
... the appearance or perception of independence plays an important role in evaluating whether independence in fact exists.
Will the public have confidence in a unit where the head is merely appointed by the Minister, with no involvement of Parliament, and where his or her rank is subordinate to that of the national commissioner?
As the ruling says, if Parliament fails to create an institution that appears from the reasonable standpoint of the public to be independent, it has failed to meet one of the objective benchmarks for independence. It is hard to imagine that the Bill before us today for its Second Reading convincingly allays public fears and concerns of political interference in the work of the Hawks, especially given the fact that the public submissions were simply bulldozed through and largely ignored.
A month and a half of fiddling and tinkering with the Hawks is unlikely to persuade the public that Parliament has adequately protected the Hawks from fiddling and tinkering by corrupt politicians in high places and in the halls of government. Are we once again going to be told that we are offending the constitutional obligation on Parliament to create an independent anticorruption entity, which is intrinsic to the Constitution itself and which Parliament assumed when it approved the relevant international instruments, including the United Nations convention? The judgment stated that the now defunct Scorpions were independent - the Hawks are not! The Hawks are not the Scorpions, and little effort has been made to replicate what was independent.
In conclusion, the Bill before the House today does not adequately deal with at least three of the key concerns consistently raised by the DA.
Financial independence is a prerequisite for independent anticorruption efforts. The national commissioner remains the accounting officer for the Hawks budget and the money allocated to it forms part of the Budget Vote for the Police. The Hawks, like the Independent Police Investigative Directorate, should have a separate Budget Vote and they require greater financial independence to ensure that they will not face spurious budget cuts or resource constraints when zooming in on corrupt officials and politicians.
The Hawks and their members remain in the Department of Police, with all the powers, duties and functions of police officers. While it is necessary for the Hawks to have these powers and functions, it is unacceptable that their members operate within the rank and file of the SAPS, where independence is undermined by a culture of taking orders from superiors without question.
The appointment process for the Head of the Hawks is still the overall responsibility of the Minister of Police, with the concurrence of Cabinet. The DA put five recommendations to the committee to involve Parliament, but the committee disagreed. The committee failed to secure a positive role for Parliament as custodian of the democratic voice and concerns of the people of South Africa in the appointment of the head of this corruption buster.
The haste with which this Bill was introduced, deliberated on and finalised is of great concern. It is apparent that there was a predetermined outcome and the bare minimum was done on the Bill in its short time before the committee. It is unfortunate that Parliament was not given adequate time to consider a menu of options in order to create a truly confidence-inspiring corruption buster for our country. Speaker, the DA maintains that so much more could and should have been done. Parliament missed a "golden opportunity" to assert itself as legislative authority.
South Africans deserve an independent, effective and highly specialised, prosecution-driven anticorruption unit to combat the scourge of corruption that undermines the goals of increasing growth, creating jobs and fighting poverty. The Hawks, as created by this Bill, are very unlikely to be that independent, effective and highly specialised anticorruption unit which will courageously combat the scourge of corruption. The police who fall under that umbrella body will try, but at this stage, with the Bill in its current form, I doubt very much that the judges of the Constitutional Court will even allow them to. [Applause.]
Thank you, hon Speaker. Deputy President, Ministers and hon members, let me state at the outset that Cope, having engaged with the Bill over a period of days and weeks, and having evaluated the work on the basis of the Constitutional Court judgment that we had before us, will support the Bill. [Applause.]
I need to state that in our consideration of this Bill we, as committee members coming from opposite poles, engaged robustly on it. The end result was that we agreed that we had done our best under the circumstances, and it was, of course, the right of the Constitutional Court to assess the Bill in its current form to determine whether we had done enough or not. We based our engagement on the four pillars that were instructions in the judgment. The first one was security of tenure. Having engaged with the issue of security of tenure in the committee, we were satisfied with the powers for the national Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, DPCI, to do the implementation and the appointment of staff, including the fixed term of seven to ten years.
We went further and said that all the staff that were in this component were the responsibility of the national director. In fact, the second pillar we discussed was the issue of subordination, which is part of the judgment. On that score we agreed that, having engaged robustly as a committee, we had to find a middle road in order to make sure that the director was not subordinate to the national commissioner. The post was called "deputy national commissioner" and we agreed that we needed to change the name of the position. It had to be independent, and it had to be the national head of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, the head of the DPCI. It would basically be the equivalent of the national commissioner. We did not engage in regard to the remuneration, the salary, at this stage.
The third issue was the finances. We engaged on this, weighing up whether we wanted to support the Bill, and looking at the judgment. I need to say that if you look at section 214 in the judgment, you will see it speaks to the issue of co-existence provided that there is adequate independence. We engaged in regard to resources in the light of the judgment, and we agreed as a committee in our engagement that the budget of the directorate was the responsibility of the national director, from its drafting to preparing it for submission by the national commissioner. There is no veto right. There is no veto right in that respect, in regard to independence.
The last issue was the location. We also weighed this up in our engagement on the location. Where should the directorate be located? We looked at the judgment. The judgment makes the instructive comment that it is not their responsibility to say where it should be located. In fact, it goes on to say that whether it is in the police or in the National Prosecuting Authority, as was the case with the Directorate of Special Operations, DSO, in terms of justice its placing is not necessarily illegal.
Having considered all that was presented in the judgment, we then felt that the work we were doing was to correct what had happened. What had happened in the abolishment of the Scorpions was that it had been a rushed process, it had been incorrect and it had had loopholes in it. Let us state that as a fact. We also agreed that we had done the best we could in this regard, although it might not be one hundred per cent of what we wanted to achieve.
We agreed that the Constitutional Court was the final arbiter on the Bill. We should submit it to the Constitutional Court for it to have its say. If we needed to correct something, we would have to correct that. However, having received a legal opinion from Parliament, we were convinced that the legal opinion gave us a direction that we needed to take.
Therefore, I declare that we support the Bill. We say that while it should be put to the test of the Constitutional Court, we have done our work! [Applause.]
Thank you, Deputy Speaker. Hon members, Deputy President and hon Minister, there are three very important points that I want to raise here. The first one is accountability. The Head of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation will now report directly to the Minister, not through the national commissioner, as was happening before.
The budget will be prepared and submitted to the national commissioner for the national commissioner to submit to Treasury as is. The national commissioner will not have the power to change or make variations to the DPCI budget. We are creating a synergy between the national commissioner and the head of the DPCI.
The head of the DPCI will accompany the national commissioner to assist in presenting the service budget or estimate to Treasury, in order for the head to account for the monies that will be allocated to the DPCI. We in the Portfolio Committee on Police acknowledge that section 217(1) and (2) of the Constitution of South Africa give the national commissioner the powers to manage and control the police. We know that. However, that is why we put the head in tandem or in synergy with the national head of the DPCI.
On security of tenure, the head of the DPCI will control the structure for its employees and manage them under the policy that has been laid down by him or her under the guidance of the Minister. The secure period of employment, from seven to ten years, allows for the management, control and direction of the DPCI. Discipline will be controlled within the DPCI, without the interference of the national commissioner. Consultation will take place with the national commissioner whenever there is a need to do so.
On judicial oversight, the national Civilian Secretariat for Police will now be able to know and prepare the budget of the judge in its wing. This is to ensure that nothing interferes with the independence of inquiries that will be conducted by such a judge.
Lastly, on the ministerial committee, the powers and functions of this committee have been curtailed and limited. It now only has to report to Parliament on their function and unblock the obstacles within the department whenever they occur. They have no power to direct the DPCI on how to do its work and no power to influence cases anymore.
This means that the amending legislation before the hon House has been overhauled and is different from what was presented to the Portfolio Committee on Police. The portfolio committee has attempted to satisfy the objections of the Constitutional Court. If the Constitutional Court disagrees with us as a committee, or with Parliament, it should be very specific on what points it disagrees with us. The IFP supports the South African Police Service Amendment Bill. [Applause.]
Hon Deputy Speaker, I want to say to the hon Chikunga ... [Interjections.] ... that when the Scorpions unit was scrapped, the speakers from the ANC were just as sure then as she is today in saying that the scrapping of the Scorpions was constitutional, when in reality it was a different story.
I want to quote from the response of the hon President, Jacob Zuma, on 16 February this year to the debate on the state of the nation address. He said:
But, the fight against crime and corruption continues. We will not become complacent.
I want to say that with this Bill the ANC has become complacent. [Interjections.] In accepting this Bill you are only paying lip service to the people of South Africa when it comes to corruption.
Hoekom s ek dat hierdie wetsontwerp net lippediens aan die publiek van Suid-Afrika is, as dit oor korrupsie gaan? Die rede is dat die ANC 'n gulde geleentheid gehad het om 'n struktuur daar te vestig wat totaal onafhanklik die beste praktyk kon beoefen het om korrupsie in Suid-Afrika te beveg - spesifiek ook korrupsie soos dit in die SA Polisiediens voorkom.
As u met iets totaal buite die SA Polisiediens gekom het, dan sou die regering van die dag vertroue by die publiek van Suid-Afrika geskep het. Dit sou dan vir die publiek van Suid-Afrika ges het dat ons ernstig is om korrupsie te beveg. [Tussenwerpsels.] (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[Why do I say this Bill only pays lip service to the South African public, when it is about corruption? The reason is that the ANC had a golden opportunity to establish a structure that could, with total independence, exercise the best practices to fight corruption in South Africa - specifically also such corruption as occurs in the SA Police Service.
If you had come up with something that was completely separate from the SA Police Service, then the present government would have created trust among the South African public. It would have indicated to the South African public that we are serious about fighting corruption. [Interjections.]]
However, the ANC has become complacent and that is the problem.
Die tyd aspek wat hier ter sprake is, is 'n bewys daarvan. Daar was amper 'n jaar gewag voordat die wetsontwerp by die Parlement ingedien is. In terme van openbare verhore, was alles gejaagd. Dit was so erg dat hierdie komitee selfs gesit het terwyl belangrike begrotingsdebatte aan die gang was. Dit is eintlik minagtend teenoor die begrotingsdebatte, want ek dink dat een van die belangrikste take van 'n parlementslid is om by begrotingsdebatte teenwoordig te wees, want dit gaan oor belastingbetalers se geld. Daar is ander komitees wat aangaan, maar u het dit net deur gestoomroller. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraph follows.)
[The time aspect that is under discussion is proof of this. Nearly a year passed before the Bill was submitted to Parliament. In terms of public hearings, everything was rushed. It was so bad that this committee was meeting while important Budget debates were taking place. It is in effect disregard of Budget debates, because I think that one of the most important duties of Members of Parliament is to be present at Budget debates, because it concerns taxpayers' money. There are other committees that proceed, but you just steamrollered it through.]
Saying to the people that we went through all the drills and procedures was only window-dressing. [Interjections.]
Ons sal moet wag om te sien - as u so seker is dat u aan die grondwetlike vereistes voldoen - of dit hierdie keer weer die geval gaan wees. Die VF Plus sal nie hierdie wetsontwerp ondersteun nie. Ek dank u. [Tussenwerpsels.] (Translation of Afrikaans paragraph follows.)
[We will have to wait and see - if you are so sure that you meet the constitutional requirements - whether it will once again be the case this time around. The FF Plus will not support this Bill. I thank you. [Interjections.]]
Deputy Speaker and hon Minister, the ACDP, together with other political parties, vigorously opposed the disbanding of the Scorpions, believing that it was a highly successful anticorruption unit, and that it was being disbanded because it had successfully prosecuted high- profile members of the majority party. It was their success that ultimately led to their demise.
We also opposed the South African Police Service Amendment Bill that replaced the Scorpions with the Hawks. Subsequently we learnt that the Constitutional Court, in a 5 to 4 split decision, found that the Hawks were not sufficiently independent, and were vulnerable to political interference, and we as Parliament were required to amend the Act.
Let us be reminded of what the court said about the need and rationale for combating corruption. The court said:
When corruption and organised crime flourish, sustainable development and economic growth are stunted. And in turn, the stability and security of society is put at risk.
We agree wholeheartedly with these sentiments. Systemic poverty will not be eradicated without eradicating systemic corruption. Hence the need for an independent unit.
Much debate surrounded the location of this unit. The ACDP would have preferred that the unit be located outside the SAPS. However, as pointed out by the Constitutional Court, the Constitution does not require the creation of a specialised crime unit outside the SAPS, or for that matter, within the National Prosecuting Authority, NPA, as desirable as this may be. The head of the Hawks, Lieutenant General Dramat, significantly indicated that the unit should remain within the SAPS.
The committee made substantial and far-reaching amendments to the South African Police Service Act. It is noteworthy, for example, that the executive can no longer dismiss the head of the unit. This can only be done by a majority vote in Parliament, and that only after an enquiry has determined that his dismissal is warranted. The unit's head also has a veto right over the unit's budget, prepared in consultation, while the Hawks and not the National Police Commissioner will present the unit's budget and annual report to Parliament.
The crucial question is whether these amendments form a sufficiently protective layer of independence for the Hawks as an effective anticorruption entity. We in the ACDP say that this goes a long way toward that.
Let us be reminded that the court's decision was a majority judgment of 5 judges, and that 4 judges held a different view. They held that the Hawks were sufficiently protected under the pre-amended Act. The minority judgment, led by the then Chief Justice Ngcobo, held that:
The inclusion of each branch of government ... serves as an important safeguard against encroachment by any single branch into the independent operation of the DPCI.
The minority judgment said that these were adequate checks and balances to ensure the independence of the DPCI. The question is, when it goes back to the courts, will they find that the present view is constitutional, or not?
We in the ACDP believe that these substantial amendments go a long way, and that they may well pass constitutional muster, given the view that there were four minority judges that found that the previous version was constitutional. Notwithstanding the fact that we would have preferred to see the unit located elsewhere, the ACDP will support this Bill. I thank you. [Applause.]
Hon Deputy Speaker, hon Deputy President, hon Minister, and members of the House, section 199(1) of the Constitution states that, and I quote:
The security services of the Republic consist of a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence services established in terms of the Constitution.
Section 199(4) states that, and I quote again:
The security services must be structured and regulated by national legislation.
Section 199(6) states that, and I quote yet again:
No member of any security service may obey a manifestly illegal order.
Section 199(7) states that, and I quote further:
Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions - a) prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or
b) further, in a partisan manner, any interest of a political party.
The above speaks to the independence and impartiality that we require from our security services, including the police. Section 205(3) states that, and I quote:
The objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.
Hon members, you may well ask why I am starting with these extracts from our Constitution. Hon Deputy Speaker and hon members, the reason is that throughout the process of the consideration of this Bill we were subjected to some of the crudest interpretations of our Constitution, as we have seen repeated here in the debate today. I therefore thought that it would be a good point of departure for this debate to remind ourselves of what it is that the Constitution requires from a democratic police service in a democratic South Africa.
If we accept the Constitution as the supreme the law of a democratic South Africa, and this side of the House certainly does, then I think we can all agree that the Constitution places the primary obligation to fight all forms of crime, including that of corruption, at the door of the SA Police Service, SAPS. So, while we address the issues raised by the Constitutional Court, we have as legislators the added responsibility to draft legislation that will provide for the best possible directorate within the SAPS to fight corruption, priority crimes and organised crimes. Hon Deputy Speaker, that is exactly what we, from the side of the ANC, have committed ourselves to doing.
Today false allegations were made by members from certain quarters that the ANC had arrived with preconceived ideas and had therefore not considered submissions made during the public participation process. Nothing can be further from the truth! I do not know how one can argue that at least 53 substantial amendments to the introduced Bill is not applying your mind!
At night, when the committee had finished the public participation hearings or deliberations on the Bill, the ANC study group remained behind. We then summarised and debated amongst ourselves the issues that had been raised, and started working on possible ways of addressing the concerns through introducing amendments to the Bill. That is why, on the first day that the committee started to deliberate on the Bill, the ANC was already in a position to propose amendment after amendment after amendment. Following further debate with some political parties on the committee, we amended some of our own proposed amendments in order to find common ground and agreement!
Now I don't know about you, hon Deputy Speaker, hon Minister and members of the House, but I humbly submit that to any reasonable citizen there can be no other perception than that a serious consideration of the public submissions took place, and that serious deliberations thereon by the ANC and, indeed, most parties represented on the committee took place. If some parties, through their lack of participation, their preoccupation with other topical issues of the day, and their prefixed and predetermined mind- set and agenda, have neutralised themselves in the process, then they surely cannot blame those that took the task at hand seriously and took it forward.
The chairperson spoke about the appointments of the heads, and I am not going to repeat that. We took to heart the concerns that were raised in the public participation process regarding the lack of criteria in the Bill on the type of head that we would like to see appointed. We have included such criteria.
We went further. We said, and that is where Parliament's participation in the appointment process comes in, that as part of the regulations the Minister must bring to Parliament for its concurrence the regulations on the process of appointment - concurrence, not notification. So Parliament and the Minister would have to agree on the "how" of the appointment process. If at any point this Minister or any future Minister wanted to change that process, they would have to come back to Parliament with the amended process and Parliament would again have to concur with the proposed amendments.
That brings us to the removal of the head of the directorate. Clause 17DA of the Bill determines that the national head of the directorate can only be suspended from office pending an inquiry into his or her fitness - on the grounds of misconduct, continued ill health, incapacity to carry out the duties of office efficiently, or no longer being a fit or proper person to hold office.
The decision to remove the head must be communicated to Parliament. The Minister, after consultation with the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and the Chief Justice, must appoint a judge or retired judge to lead the inquiry. The national head shall be informed of any allegations and shall be allowed to make submissions to the inquiry. This was not in the Bill before.
Furthermore, the Bill now also makes provision for the National Assembly to remove the national head of the directorate. The same criteria as for the removal of the national head by the Minister apply. One may well ask why it was necessary to include a provision for the National Assembly to remove the national head. This was done to further enhance independence and to protect the directorate against interference.
Parliament may feel that the head is not doing a proper job and when a Minister is not acting against such a person, Parliament, through the National Assembly, can then start a process of removal. The National Assembly will establish a committee to look into the matter. The report of such a committee will be tabled in Parliament and, with two-thirds support by members of the National Assembly, the head of the directorate will then be removed.
The security of tenure of the staff was addressed, and through that we also further strengthened the structural independence of the directorate. It will be the national head that will determine the fixed establishment and the grading of posts in the directorate. It is also the national head that will appoint the staff of the directorate. The national head of the directorate must develop a recruitment policy for the directorate. Any disciplinary matters that involve any member of the directorate must be done within the confines of the directorate.
No member of the directorate may be transferred or dismissed from the directorate without the consent of the national head of the directorate. The national head, deputy national head and provincial heads are not allowed to get involved in any management activities of the SAPS other than those associated with the directorate. The staff of the directorate cannot be deployed in national joint operations unless the head determines that such operations will be of assistance to the directorate in the execution of its functions and mandate.
Clause 17D of the amending Bill determines that the Minister must table policy guidelines for approval by Parliament. This was such a big issue. The determination of policy is the prerogative of the executive. The execution of those policies is the responsibility of a department. That is democracy, and that is the democratic dispensation that we are in. For enhanced transparency, these guidelines will be brought to Parliament for approval. We will not just take note of them but will actually have to apply our minds to the matter.
For some, as we heard earlier, the reference to "selected offences" in Chapter 2 and in section 34 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, Act 12 of 2004, is an issue. It simply lists a whole lot of offences, some of which are cases of fraud and corruption that can and should be investigated by ordinary detectives. The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation will deal with the top slice of crimes committed.
The head will determine which crimes are to be investigated, guided by the policy guidelines. The Bill makes provision that when there is a difference of opinion between the national head and the national commissioner or a provincial commissioner on whether a case falls within the mandate and scope of the directorate, the position of the national head of the directorate will prevail.
All members of the directorate will be expected to undergo security clearance. Members of the directorate are expected to do their work impartially and independently. Members will be expected to take an oath, in which they undertake to conduct their work in accordance with the Constitution - which underlines their independence - and the law.
It will also be a criminal offence for any person to interfere with the work of the directorate, including anyone from the South African Police Service, SAPS. Such a person is liable, upon conviction, to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.
The head of the directorate will now directly request secondments from other departments, and this will no longer occur through the national commissioner, thus enhancing its structural and organisational independence, Mr Groenewald.
Furthermore, the Bill obliges the head of Crime Intelligence to make available to the directorate dedicated intelligence capacity for a specific case. The directorate will thus not be allowed to form its own intelligence capacity, but will receive intelligence support from the existing intelligent structures within the SAPS.
The role of the ministerial committee is now simply to co-ordinate the relevant government departments. They will meet as often as is required, and are no longer obliged to meet at least four times a year. The ministerial committee is expected to report to Parliament on its activities as part of the annual report of the directorate. If they have not met during a particular year, they will simply report that they did not meet, as there was no need. The ministerial committee will also have to report to Parliament upon request. This brings oversight over the executive, as determined in the Constitution and as required by the Constitutional Court's ruling, into the Bill.
The co-ordinating committee will now be chaired by the national head of the directorate and the deputy head will be the deputy chairperson. It was previously chaired by the national commissioner. The national commissioner will no longer sit on this committee. The committee will review, monitor and facilitate the support of the respective government departments or institutions to the director. It will also look at secondments and address problems that might arise regarding such support and assistance.
One of the most contentious issues during deliberations was the financial independence or dependence of the directorate. In the end, the committee decided to provide for dedicated and exclusive funds for the directorate, the so-called ring-fenced funds.
The head of the directorate shall prepare and provide the national commissioner with the budget from the directorate. The national commissioner shall then include it in the SAPS budget. Clause 17H(3) determines that if there is a dispute between the national head and national commissioner regarding the budget, the Minister will mediate.
The Bill further makes provision that the national head must be part of all deliberations on the directorate's budget, including National Treasury. The national head will thus put his or her own case in negotiations for budget allocations. The national head will also make his or her own submissions to Parliament during the budget process. The annual report to Parliament must include, as a distinct programme, the report on the performance of the directorate.
All monies appropriated by Parliament for the directorate must be seen as specifically and exclusively appropriated for that purpose, or what is popularly referred to as a "ring-fenced budget". They cannot be used for any other purpose. The head will control the funds of the directorate; this, we believe, is adequate financial independence.
A separate budget would have meant that the directorate staff would have had to be increased by at least a further 1 900 people dedicated to administration only, thereby shifting the focus from their primary task.
Provisions regarding the appointment of a retired judge to deal with complaints by the directorate or its members, and also by members of the public, have been improved. The judges' operational budget will now reside with the Civilian Secretariat for Police and will also be a ring-fenced budget. The secretary, in consultation with the retired judge, shall develop an awareness programme regarding the work of the judge amongst the public and members of the directorate, including the role and functions of the complaint mechanism.
Refusal to assist the retired judge with his work, or interference with the work of the judge, is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. It is interesting to note that the judge, in the period since enactment, has received only three complaints. Now, you have some who complain about that, instead of celebrating the low number of complaints, which speaks to the fact that the directorate has been able to do its work without interference or hindrance.
Hon Deputy Speaker, Minister, Deputy President and members, two issues were quite significant in the debate on where this directorate should be placed. One was the decision to selectively ignore what was happening internationally and the findings of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, UNCAC, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD. The majority of signatories to the UNCAC have based their anticorruption units within existing law enforcement agencies. International bodies warn against creating new bodies that will become bureaucratic in nature, and get bogged down by administration, thereby diverting limited resources. They point to a strong link between organised crime and corruption, hon Kohler-Barnard, and warn against overburdening corruption bodies, saying that they should not investigate cases of petty corruption. Therefore, best practice in anticorruption bodies is that they should investigate selective rather than all offences. I would argue that these were ignored because it did not support a certain agenda.
The second issue was the argument for the establishment of a Chapter 9 institution. Here we were told to adhere to a Constitutional Court judgment by changing the Constitution! It boggles the mind. I think it is also important to remind ourselves that a Chapter 9 institution does not in itself guarantee success. It is often dependent on the incumbent.
Hon Speaker, we in the ANC believe that we have not only adhered to the Constitutional Court ruling, but that we have established the best possible directorate with adequate independence, which will be able to fulfil its mandate without fear or favour, with determination and commitment, and in the service of our country and its people.
I must react to what the hon Groenewald said. I would like to ask the hon Groenewald whether he actually read the Bill that is before the House, because I am pretty sure he did not! From his speech you could hear that he had not done so. Hon Groenewald, we made at least 53 substantial changes to the introduced Bill, which is apart from word changes here and there. [Interjections.] That is the principle. You were not there, you did not participate, and you missed an opportunity. As you said, you missed an opportunity.
Then, to the hon Kohler-Barnard, may I explain to you the process of a Bill? I know that you are not in government. [Interjections.] The fact of the matter is that no Bill ever has more than one option. Options come in discussion papers - that is where options come in. Government makes policy. Even when you get to the point of a Green Paper, there are no longer options, hon Kohler-Barnard. So, I don't know where you get these "options" in a Bill from. Options were considered during the period when you complained that it took so long before the Bill was introduced. That was when they were looking at the options! That was when they were discussing them with the Treasury and the Department of Public Service and Administration. That was when the options came into play. [Interjections.]
Agb Adjunkspeaker ... [Hon Deputy Speaker ...]
I am not going to take a question! So you can sit down. It's fine.
Hoe weet die agb lid ek wil dit doen? Wys bietjie jy het durf, man. [How does the hon member know I want to do that? Show us that you have guts.] [Interjections.]
I am not going to take a question! You are wasting my time. The problem is, as Abraham Miller said:
Ten gods cannot change the opinion of one fool, especially if another fool agrees with him.
[Laughter.] [Applause.]
Firstly, on the issue of public perception, public perception will be determined by the success of the Hawks. May I also state to the hon Kohler- Barnard that it was not the Minister who named the unit the Hawks; it was business that named them the Hawks.
Secondly, public perceptions of independence will also best be determined by the success of the directorate - let their deeds speak for themselves. Therein lies the responsibility to improve their communications regarding their successes.
Let me quote Sophocles in Antigone: The kind of man (or woman) who always thinks that he (or she) is right, that his (or her) opinions, his (or her) pronouncements, are the final word, when once exposed shows nothing there. But a wise man (or woman) has much to learn without a loss of dignity.
[Interjections.] Your opinion is your opinion! [Interjections.] Your perception is your perception! [Interjections.] Do not confuse them with facts or truth. [Interjections.] Wars have been fought and millions of people have lost their lives because of the inability of men and women to understand the idea that everybody has different viewpoints.
The last point that I want to raise is the fact that it is interesting that nobody raised the fact that in the Constitutional Court judgment a point was raised. In the minority judgment, which the majority judgment referred to as the main judgment, a point was raised where the minority judgment stated, "Luckily we were never asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Scorpions." The ANC will support this Bill. [Applause.]
Hon Deputy Speaker, let me thank members of the Portfolio Committee on Police. In fact, most of them are saying one and the same thing.
What the member from Cope, hon Ramatlakane, expressed here was that the committee did its best to ensure that we met the requirements of the Constitutional Court. He further spoke of the four pillars that they followed up.
The chairperson from the ANC and the hon Van Wyk expressed similar sentiments.
We listened attentively to the member of the IFP, hon Ndlovu, when he specifically went into detail about the security of tenure, accountability, judicial oversight and the ministerial committee.
To hon Swart from the ACDP, your expression of the fact that what you have done in regard to the Bill over the past weeks goes a long way is noted. I think that one could tell that from what the people who participated were saying.
Hon Groenewald, I think that you can still change your mind. The issue you raised was about the Act itself and the guarantee of passing the constitutional muster. May I remind you that there was a provision for a three-year review, because we had no crystal ball to know how this new entity was going to work.
Hon Kohler-Barnard, I really think that they gave you the wrong speech, unless you wrote it. I say this because, instead of arguing here in regard to what the ConCourt said, you were telling us about Luthuli House and Polokwane, and you were talking about Mangaung! But you can't even pronounce the word "Mangaung". [Laughter.] I really plead with the leadership of the ANC to afford her guest status at the ANC national conference, because I think she likes it. Thank you very much. [Applause.] Debate concluded.
Question put: That the Bill be read a second time.
Division demanded.
The House divided:
AYES - 220: Abram, S; Adams, P E; Ainslie, A R; Balindlela, Z B N; Bhanga, B M; Bhengu, F; Bhengu, P; Bonhomme, T; Borman, G M; Boshigo, D F; Bothman, S G; Burgess, C V; Buthelezi, M G; Carrim, Y l; Cebekhulu, R S; Cele, M A; Chikunga, L S; Chohan, F I; Coleman, E M; Cwele, S C; Dambuza, B N; Daniels, P N; Davies, R H; De Lange, J H; Diale, L N; Diemu, B C; Dikgacwi, M M; Ditshetelo, I C; Dlakude, D E; Dlulane, B N; Dubazana, Z S; Dube, M C; Dudley, C; Dunjwa, M L; Ebrahim, E I; Fihla, N B; Fubbs, J L; Gasebonwe, T M A; Gaum, A H; Gcume, N P; Gcwabaza, N E; Gelderblom, J P; Gina, N; Gololo, C L; Goqwana, M B; Gumede, D M; Hanekom, D A; Hlengwa, M; Holomisa, S P; Huang, C; Huang, S - B; Jacobus, L; Jeffery, J H; Johnson, M; Kekane, C D; Kenye, T E; Kganare, D A; Khoarai, L P; Khumalo, F E; Koornhof, G W; Koornhof, N J J v R; Kota-Fredericks, Z A; Kotsi, C M P; Kubayi, M T; Landers, L T; Lekgetho, G; Lekota, M G P; Lesoma, R M M; Line, H; Lishivha, T E; Lucas, E J; Luyenge, Z; Maake, J J; Mabasa, X; Mabedla, N R; Mabuza, M C; Mackenzie, G P D; Madlala, N M; Madlopha, C Q; Magagula, V V; Magau, K R; Magubane, E; Magwanishe, G; Makasi, X C; Makhuba, H N; Makhubele, Z S; Malgas, H H; Maluleka, H P; Maluleke, J M; Manamela, K B; Manana, M C; Manganye, J; Mangena, M S; Martins, B A D; Mashigo, R M; Mashishi, A C; Masutha, T M; Mathebe, P M; Mathebe, D H; Mathibela, N F; Matlanyane, H F; Matshoba, J M; Maunye, M M; Mavunda, D W; Mayatula, S M; Maziya, M; Mbhele, P D; McIntosh, G B D; Mdaka, M N; Mdakane, M R; Mfundisi, I S; Mjobo, L N; Mkhize, H B; Mlambo, E M; Mlangeni, A; Mmusi, S G; Mncwango, M A; Mnisi, N A; Mocumi, P A; Mohale, M C; Mohorosi, M; Mokoena, A D; Molebatsi, M A; Molewa, B E E; Moloi-Moropa, J C; Moloto, K A; Morutoa, M R; Mosimane, C K K; Moss, L N; Motlanthe, K P; Motsepe, R M; Motshekga, M S; Motshekga, M A; Mpontshane, A M; Msimang, C T; Msweli, H S; Mthethwa, E M; Mthethwa, E N; Mufamadi, T A; Mushwana, F F; N'wamitwa-Shilubana, T L P; Nchabeleng, M E; Ndabandaba, L B G; Ndlanzi, A Z; Ndlovu, V B; Nel, A C; Nelson, W J; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngcobo, E N N; Ngcobo, B T; Ngele, N J; Ngonyama, L S; Ngwenya, W; Ngwenya-Mabila, P C; Nhlengethwa, D G; Njikelana, S J; Njobe, M A A; Nkwinti, G E; November, N T; Ntapane, S Z; Ntshiqela, P; Nxesi, T W; Nxumalo, M D; Nyalungu, R E; Nyekemba, E; Oliphant, M N; Oosthuizen, G C; Peters, E D; Phaliso, M N; Pilane-Majake, M C C; Pilusa-Mosoane, M E; Plaatjies, S K; Radebe, G S; Radebe, B A; Ramatlakane, L; Rwexana, S P; Saal, G; Segale-Diswai, M J; Selau, G J; Shabangu, S; Sibanyoni, J B; Sibiya, D; Sindane, G S; Singh, N; Sithole, K P; Sithole, S C N; Sizani, P S; Skosana, M B; Skosana, J J; Smith, V G; Snell, G T; Sogoni, E M; Sonto, M R; Sosibo, J E; Sotyu, M M; Suka, L; Sulliman, E M; Sunduza, T B; Surty, M E; Swart, S N; Thobejane, S G; Thomson, B; Tinto, B; Tseke, G K; Tsenoli, S L; Tshabalala, J; Tsotetsi, D R; Turok, B; Van der Merwe, J H; Van der Merwe, S C; Van Der Merwe, L L; van Rooyen, D D; van Wyk, A; Williams, A J; Xaba, P P; Ximbi, D L; Xingwana, L M; Zikalala, C N Z; Zulu, B Z.
NOES - 57: Alberts, A D; Boinamo, G G; Bosman, L L; Coetzee, T W; Davidson, I O; De Freitas, M S F; Duncan, P C; Eloff, E H; Esau, S; Farrow, S B; Greyling, L W; Groenewald, P J; Harris, T D; Hill-Lewis, G G; James, W G; Kloppers-Lourens, J C; Kohler-Banard, D; Kopane, S P; Lamoela, H; Lee, T D; Lorimer, J R B; Lotriet, A; Lovemore, A T; Max, L H; Maynier, D H; Mazibuko, L D; Michael, N W A; Mnqasela, M; Mokgalapa, S; Morgan, G R; Motau, S C; Mulder, P W A; Mulder, C P; Ollis, I M; Paulse, S; Rabotapi, M W; Robinson, D; Ross, D C; Schfer, D A; Schmidt, H C; Selfe, J; Shinn, M R; Smalle, J F; Smiles, D C; Smuts, M; Steenhuisen, J H; Steyn, A; Stubbe, D J; Trollip, R A P; Van Dalen, P; Van Den Berg, N J; Van Der Linde, J J; Van Der Westhuizen, A P; Van Dyk, S M; Van Schalkwyk, H C; Waters, M; Watson, A.
Question agreed to.
Bill read a second time.