Kinnear Petition; CSPS & PSIRA BRRR recommendations: progress; with Ministry

Meeting report

Outstanding minutes

The Chairperson presented outstanding minutes from three Committee meetings last year. These were held on 8 May 2020 and 1 October 2020.  

Mr K Maphatsoe (ANC) moved to adopt.

There was no seconder, so it was decided that the Committee would return to this item later in the meeting.

Background to petitions

The Chairperson introduced the petition from Ms Nicolette Kinnear, which called on Parliament to source information surrounding the death of her late husband. Ms Kinnear had submitted the petition to the Speaker of the National Assembly for the brutal assassination of the late Lieutenant Colonel Kinnear. The Speaker had referred the petition to the Committee.

She also provided an update regarding the developments following the petition related to the killing of Mr Cornelius Basson’s son, which the Speaker had referred to Committee on 25 July 2019. The particulars of the petition were that Mr Basson had requested Parliament to intervene as his son had been killed and he had not received progress reports or feedback from SAPS. The Committee had met on 27 November 2019 to hear the petitioner and responses from SAPS, and Mr Basson had expressed his disappointment at the manner in which SAPS had dealt with the investigation.

On the 13 January 2021, Mr Basson had contacted the Committee to inform them that his son’s killer had been arrested. They saw this as a success for the Committee. She thanked the Minister, Deputy Minister and the National Police Commissioner for their assistance in resolving the matter relating to the death of Mr Basson’s son.

Petition of Ms Nicolette Kinnear

Ms Nicolette Kinnear stated that in the petition document, she had addressed two questions.

The first pertained to the guarding of her husband that had been removed on 19 December 2019. The Minister had previously explained that an investigation would need to be carried out in order to establish why the guarding was removed when it was. They had been placed under guarding on 13 November 2019, following a meeting that her husband had attended with his commander, Lieutenant Andre Lincoln. On that day, intelligence had been received that the two of them, along with other members of the SAPS, had been placed on a hit-list. According to the intelligence her husband had shared with her, it had been said that Serbians were coming in. He had returned home that evening with guarding. The very next day, on 14 November, Colonel Andre Kay -- who lived in the same residential area as they did -- was assassinated while exiting his driveway.  This was similar to the way her husband was assassinated.

On 23 November 2019, an attempted hand grenade attack took place at their home at about 12:15am in the morning. This attack took place while the family and the home were under guarding. This had caused great concern for Ms Kinnear. It was no secret that her husband had been on a hit list for many years. There had been something different about that incident, however, which was why she had raised the issue in a media article when the guarding was removed in January 2020. It was of concern to her that the family was attacked and that the attackers had known that they were in the house. She viewed this as an attack on her family and not only on her late husband. In the media article she had posed the question: ‘Why was the guarding removed?’

At the time, her husband was ‘slapped’ with a letter that stated that he needed to report back to the Sea Point SAPS branch. This was a ‘low-blow,’ as she felt that the issue was not about where her husband was working, but more specifically the intelligence and information that he had. At that stage, he was stationed at the Anti-Gang Unit (AGU). She was aware that he had refused to sign the document for the move, and she had supported him in this decision. Part of the reason for their decision was that moving would simply pass the problem on to the next detective and family, who would then be placed in danger.

In the aforementioned article, she had raised the concern about the removal of guarding. She had never said that they expected to be guarded, or that they insisted on being guarded by the then AGU. She was well aware that it was not the AGU’s mandate to guard, so they had never expected that the AGU would be the unit to undertake that. A communication was drafted from the Commander and the then police commissioner (PC), which stated that she, as a wife, ‘had unrealistic expectations from the unit and the AGU members had needed to be redeployed, and her husband, being on management, should have known better.’

This had ‘gutted’ her, as this was never her expectation from the AGU. The media article did not state that she had said that the AGU needed to guard the family. To respond to her and her late husband in that manner had been grossly unfair. Her request had been on behalf of her husband, who she felt had needed protection because of his job, and she had not said that the unit he was at needed to provide this service.

She had shared the 59-page document, which had been in the public domain for some time, with the Committee. Her husband had raised concerns about the Western Cape Crime Intelligence (CI) unit in late 2018 or early 2019. For years, they had experienced incidents of being tailed, being bugged, and having cars parked in front of their home. Her children had been followed. In the document, her husband had referred only to interference into his SAPS investigations, but it was never only that. The threats against her husband were never only against him, but their whole family. The members referred to by her husband in the 59-page document had followed her children.

She had attended the bail application case for the hand grenade attack on their home, and the whole ‘unit’ had been there -- for what? They all knew what the CI mandate was, and she still failed to understand what the reason could be. What concerned her was that the day those members came to court, was the day the accused came forth with some very strange allegations and information that they alleged against her husband. These had not come from the state’s side, but from the accused’s side. She commented: ‘How convenient that on this day, their rogue unit rocks up in court.’

The second question she had, and why she specifically referred to this document, was because Gen. [Peter] Jacobs [now suspended head of Crime Intelligence] had made a recommendation in 2019 that it was a ‘rogue’ unit, and therefore needed to be disbanded. To date nothing had happened. It had also surfaced that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) had decided not to prosecute for whatever reason, which had been taken on review. Was the reason the Kinnear family was being sidestepped in terms of a security assessment due to the ‘59 page document?’ Was this the reason why, even after the attempted hand grenade attack on their house, guarding was removed? Was it a matter of ‘sour grapes,’ that he had written a document that affected the very members who would need to see to their safety -- was this why they were just left out? What had been the criteria for an assessment?

Clearly, being victimised and harassed did not justify the recommendation for guarding her husband. She knew that it had been said that her husband did not want to give his cooperation, and she honestly wanted to ask ‘if anyone in this meeting would do it – knowing that that was how her late husband felt?’ He could not allow people that he did not trust to have access to information about the layout and security system of their private home. She also knew that he had reached out in trying to meet them halfway. Everybody knew there was an issue between him and the Western Cape CI office. It was not that he had not cooperated, and she begged to differ with the statements that he had ‘blankly refused to cooperate’ regarding the security assessment.

The very group of officers her husband had exposed in the document had been placed under guarding. Had they just been side-stepped as a result of the 59-page document? Who gave the instruction for the guarding to be removed? It had been mentioned in previous meetings that there had actually been no official authorisation to remove the guarding. Why was there no official authorisation?

She said they needed to hold one another accountable so as to ensure that it would not happen again. Her husband had been part of SAPS for 31 years, and ‘they were as blue as ever,’ It was grossly unfair that as a family, besides being robbed of a husband, that they had been robbed of family life, as they did not get assistance from the organisation he worked for. They had adapted to ensure the safety and anonymity of their children. For example, her husband used to watch their children’s soccer games through the fence so that no one made the connection between him and his children.

Protection should be an essential part of keeping someone alive -- why did it seem that it was reserved for certain people only? There were clear indications in the security policy as to when a threat analysis needed to be carried out. The policy also stated the process that needed to be undertaken for a threat analysis. Nothing like this had happened in the case of her family. She requested clarity regarding the reason why the guarding was removed, and whether this was due to the document produced by her late husband.

In the build-up to the assassination on 18 September 2020, her husband had been away on investigations earlier that month, and it became known that his phone was being tapped. It became clear that reports were drafted, documented and dropped at various offices, informing certain senior officials what was happening, yet between 3 and 18 September, nothing was done to ensure that safety precautions were in place. Was it a matter of complacency? Was it a matter that his name was on a hit-list every second day – that somebody thought. ‘ag, it’s just another list?’ Were there other reasons, or were the warning signs blatantly ignored?

Since then, many people had been blamed. It was public knowledge that Gen. Andre Lincoln [Western Cape AGU Head] and Gen. Jacobs were under disciplinary investigation. What about the others? In the Western Cape, as a detective, Gen. [Jeremy] Vearey [Western Cape Head of Detective Services] was her husband’s boss as Provincial Head. Gen. Vearey had publicly acknowledged that he was also on the same hit-list as her late husband. What had Gen. Vearey done to ensure that his detective, her husband, was kept safe? She realised why Gen. Jacobs, who was the National CI Head, was investigated – but what about the Provincial CI Head? She could not understand why they had jumped a level, and effectively missed out the provincial level. Where did the Provincial CI fit into all of this?

She reiterated her main questions. Firstly why was guarding removed? Secondly, why were no measures taken between 3 September and the actual assassination on 18 September 2020?

Discussion

Mr A Whitfield (DA) stated that the petition request from Mrs Kinnear was very straightforward and should not be complicated to answer. The Committee, the public and those living in the Western Cape within the SAPS deserved an honest and frank report from the National Police Commissioner and the Minister that answered the questions posed by Ms Kinnear in her petition. Why was protection removed from this family, given everything that was known and the consequences of the events that unfolded? He encouraged the Committee to keep the item at the top of their agenda because they needed to root out any possibility of ‘rotten’ elements in the SAPS, or any negligence that may place any other police officers at risk. This petition spoke to the core of what members of the public and the police service were concerned about.

Mr O Terblanche (DA) echoed Mr Whitfield’s sentiments. Ms Kinnear had been very clear about the points she wanted answers on. Given the facts, how was it possible that the police had reacted in the way that they did? It was known that Col.l Kinnear was a detective investigating gang-related issues and high-profile people. There had been an attempted murder against his life, and still the protection was removed. That was one of the questions that they needed answers to. Apparently, even the Minister gave assurances that clarity would be given on the withdrawal of protection, but the family had not received any feedback. The Committee needed to be informed about what happened in the meantime, in terms of the investigation. They needed to get regular updates. If they did not act correctly in this instance, what message were the Committee and the Police sending to other detectives that must enter the same ‘battleground.’

 

Dr P Groenewald (FF Plus) said that the way the situation had been handled was a victory for criminals. The Minister was on record as stating that criminals had more resources and money and used more sophisticated equipment when it came to crime. What planning had the police done in terms of protecting its members from gangs in the Western Cape? Part of the modus operandi of criminals was that they bribed certain people to ensure that they were successful. If there was not a successful prosecution in this case, it would be a huge victory for criminals. The Committee needed clear answers. To have two attacks in one month and have protection withdrawn after only a month, was not adequate. He asked the police not to use the excuse that ‘they could not reveal information as the case was under investigation.’ The Committee was not interested in the process as far as certain suspects were concerned. Why had the protection been withdrawn? Had there been an investigation into the withdrawal – were some people bribed by the gangsters?

Rev K Meshoe (ACDP) said it had been very insensitive of the police to state that Ms Kinnear had had ‘unrealistic expectations’ after having asked about security for her husband. When a family felt insecure or vulnerable, it was the duty of the police to bring comfort and assurance to the family, rather than to say they had ‘unrealistic expectations.’ If a wife thought that her husband, who was a detective and was doing a dangerous job, was vulnerable, she had the right to have said that. He failed to understand why she had been accused of having ‘unrealistic expectations.’

 

He understood why the Kinnear family felt that SAPS had failed them. He appreciated that Ms Kinnear had said that what had happened to their family should not happen to another family. The experience of the Kinnear family should not happen to another family. Life was precious, regardless of rank. Why was Gen. Vearey put under guarding as a result of being on the same hit-list as Col. Kinnear, when the Colonel was not? Gen.  Vearey was effectively Col. Kinnear’s boss, and he knew that the Colonel was on the same hit-list – why were no measures taken for the Colonel?

Mr Basson’s case had been solved only after he came and made a petition to Parliament. If he had not made a petition to the Committee, that case might not have been resolved. He suggested that there was considerable dissatisfaction with the way SAPS handled such cases, particularly the lack of communication and updates. SAPS was notorious for not giving feedback. It could not be defensive about failing to give proper feedback to people who had cases.

The Committee had been told that the AGU had protected the family for some time, which was not official. What had made AGU provide the guarding if the generals and National CI did not know about it? What procedures were followed before guarding was given to somebody under threat? Did Provincial Commissioners have the right to do that? When that took place, would they need to inform National or not? Did headquarters know about detectives on the hit-list? If they did not, it needed to be ensured that they did. Why had the AGU removed the guarding, particularly given that someone had come with a hand grenade while the family was under guarding? It raised suspicions.

His final question related to the threat analysis. At what stage was a threat analysis made? When it came to someone on a hit-list, was it not automatic? After hearing that Col. Kinnear was one of the best of the best, if one heard that the ‘best of the best’ was on a hit-list, why did one not do a threat analysis? He reiterated the questions asked by previous Members as to who was responsible for removing the guarding.

Ms P Faku (ANC) said there needed to be consequence management resulting from the removal of the guarding. Why was the protection removed from the Kinnear family home?

Mr K Maphatsoe (ANC) said that the Committee, as in the case of Mr Basson, would continue to follow through regarding the case of Col.  Kinnear. The events at the time showed that his life was under serious threat. The police should have taken it very seriously, because he was dealing with serious cases and had sacrificed his life serving the SAPS and the people of the country. If the same institution could not protect its own when the information was there, who was doing the analysis? Why was the protection removed immediately after the grenade attack? It raised serious questions. That was why the family felt so strongly that there were people involved from the SAPS side. The police had failed the family. Col. Kinnear was being tracked and they had targeted him outside his own home. The police had better tracking equipment and could have protected the Kinnears. There was poor security analysis and poor decision making in terms of the provision and removal of guarding.

The Chairperson said that the matter would not be concluded that day, but they would request that they were provided with regular updates on the matter. If the matter was placed on the agenda again, the family would be invited to attend the meeting. If it was directed to the Committee as an internal report, they would send the responses and the report to the family.

 

Mr H Shembeni (EFF) said he had made a point at a meeting the previous year regarding investigators that were killed, and what the Department was doing to address it. They had investigators in the Independent Projects Trust (IPT) who had been killed. If one made a follow-up, one would find that the murder was linked to the police officers being investigated.

 

In this case, the late Col. Kinnear was killed because something/someone was about to be exposed. It was not the gangs that killed him. Somebody did not do his job and was trying to protect himself or other people. This was a matter of exposing corruption in the SAPS. They were dealing with a ‘dirty’ Department, and they needed to clean it up to prevent such things happening regularly. They were being led by the ‘Mafias’ in the Department. Once people spoke out, they became a target. They had killed young constables, and information had come out that most of those who were killed were killed by SAPS’s own firearms. Some of the firearms were being taken from the SAP13 store to commit crimes, and were then being brought back. It was a trend that was used by the apartheid police, and it was being used presently. Until they dealt with the leadership in the SAPS, they would not be able to fight crime. They needed to first deal with SAPS. Competent and dedicated police were being ‘taken out,’ and the useless ones were being promoted through the ranks. He requested that the Minister and National Police Commissioner look into this issue.

SAPS response

Mr Bheki Cele, Minister of Police, said that the response would be led by the National Commissioner. The investigations into the death of the late Lt. Col. Kinnear were ongoing. There were additional matters that had been proposed going forward, many of which had been implemented. SAPS could provide updates to the family or to the Committee regarding the things that had been done to date, and the people who were under investigation.

He said the report from the Department had not been assessed by the Minister himself or the police management as yet. They had received the report the previous Friday night, and needed to go through it and then report back. The questions posed by the Committee and family would be answered once they had been put to those who had developed the report. There was a clear period leading up to the assassination of Colonel Kinnear. The ‘59 page document’ had been distributed to many people, so the timeframe of events would need to be looked at. He corrected himself, saying that he had actually received the document on the Saturday, having requested it on the Friday.

 

Gen Khehla Sitole, National Police Commissioner, said that as a preliminary introduction to their response, they had two legislative documents that dealt with this subject in the SAPS. Policy 3 of 2019, referred to as the SAPS Security Policy, outlined very clearly the procedure and responsibility when members of SAPS were under threat. Complementing this policy, they had the Police Safety Strategy, which was operationalising its Security Policy. The Police Safety Strategy was a strategy which held all provincial commissioners and divisional commissioners, including section commanders, accountable for its implementation.

In terms of Policy 3, every level was responsible for undertaking and exercising the necessary security measures to protect members when their lives were threatened. The policy and strategy applied to all SAPS members/employees, irrespective of the level. Commanders were responsible for taking the necessary steps to protect them. Paragraph nine of the policy talked to the threat assessment. Whenever there was a threat to members of the police force, a threat assessment process was commissioned. Paragraph 16 had deviations which suggested that the deployment, in respect of a threat, could be done preliminarily in responding to a situation. Under certain circumstances, a deviation could be motivated right up to the highest authorities. This could include the protection of family members who were not necessarily SAPS members.

Kinnear case

Maj Gen Leon Rabie, Head: Strategic Management, presented the timelines and events that had been taken into account in the investigation into the assassination of the late Col. Kinnear.

Kinnear Dossier: November 2018

-On 29 December 2018, Lt Col Kinnear submitted a formal complaint which included a number of allegations, including reference to dockets not adequately investigated, as well as a rogue unit operating in the Western Cape.

-On 18 January 2019, the Divisional Commissioner: Crime Intelligence formally informed the National Commissioner of aforementioned, who appointed a team of three Deputy National Commissioners to investigate the allegations in the dossier submitted. On conclusion of the preliminary investigations, the task team recommended that all allegations be formally investigated by Detective Service, Head Office.

-The Deputy National Commissioner: Crime Detection appointed Maj. Gen. Magson and a team of investigators to investigate a total of 29 dockets, which were ultimately referred to Court for a decision. The public had prosecutor declined to prosecute on all the dockets submitted for a decision.

 

Interim Protection – November to December 2019

-On 13 November 2019, a threat was identified involving four police officers, including the late Col. Kinnear.

-On 14 November 2019, Lt Col Kay, attached to the Provincial Firearms, Liquor and Second Hand Goods, was shot and killed.

-Following these two incidents, the Commander of the Western Cape Anti-Gang Unit had deployed an armoured vehicle and two members on a 24-hour basis to provide static protection at the residence of the Col. Kinnear. This arrangement stayed in place from 15 November 2019 to 13 December 2019.

-On 23 November 2019, a suspect was searched and arrested by the static protection capability at the home of Col. Kinnear for being in possession of a hand grenade.

-On 13 December 2019, a decision was taken to withdraw the static protection capability, based on the following:

 

1. The deployment was an interim measure to provide protection pending the outcome of a formal threat assessment by National Counter Intelligence.

2. The threat assessment was not finalised however, as a result of Lt Col Kinnear’s reluctance to cooperate with National Counter Intelligence. Consequently, the threat could not be confirmed at the time, resulting in the withdrawal of the static protection.

Threat and Risk Assessment

-The threat and risk assessment was initiated on 14 November 2019

-After several attempts to conduct the assessment, the assessor had met with Col. Kinnear on 11 March 2020 in Cape Town.

-Due to operational commitments, Col. Kinnear had requested that the assessment be postponed to a later stage.

-Subsequent to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions, the finalisation of the assessment was further delayed.

Actions initiated by Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI) - September 2020

-On 3 September, DPCI Gauteng received information of a potential threat against Col. Kinnear. The phones of both Maj Gen Lincoln and Col. Kinnear were regularly ‘pinged.’ An enquiry was opened in this regard. Maj Gen Lincoln was informed accordingly.

-On 4 September, Western Cape DPCI informed of illegal monitoring of senior officers attached to the Western Cape Anti-Gang Unit.

-On 7 September, the Provincial Head: DPCI, Gauteng, formally informed the National Head: DPCI and the Divisional Commissioner: Crime Intelligence, of the monitoring of the whereabouts of senior police officers attached to the Anti-Gang Unit in the Western Cape.

-On 8 September, the Provincial Head: DPCI, Gauteng, briefed the National Head: DPCI, on the pending threats that involved the above mentioned senior managers. The National Head: DPCI directed that the immediate commander of Col.  Kinnear be informed, which was done.

-On 9 September, a copy of the threat information note was hand delivered to the office of the Divisional Commissioner: Crime Intelligence.

 

Internal Investigation into the assassination

 -On 21 September, the National Commissioner appointed a Divisional Commissioner to conduct an internal investigation into the assassination of Col. Kinnear.

-The preliminary investigation was concluded on 6 October, and a recommendation was made that a more senior officer be appointed to investigate the matter further.

-On 16 October, the National Commissioner appointed a Deputy National Commissioner to investigate further.

-The departmental investigation was concluded on 17 November, including the following recommendations:

 

1. Disciplinary proceedings be initiated against identified senior officers;

2. An urgent intervention be initiated by the National Commissioner to restore order and stability in the Western Cape, facilitated by independent experts; and

3. Criminal investigations on other related matters be pursued.

 

Further responses

 

Gen Sitole went on to state that the internal processes were proceeding. They had taken note of the concerns raised by the Committee and family during the course of the meeting. They would ensure that the whole scope was covered. The disciplinary proceedings were based on one of the questions raised by the family about the withdrawal of protection. There was both a departmental and criminal process running. The first was being conducted by the Department for Infrastructure and Transport (DPTI), and the second by IPID.

Minister Cele stated that there were processes under way. They would review the reports and ensure the two central questions raised by Ms Kinnear were addressed. They needed to look at the build up from the point of the submission of the 59-page document up to the assassination, and not just from a week or two before the murder.

Discussion

The Chairperson said that although the matter would not be concluded that day, it would not be removed from the Committee’s priority list. She assured Ms Kinnear and her family that the Committee would hold the various members of the SAPS accountable. The Committee would exercise its oversight responsibility on this matter. If a matter was formally tabled before the Committee, the Committee was obligated to get to the bottom of it. She thanked Mrs Kinnear for coming to the Committee and her confidence that Parliament would attend to the matter. Her husband would not be forgotten. There would be justice for the late Colonel Kinnear.

 

Ms Kinnear thanked the Committee for the opportunity to present and expressed that her hope was that they would get to the bottom of it all. She hoped that there would be transparency to ensure that such occurrences did not happen in the future.

 

The Chairperson assured her that the Committee would update her with the reports they would received from SAPS. It would continue to follow-up on the matter as they were united in wanting answers.

 

Minutes adopted

She returned back to the matter of the minutes of the 8 May and 21 October 2020, read earlier in the meeting.

The minutes were accepted and adopted.

CSPS: Progress on Budget Review and Recommendation Report (BRRR)

Mr Alvin Rapea, Secretary: Civilian Secretariat for Police Service (CSPS) introduced the presentation on progress with the BRRR for the entity’s 2019/20 performance.

Ms Itumeleng Ledwaba-Moagi, Director: Strategic Management, CSPS, described the progress made relating to the recommendations made in November 2020. Specific attention had been given to filling vacancies before the end of the 2020/21 financial year, as well as COVID-19 prevention precautionary measures. Emphasis was also placed on the their response to the recommendation to conduct an audit of all Family Violence, Child Protection And Sexual Offences (FCS) units looking at capacity gaps, including human and material resources.

She gave details of the key observations from the Committee on the annual report and audited financial statements for 2019/20 on 24 November 2020. The Department had performed well, having achieved 86% of its predetermined objectives for 2019/20. There was an apparent misalignment between the Department’s allocated budget and its performance, given the history of underspending. It had received an unqualified audit opinion with no material findings on performance, but the Auditor- General of South Africa (AGSA) had identified matters of emphasis on material underspending, and material findings on internal control deficiencies. The Department had a high staff turnover rate in 2019/20, with a vacancy rate of 7.79%.

The Committee had recommended that:

-an investigation be launched into the irregular expenditure incurred by the Department and consequence management applied;

-the Civilian Secretariat fill all its vacancies before the end of the 2020/21 financial year;

-the Civilian Secretariat source additional funds for a public education campaign aimed at SAPS members, to reduce civil claims and compliance by the SAPS;

-the Department develop action plans to turn around the underperformance with respect to its performance targets;

-the Civilian Secretariat take all the necessary precautions for its staff and offices to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic;

-the Civilian Secretariat assist the leadership of the SAPS to exercise proper command and control with respect to police conduct;

-the Civilian Secretariat conduct an audit of all FCS units and provide a report on their capacity gaps, including human and material resources, and make the report available to the Committee;

-the Civilian Secretariat provide a detailed breakdown of all personal protective equipment (PPE) suppliers, their company directors and money spent for each PPE item;

-the Department implement all Internal Audit Unit recommendations;

-the Civilian Secretariat find ways and means to assist the SAPS to reduce civil claims against the police by looking at the root causes of civil claims.

In response to the recommendation that the Civilian Secretariat fill its vacancies before the end of the 2020/21 financial year, the retention policy had recently been approved in order to mitigate against attrition. The policy made provision for counter offers as part of the strategy to retain talent and reduce the vacancy rate. The major challenge was when there were resignations in the fourth quarter, as this offset the progress which would have been made during the year, and also made it difficult to mitigate within a short space of time.

 

In the third quarter, the Department had reached a 7% vacancy rate, but at the time of the report, the vacancy rate had regressed to 8.39%. As at January 2021, there were 13 vacancies, which had increased by three exits during this period. The adjusted level 3 lockdown and the instruction by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) to reduce the attendance of employees at the workplace to 50%, had exacerbated the slow pace of capturing applications, particularly due to the limited capacity in the human resources (HR) component.

The issue of capacity became more pronounced when filling lower level posts, since the Department received on average between 800 and 2 000 applications, with only three people to capture applications, while also dealing with other administrative functions of HR such as leave, the Performance Management and Development System (PMDS), overtime and other conditions of service.  As a drastic measure to reduce the backlogs the data capturers’ capacity was increased by four persons for a period of three months.  However, efforts were being made to fill at least four posts before the end of the financial year on 31 March, which was anticipated to bring the vacancy rate down to 7.10%.  

The CSPS had developed a talent management strategy and the recruitment, selection and retention strategy, with a concerted effort to promote internally in order to lift the morale of employees, to retain institutional knowledge and provide continuity. The unintended consequence of the implementation of these two strategies was that internal promotions did not have a positive impact on the reduction of the vacancy rate, since the promotions also left vacancies elsewhere in the Department.

The CSPS had implemented precautions for staff and offices to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Following the President’s announcement on the adjusted level 3 lockdown, the Department had reverted back to its COVID-19 level 3 lockdown workplace operational plan. The plan indicated that only 50% of the staff complement was allowed to be physically in the office at any given time, following approved routine schedules. Employees with co-morbidities continued to work remotely, in accordance with DPSA guidelines. As and when a COVID-19 case was identified, the offices were disinfected and deep cleansed, and those employees who may have come into contact with a COVID-19 case were advised to isolate and quarantine.  

To date, since the start of the pandemic, 14 cases had been identified, which was 9.7% of the staff complement, and 13 employees had recovered. The Department had experienced one death of a person who had tested positive, but had been cleared of COVID-19 before the death.

Following an audit of all FCS units to identify capacity gaps, a report on a sample of 36 FCS units had been compiled in the previous financial year, focusing on the implementation of the Sexual Offences and Related Matters Act. The report had provided a picture of the resource challenges at the visited units. A further audit of FCS units would be done in the 2021/22 financial year.

The 36 sampled units had a total of 526 detectives, which averaged out to about 15 detectives per unit. However some units (mainly rural) had fewer than 10 detectives. Ideally, a detective had to carry about 35 to 40 dockets at a time. However, the lowest number of dockets in the sampled units was 60, with the highest number being 135 at the time of audit. This pointed to a shortage in detectives at the units visited.

Forensic social workers (FSWs) were based at the provincial level, and serviced up to five units. This clearly indicated that there was a shortage of FSWs. Furthermore, there was a challenge that some were not able to speak some of the local languages, thus impacting on their work. The shortage of FSWs resulted in backlogs on assessments of cases involving children and people with disabilities.

Discussion on SAPS BRRR

The Chairperson said that the BRRR that she had asked SAPS to bring had been a response to what had been asked in the initial meetings the year before. SAPS had been asked to respond to the Committee’s recommendations and present the related progress to the Committee. The matters presented were not open for responses nor questions, as the presentation had responded to recommendations previously made by the Committee.

She requested that the Committee Members should not write questions directly to SAPS, but that questions, concerns or queries were directed to the Office of the Chairperson or the Office of the Committee Secretary. They had received complaints from SAPS that they were inundated with questions from Committee Members. Some of the questions were political, and the SAPS did not know how to respond to them. Therefore, her office would handle this and ensure that all Members received their respective responses.

They had previously requested that the crime statistics documents be presented to the Committee immediately after the press conference had taken place. Unfortunately, the information was not received immediately after the press conference, which had made it difficult for Members to respond to the statistics. There would be a presentation on the crime statistics the following week, at which the Members could interrogate the statistics. Crime statistics could not just be given in a press conference, as the Committee needed to exercise its oversight responsibility.

An oversight visit would take place that term, and complaints or concerns could be directed to the Chairperson. A strategic planning session was being planned for the Committee. It would be a physical session at which they would honour all the lockdown and COVID-19 regulations. She had requested that the staff assist her with the session so that they could do monitoring and evaluation of the Committee’s own work.

The Deputy Minister and the National Commissioner would visit the Central Firearm Registry (CFR) later that week. Once they had the report on the final Firearm Amnesty, she would schedule a meeting for the Committee so that it could be presented. Committee meetings would be held twice a week, one on a Tuesday to enable the Minister’s attendance.

Lastly an additional staff member had been allocated to the Committee, as its work had increased and they now had two meetings per week.

Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA) BRRR

Deputy Minister of Police, Mr Cassel Mathale, handed over to Mr Manabela Chauke, Chief Executive Officer (CEO): PSiRA who briefly introduced the report.

Dr Leah Mofomme, Chairperson: PSiRA Council, introduced the Council and management staff of PSiRA appointed by the Minister.

Mr Chauke presented PSiRA’s measures to strengthen compliance and enforcement, improve capacity, and deal with delays in investigations and the empowerment of small businesses. Measures to improve their relationship with SAPS and NPA were outlined.

Initiatives to strengthen compliance:

-Capacitating the Law Enforcement Department;

-Self-assessment compliance tools for security service providers;

-A memorandum of understanding (MoU) between PSiRA and the Department of Employment and Labour (DEL) was in progress;

-Increased consumer and industry campaigns;

-Promoting consumer accountability for services utilised;

-Introduction if incentives for complying security service providers; and

-Publication of non-complying security service providers

Initiatives to strengthen provincial industry compliance forums:

-Increased participation of all stakeholders to ensure a collaborative approach to regulation;

-MoUs with more relevant stakeholders – formalise relationships to ensure better co-operation;

-Promotion of compliance and enforcement through focused and targeted marketing campaigns;

-Review of the code of conduct to foster behaviour changes on security service provider

Initiatives to improve successful finalisation of criminal cases:

There was a revised memorandum of agreement (MoA) with SAPS in progress to focus on:

-Increased co-ordination of efforts at the national and provincial level;

-Sharing of information on cases investigated by both PSiRA and SAPS;

-Monitoring of criminal cases opened, and feedback on progress;

-Capacity workshops with NPA prosecutors on the PSiRA Act and requirements;

-Publication of enforcement successes and compliance achievements.

 

Initiatives to improve relationship:

 -A revised MoA between PSiRA and SAPS was in progress;

-Integration of the firearm register for all licensed service providers;

-An MoU at the national and provincial levels of NPA , to address the promotion of PSiRA’s mandate to prosecutors, the facilitation of prosecution outcomes, referral of dockets for decision by SAPS/PSiRA, and identifying capacity-building gaps for both stakeholders.

The Chairperson reiterated that the presentation responded to the questions they had previously asked and the recommendations they had made during the sessions on the BRRR reports. At that time, Members had noted that they did not have sufficient time to engage with the various units of the Department.

 

There was one outstanding matter relating to PSiRA, which the Minister and Deputy Minister had reported on. This was the PSiRA Bill, which was presently with the Presidency. The response they had received was that there were various clauses in the Bill that were obsolete. The Safety, Peace and Stability Inter-Ministerial Committee of Cabinet would look at the Bill, and once they had an update on the matter, she would inform the Committee.

The Chief Whip had indicated that on the last day of the oversight visit, a three-line whip was scheduled and all the Members would be expected in the House. The oversight visit would continue but would be shortened by a day.

Introduction of PSiRA Council of Governance

Mr Terblanche commented that Dr Mofomme, a former colleague of his, was now the Chairperson of PSiRA, and he was glad to see her back. He knew that she was a ‘very competent woman.’

 

The Chairperson was pleased that they had another woman on the Council. They had continuously asked that women representation increase across all units. She asked that the Council introduce themselves.

Dr Mofomme introduced the members of the PSiRA Council.

Mr Solomon Ralebipi, Deputy Chairperson, introduced himself.

Dr Sithembile Mbete, Council member, introduced herself. She was currently a senior lecturer at the University of Pretoria, and was honoured to be serving on the Council.

 

Mr Humphrey Ngubane and Ms Thandeka Ntshangase, Council members, introduced themselves.

 

Closing Remarks

 

The Chairperson thanked the PSiRA Council members, and congratulated the Deputy Minister on the balanced representation on the Council.

 

The last matter regarding the appointment of the members of the Critical Infrastructure Council was discussed. She said that members of the private sector had been invited to apply. The advert had been placed in all the newspapers. The secretary was asked to circulate the list of candidates who had applied to the Committee members. If the Committee was unhappy with the list of candidates and wanted to extend the date for applications, she would do so.

 

The meeting was adjourned.