Department of International Relations & Cooperation 1st Quarterly Report; Latest developments in Libya

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International Relations

16 August 2011
Chairperson: Mr T Magama (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

DIRCO presented its First Quarter expenditure report. The annual total appropriated budget allocation was R4.796 billion and the expenditure during first quarter was R749 million or 81,6% of the allotted amount. Programme 1: Administration had an under-spend of R71 million. There were rollover requests to National Treasury totalling R82.3 million. Expenditure on the Capital Budget for the First Quarter was R4.4 million. Projected expenditure was forecast at R42 million in the second quarter. Programme 2: International Relations had an appropriation for the first quarter of R628 million and it had an under-spend of R88 million. Programme 3: State Protocol & Public Diplomacy Services appropriation for the first quarter was R54.2 million and it had an under-spend of R5.6 million. Programme 4: International Transfers (which included membership fees to international organizations, subscriptions and transfers to the African Renaissance Fund) had an appropriation for the first quarter of R5.1 million and it had an over-spend of R100 000.

Committee members raised questions about the cost and accountability of foreign missions. Was it possible to obtain foreign mission accounts electronically to cut down on processing times? What was expected of state visits and what did South African delegations get in return during state visits? Where would African Renaissance Fund expenditure fall, in respect to the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency? Members suggested that the Committee should hold joint meeting with the Defence Committee on the issue of peacekeeping and international obligations.

DIRCO provided a briefing on the latest developments in Libya. Recently there had been a dramatic shift in favour of the rebels. The gradual advancement of the rebels suggested that there could be a major tipping point. South Africa was insistent that the military solution would not provide a durable political roadmap for Libya. On a number of occasions, it had been indicated by South African leadership that the African Union roadmap was the only way to resolve the conflict. South Africa had urged NATO to stop air strikes in order to create space for the political solution to take root. Key challenges facing Libya were imposing a ceasefire to end the war and monitoring of such ceasefire. It would be critical to disarm civilians and destroy armaments. The composition and formation of a transitional government would be another key question as would the drafting of a new constitution. To what extent would the execution of the International Criminal Court indictments contribute to peace? Or would the indictments undermine the process of national reconciliation and unity? To what extent would the non-execution of indictments encourage a sense of impunity in the political equation. The formation of a new national defence force that integrated all of the armed formations in the country and imposed a new professional doctrine in the military, was one of the key challenges facing a new administration.

Committee members raised question as to what were South Africa’s national interests in the Libyan crisis and what would South Africa’s role be going forward, post-Gaddafi? Was there a roadmap on the table in terms of an election and draft constitution? Members raised concern as to the ‘incoherence’ of South Africa’s foreign policy. The Chairperson stated that the Committee should engage with the White Paper on Foreign Policy in order have a common grounding on how South African foreign policy was conducted.


Meeting report

Department on progress with Delivery Outcome Agreement & Quarterly Report (April–June 2011)
Mr Asogan Moodley Deputy Director General: Corporate Services and CFO of DIRCO, stated the total appropriated budget allocation was R4.796 billion and the actual expenditure during the first quarter was R749 million, or 16% of the overall appropriation. This left a balance of R4.047 billion for the remaining three quarters. The expenditure represented an under-spend of R169 million or 81% of the R918 million appropriation for the 1st Quarter.

Programme 1: Administration had a total appropriation for the year of R1.245 billion. The appropriation for the first quarter was R230 million and the actual expenditure was R159 million, which represented and under-spend of R71 million, or 69.1% of the first quarter appropriation and 13% of the total appropriation. There were rollover requests to National Treasury totalling R82.3 million for capital projects that were not completed in the last financial year. In Washington, where there were problems with community participation in the renovation of the chancery and the official residence. In London, when DIRCO started with construction, asbestos was found in the existing buildings and the entire contract needed to be renegotiated as the asbestos needed to be removed under controlled conditions before proceeding with construction. In Abuja, environmental challenges delayed construction of and move to the new chancery. DIRCO was still waiting for approval from National Treasury on the request. Expenditure on the Capital Budget for the First Quarter was R4.4 million. Projects in Dar es Salaam and Lilongwe had progressed and the Department would continue with them in the current financial year. Projected expenditure was forecast at R42 million in the second quarter. DIRCO was involved in lease negotiations with the borough of London about the Deputy High Commissioner’s Residence at Cavendish Close and the Chancery, at Trafalgar Square. The decision had been taken to move out of the official residence in Geneva and opt out of the lease by invoking the diplomatic break clause. DIRCO decided that from a strategic perspective it was important to purchase property in Geneva due to the multilateral environment.

Programme 2: International Relations had a total appropriation for the year of R2.529 billion. The appropriation for the first quarter was R628 million and the actual expenditure was R540 million, which represented and under-spend of R88 million, or 86% of the first quarter appropriation and 21% of the total appropriation. The reason for the variance of monies not recorded as being spent was due the time delay in processing accounts from missions abroad.

Programme 3: State Protocol & Public Diplomacy Services had a total appropriation for the year of R211.5 million. The appropriation for the first quarter was R54.2 million and the actual expenditure was R44.6 million, which represented and under-spend of R5.6 million, or 82.3% of the first quarter appropriation and 21% of the total appropriation. The reason for the variance was that this programme also funded state visits abroad and expenditures incurred at missions. Once the mission accounts were processed at head office, the expenditure would increase.

Programme 4: International Transfers included membership fees to international organizations, subscriptions and transfers to the African Renaissance Fund. The total appropriation for the year was R809.9 million. The appropriation for the first quarter was R5.1 million and the actual expenditure was R5.2 million, which represented and over-spend of R100 00 - largely related to the amount of membership fees. A significant number of payments for subscription fees would occur in the fourth quarter. Payments to the UN organizations, the African Union, NEPAD and SADC would take place in January or February of 2012 and current spending reflected these intricacies.

Discussion
Mr K Mubu (DA) asked where would the African Renaissance Fund expenditure fall, in respect to the establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)? How much had been paid for African Renaissance Fund (ARF) projects? The briefing reflected payments to the Commonwealth, the UN and SADC; where were the disbursements to the African Union? What financial expenditures had been made to the Pan-African Parliament (PAP)? Was it possible to get foreign mission accounts electronically to cut down on processing times?

Mr M Booi (ANC) asked how much was spent on state visits and how many visits were allowed to take place per year? Regarding delays in foreign mission accounts, how would the Committee keep the Auditor General (AG) informed of the process and what implications would the delays have for the AG’s final audit report? What was expected of state visits and what did South African delegations get in return during state visits? For example a visit to Burundi would have only 20 people whereas a visit to China would have 400 people. How was DIRCO marketing itself in terms of a more aggressive approach towards Africa? How did DIRCO keep tabs on spending for UN peacekeeping missions? Did the UN repay South Africa for money spent?

Ms R Magau (ANC) asked if DIRCO ever performed a cost/benefit analysis and evaluated whether South Africa needed to affiliate and pay membership to all of those institutions? Or should the department prioritise as to which institutions were most beneficial? 

Ms W Newhoudt-Druchen (ANC) asked whether the costs for construction work were always within budget and did National Treasury allocate money specifically, if there were unexpected construction expenditure? Were DIRCO and the Department of Public Works (DPW) working together or were capital projects solely DIRCO’s responsibility?

Ms L Jacobus (ANC) asked whether the amount for state visits included incoming and outgoing funds? How were contributions from members of the Pan African Parliament going?

Mr S Mokgalapa (DA) asked whether the DIRCO had contemplated a review of foreign missions that were “just redundant.” He stated that the briefing did not reflect expenditure per mission. Part of the Committee’s oversight was to know what was occurring in the foreign missions. The only time the Committee heard of what was going on in the foreign missions was in the media - this put the Committee in a predicament. The Committee needed to know how accountable the foreign missions were, how much were they spending per mission and were their books in order? The Committee needed come to a point where it called for the review of the diplomatic value of each of the country’s foreign missions.

Mr Moodly replied that the Department could provide the Committee with the details on the expenditure for the ARF. Once SADPA was established, the assets and liabilities of the ARF would be transferred to SADPA.

The evaluation of disbursements to international organizations was done through the line function branch in consultation with the DG and the Minister. The DIRCO delegation would take the question of evaluating South African participation and membership in international organizations back to the Department and bring it to the attention of the DG and the Minister.

With regards to the Pan African Parliament, DPW was the lead department and they were managing the construction. DIRCO was not in a position to convince the National Treasury that funding for public participation in the environment for PAP was necessary. National Treasury was working with DPW on contributions on the construction of the Pan African Parliament. Last year we indicated that it would have been good to make a joint presentation with DPW to the Committee. With the Chairperson’s permission, DIRCO would encourage DPW to make a joint presentation to the Committee on the Pan African Parliament.

With regard to the documentation from foreign missions, DIRCO did indeed have an electronic cashbook system currently in the process of being rolled out to all missions. Once widely available, it would certainly improve the submission of accounts, and the cashbooks would be made available on a much quicker basis.

In response to the questions on state visits, all of these answers belonged to the Presidency. The number of state visits was determined by the President. The President himself had requested certain state visits on an urgent basis regarding the Middle East and North African countries. DIRCO had a program that it recommended to the Presidency; however the final decisions lay with the Presidency. DIRCO would engage with the Presidency and revert back to the Committee.

With regards to UN peacekeeping missions, Mr Moodley extended this question to Mr Nkosi, as he was the DDG for Africa Bilateral and would be able to provide an answer on UN involvement in peacekeeping missions.

DIRCO would take the question about international organizations and membership fees on board and would return to the Committee with that information after engaging with the DG and the Minister on the review of two things: 1) Membership to international organizations and 2) the question raised by Mr Mokgalapa about diplomatic missions abroad.

Mr Moodley noted the concern that a cost benefit analysis was an issue raised in the past and stated that it was a matter that would be brought to the attention of the DG and the Minister.

DIRCO dealt with construction for mission work in the budget by providing a limited amount of money for maintenance work. Regrettably with unforeseen costs, such as the asbestos problem in the London building, DIRCO would go back to Treasury and re-evaluate the costs that would be incurred. The work usually occurred over more than one financial year and DIRCO could engage Treasury as the work progressed.

The budget for state visits provided for both incoming and outgoing state visits. However outgoing state visits were much more expensive then incoming state visits.

With regards to the contribution of member states to the PAP, Mr Moodley said he would get information from the Africa Multilateral DDG Amb Kudjoe and would send the information to the Committee. All of South Africa’s membership contributions were up to date and in Ms Jacobus was correct that South Africa bore the “lion share” in terms of costing the PAP.

With regards to accountability and management, when DIRCO submitted its 2011 performance audit, it would add the spending budget per mission as well. Accountability oversights were done on a monthly basis. At least 30% of South African foreign missions were audited annually. For the 2010 financial year, the Auditor General visited 18 missions abroad and the internal audit unit would have audited another 20 missions. These missions were not audited on a cyclical basis, but rather selected at random.

Mr Peter Bolik, DIRCO Director of International Property Management, stated that in Washington, DIRCO was renting a temporary accommodation for two years, while the state owned facility was being renovated. The square footage of the temporary facility was 53,000 sq ft, at a monthly rental cost of just over $52,000 per month. Due to Washington’s importance as a security hub for the Americas, certain security and ICT measures needed to be applied and pushed up the cost. The Department expected to pay $250, 000 for these costs.

Mr Caifer Ramshay, DIRCO Director of Finance, said with regards to transfer payments, the AU did not appear on the report but DIRCO was up to date for payment for the 2011 financial year. The assessment for the AU would be received in January of 2012. South Africa contributed 15% of the budget of the AU. Contributions to the UN would be due towards the fourth quarter of the financial year.

Mr Booi asked if lack of information had caused an attitudinal problem and led to a question of ideology that Africa was not a priority? The Pan African Parliament was very important to strengthen democracy on the African continent. When would the electronic cashbooks system be ready? On the state visits issue, he was more interested in the costing and where the Departments money went. How much did it cost and what was the return?

Mr B Holomisa (UDM) jokingly stated that he wished to “give some advice in spirit of non interference”. He stated that DIRCO had a political head in the Department and some of the questions fielded should have been directed at her. At the beginning of the year the Committee should draw up a programme that said how many times the minister needed to appear in front of the Portfolio Committee so that the Minister could explain the rationale of some state visits, rather than summoning a delegation from the Office of the Presidency, who may be in the advanced stages of planning a visit. Concerning peacekeeping, he suggested that there be a joint session with the Defence Committee.

The Chairperson stated that having joint meeting with the Defence Committee on peacekeeping and international obligations in that respect was a good suggestion. He clarified that South Africa was a member of PAP as the parliament of the Republic of South Africa and as such paid membership in this capacity.

Mr Moodley replied that Africa was indeed a DIRCO priority. The electronic cashbook system would be finalized by the end of the financial year, as there were only 18 missions outstanding. On the cost of state visits, he suggested that DIRCO should take these questions to the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Presidency, as the makeup of the business delegations lay with the Office of the Presidency. The Office of the Presidency would be able to answer questions on returns on investment and the “nuts and bolts matters”. DIRCO pays for the cost of the President, his advisors and the protocol accompaniment; the business delegations generally covered their own costs when accompanying the President abroad. Mr Moodley suggested that after the DG and the COO of the Presidency meet the costing information could be tabulated into a schedule document and presented to the Committee to compile into document

Mr Booi asked whether Treasury would agree to the rollover requests of R82.3 million and what would be the determining factor?  

Mr Moodley replied that DIRCO had the discussion with the Treasury quite early in March of 2011. Generally, Treasury would not consider a rollover if it was within the control of the department to prevent the rollover. All of the factors in London, Washington and Abuja were outside of DIRCO’s control when this was explained to National Treasury. There was a comfort that the reasons provided were valid and there was no indication that Treasury would not approve the request

The Chairperson noted that during the budget votes, the Committee indicated that it would be more stringent on the Department in terms of spending especially for the foreign missions. He was glad to hear that there was progress on the electronic cashbooks issue but stressed that there needed to be a sense of urgency. When this information was provided, DIRCO must also inform the Committee which missions were outstanding and when the missions would be completed by, so that the Committee could see the progress.

Briefing on the Latest Developments in Libya
Mr Mxolisi Nkosi, DDG for Africa Bilateral, stated that Libya was a moving target, and what was presented in the document could be overtaken by current events. Armed groups were less than 40 km away from Tripoli and the rebellion had progressed. Recently there had been a dramatic shift in the favour of the rebels. The rebels had been assisted by the heavy NATO bombardment. In terms of a solution, the situation was a stalemate, however gradually the advancement of the rebels suggested that there could be a major tipping point in the next few weeks. South Africa was insistent that the military solution would not provide a durable political roadmap for Libya. As a country, South Africa must ensure that the AU’s political roadmap gains traction and becomes the “only game in town”.

The landscape of the conflict had shifted dramatically. Initially the focus was on the protection of civilians but NATO had gone beyond the letter and spirit of resolution 1973 of the Security Council, and forged ahead with a regime change agenda. Air strikes had not been focusing on military targets alone but had been targeting Gaddafi. DIRCO had raised concerns about the humanitarian situation. Increasingly the cut in supply lines had led to severe shortages in basic necessities such as food, medicines and fuel. This was a serious cause for concern. There were no signs of a ceasefire as both sides continued to clash. The rebels currently occupied the entire east of country and had cut the government’s supply routes between Tripoli and neighbouring Tunisia.

The sanctions imposed within the framework of UN Security Council resolution 1970 had had an impact on the regime in Tripoli. Following the adoption of this resolution the ICC had done a preliminary investigation and came to the conclusion that there was the basis and evidence to lay charges against certain individuals for acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. Warrants had been issued for the Libyan leader, the Chief of Intelligence and the elder son of Col Gaddafi. Informal talks continued about a possible negotiated solution but no proposals had received the support of the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi.

Large-scale defections of senior members of the Libyan government continued. South African leaders had raised concerns about NATO, whose acts had amounted to a serious disregard and marginalisation of the AU. On a number of occasions, the South African leadership had indicated that the AU roadmap was the only way to resolve the conflict. South Africa had urged NATO to stop air strikes in order to create space for a political solution to take root. Lately there had been a spike in the expulsion of Libyan diplomats from some capitals. Most recently in the UK and Canada. Both countries had indicated that they recognized the TNC and urged the TNC to open offices in London and Ottawa. The number of countries recognizing the TNC had increased.

The security situation remained volatile. Libyan air defences had been neutralised. Reports were that some countries were arming the rebels; the French had indicated publicly that they had dropped arms in Libya. This was a serious breach of Security Council Resolution 1970 around the arms embargo.

The economy had understandably ground to a halt in the country because Libya was a “theatre of war”. This had dried up export revenues and driven up the cost of oil due to the shortages in the global supply amid soaring demand. Libya used to produce 1.8 million barrels of oil per day. There had been a serious reduction in the oil supply from Libya to the global pool, especially in emerging markets. There was also a serious shortage of essential supplies. The US may unfreeze some of the funds and the Dutch had released humanitarian funds to the World Health Organization. The TNC had pleaded for the release of funds in order to fund the fledgling Benghazi administration.

Key challenges facing Libya were imposing a ceasefire to end the war and monitoring such a ceasefire. It would be critical to disarm civilians and destroy armaments. The role and position of Col Gaddafi would have to be decided on. The possible scenarios included a fight to the death, exile, or Gaddafi being arrested. If Gaddafi were handed over to Den Hague, his would be a highly charged political trial. The composition and formation of a transitional government would be another key question. Libya was a “clan-based society” - there had never been a sense of government administration and the veil had been lifted on a highly divided clan-based society.
How would a representative transitional government be composed in view of the extent and fragmentation of the society? Libya had never had a constitution since 1969; therefore, the drafting of a new constitution was a key question. To what extent would the execution of the ICC indictments contribute to peace? Or would the indictments undermine the process of national reconciliation and unity? To what extent would the non-execution of indictments encourage a sense of impunity in the political equation? Libya had never had a professional army, but rather had a personal army that paid its allegiance to an individual. The formation of a new national defence force that integrated all of the armed formations in the country and imposed a new professional doctrine in the military was one of the key challenges facing a new administration.

Discussion
Mr Booi (ANC) asked what was South Africa’s strategy? Did DIRCO have a sustainable strategy? Would South Africa’s influence be apparent in the UN, or was the “Mandela Aura gone?” What was South Africa focused on in order to stabilize Libya and what was achievable?

Mr Holomisa (UDM) stated that the truth of the matter was that “we were trying to recapture a lost ground”. It was clear that the AU strategy was hijacked and the image of South Africa’s foreign policy had since been a subject of debate. He envisioned a situation where after NATO and the rebels captured Tripoli, the AU would be used as a “mopping up institution”. South Africa needed to take a tactical withdrawal in this exercise and ask where did South Africa see itself after Gaddafi falls. Zuma was snubbed in Russia when he went to see the Secretary General of NATO and sell the idea of the AU’s resolution. “It looked like they just showed him the middle finger.”  South Africa was being seen as a “laughingstock”. In the post-conflict reconstruction stage, South Africa would be expected to use its resources without compensation and this was unacceptable. The sooner DIRCO engaged the Parliament regarding the post-Gaddafi period the better. What resources did South Africa gain in Libya in terms of trade?

Ms Jacobus (ANC) asked whether there was a Roadmap on the table in terms of an election and draft constitution. When Gaddafi stated that he would not agree to partake in negotiations, was he talking about himself as an individual, his family or was he talking about state institutions?

Ms Newhoudt-Druchen (ANC) stated that she hoped lesson could be learned from this situation. In the newspapers there had been talk of a “King of Kings”. How did some countries entertain the issue of a “King of Kings?” As a country, we should not accept these types of terms. What were the Libyan civilians on the ground doing internally about peace and what were they pushing for?

Mr Mokgalapa (DA) stated that this was a classic example of the incoherence of South Africa’s foreign policy. What were our national interest in terms of Libya and what was the end game in terms of South Africa’s role? The TNC had rejected the AU framework, and South Africa was a champion of the AU framework. What would be South Africa’s role post Gaddafi? He stated that there were “no permanent friends, only permanent interests”.

Mr S Ngonyama (COPE) stated that in this situation there was not a single leader or one structure who could come up with a solutions right now. The Committee needed to “put on its thinking cap” and understand its role to come up with a foreign policy that was all embracing and non-partisan. What needed to be in the forefront of the agenda was the national interest. It was important that South Africa located itself within space that managed to consolidate its integrity and dignity. It must locate within the AU space because as a country on its own South Africa would not make any impact.  Within the continent let South Africa not locate itself within the leaders, but within the people of the continent. This was where the future of South Africa lay. South Africa needed to take civil society and intelligentsia on the continent seriously. South Africa needed to put the national interest in the forefront. If South Africa did not put its national interest at the forefront, then it would “end up being Libya tomorrow”. South Africa should not assume that it was too strong. What was the strategy that informed South Africa’s position going forward?

Mr Mxolisi Nkosi, DDG for Africa Bilateral, stated that Libya was a difficult foreign policy matter. He agreed with the statements on the primacy of the national interest, as it went without saying.

In response to the question of South Africa’s position in relation to the AU, since the onset of the Libyan crisis South Africa’s first statement called for dialogue. South Africa made a clear statement that the Libyan government needed to respect and give effect to the will of the Libyan people. This was before the passage of resolution 1973 and before the hostility. The AU set up a high level Ad-Hoc Committee charged to deal with the Libyan crisis, which included the heads of state of Mauritania, Uganda, Congo-Brazzaville and Mali. South Africa had playing a very prominent role in that Committee and had been very visible in doing shuttle diplomacy to try and find a solution. This had raised South Africa’s profile in conflict resolution and mediation of disputes and placed South Africa on a high pedestal in terms of international diplomacy. This was beginning to pay off because the bellicose rhetoric from the West had toned down and NATO was now factoring in a political solution. Increasingly there was trend that South Africa’s position was gaining traction by those who initially were “hell bent” on a military solution. Where the difference remained was about Gaddafi himself. The AU wanted him to ‘step aside’ whereas NATO wanted him to ‘step down’. The military solution alone did not guarantee a durable peace and any post-Gaddafi scenario needed to be predicated on a political solution. This was a major point for South Africa as all actors had coalesced around the AU position, which effectively was South Africa’s position.

Mr Nkosi stated that questions on whether South Africa’s influence was waning should be left for another discussion, as he was only a ‘humble civil servant’ and politicians could respond to some of these politically charged issues.

Trade benefits with Libya were negligible. After Mandela negotiated the Lockerbie issue there were signs of a potential increase in trade, but this tapered down because bigger powers took advantage and benefitted more from the Madiba mediation efforts around the Lockerbie issue. Companies like Green Acre and AfriCon that moved into Tripoli withdrew their investments due to a “hostile investment climate”.

Mr Nkosi took note of member comments on the 1973 resolution but would not discuss that. Questions on whether South Africa would recognize the new administration would be answered once the new administration was established. This was political decision and the appropriate political offices would pronounce on this matter at the appropriate time.

He agreed that post-Gaddafi scenarios should be examined and what they meant for South Africa. This work has already begun but needed to be based on realities on the ground as opposed to speculation. The Department was considering withdrawing its people in Tripoli due to heightened levels of insecurity. This would make it difficult to understand the realities on the ground.

NATO was listening to President Zuma now more than they did three to four months ago as they were sending enjoys to meet with President Zuma. This was an encouraging sign that they were taking South Africa’s views seriously. Increasingly there was a realisation that “you cannot talk about a solution to the Libyan problem without talking to South Africa”.

Libya was a petro-state that had not diversified. The only trade interest that South Africa had was in energy. The long-term goal was to move away from oil imports from the Arab world to the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa for crude oil supplies. In particular, countries like Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola would be critical.

There was a road map to negotiations and it included the elements of transitional arrangements, a constitutional making process, elections and the installation of a new government. First there needed be a process of national reconciliation dealing with the integration of combatants into civilian life or national defence.

When Gaddafi spoke of not negotiating, he was referring to himself and his family but not his clan. Since Libya was a clan-based society, all clans needed to have a stake in the government’s future. In order to avoid future ethnic clan based fault lines.

Mr Nkosi agreed with the ‘King of Kings’ comment and reiterated that efforts should be people-centred and needed to embrace people-based approaches to socio-economic issues.

Unfortunately the views and the call of the Libyan people was aborted by the transition of what initially began as a popular peaceful uprising and gravitated into an armed conflict. Once the armed conflict began, it was difficult to gauge the extent of popular dissent. If Gaddafi had not given orders for his soldiers to fire at people, his regime would have collapsed by now.

The AU had pronounced on the ICC warrant that its timing was rather auspicious. It came at a time when the AU was forging ahead with the political process in Libya. The AU called on member states not to execute the warrant and AU countries had resolved that they would not honour the warrant. However, 33 African countries (including South Africa) did sign the document because there were obligations in terms of international law regarding the Rome Statute. Parliament had not just ratified, but had also domesticated the Rome Statute by passing a law that compelled the law enforcement agencies to execute a warrant issued by the ICC.

DIRCO would engage with the Committee on these matters on an ongoing basis to seek guidance on how to inform the Department’s approach.

Mr Holomisa stated that something in the discourse was lacking at a political level. He advised ANC Committee members, as a ruling party, to revise the study group with the Minister of International Relations. Because some of the answers that the Committee was getting should have been briefed by the Committee Chairperson. If the Minister cannot brief her own study group colleagues in the Portfolio Committee, progress would be slow.

The Chairperson replied that Mr Holomisa should not discuss the study group as he was not privy to what was discussed. He closed by thanking Mr Nkosi and stating that what was said served to confirm the position that there needed to be a political solution. It was important that DIRCO be clear about a post-Gaddafi era. It was of no use to debate resolution 1973, because that issue was finished. As political parties, there would always be disagreements however the view of the ANC was that this was the correct decision based on the principle that South Africa espouses as a country and due to the constitutional imperatives and values that country holds dear. There was an abuse of trust on behalf of the other members of the UN Security Council. As a matter of urgency South Africa needed to step up the efforts to pursue the reform of the UN. Unless there was a shift in the balance of power in terms of how the system worked in the UN, these kinds of problems would continue. South Africa needed to apply its mind in terms of post-Gaddafi. It was a foregone conclusion that Gaddafi’s regime would fall. The Chairperson stated that as a Committee it needed to engage with the White Paper on Foreign Policy. Issues raised by the Committee members were not issues of tactics but more of strategy and positioning. These issues were broadly encapsulated in the White Paper on Foreign Policy. Since it was a public document it was important that the Department make it available to the Committee. In order to for members to familiarize themselves with the content. This would give Committee members a common ground as to how foreign policy was conducted.

The Chairperson closed the meeting.

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